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ABSTRACT 
Tracing Memory: Representation and the Auschwitz Experience 
in Charlotte Delbo's Auschwitz et Apres 
by Heidi Grunebaum-Ralph 
This study aims to examine the ways in which memory is 
represented in Auschwitz survivor, Charlotte Delbo's 
literary trilogy, Auschwitz et Apres, (Auschwitz and After) 
(1970a;1970b;1971). Its examination of memory is premised 
on the understanding of survivor narrative as testimonial 
narrative and testimony as the telling of the memory of 
historical events which strain or exceed conventional 
frameworks of representation. As such, the aim of this 
study is to demonstrate the way that representations of 
memory of a limit-experience problematise the certainty of 
its own testimonial transmission. By attempting to 
theorise the dynamics of narrating personal memory and then 
by analysing key extracts in each volume of the trilogy, 
this examination attempts to demonstrate how the event of 
the Holocaust, the difficulty of being a survivor and an 
unwilling reception of the survivor's story are 
collectively implicated in the way that memory contests its 
own representation. By examining the discontinuities of 
memory, this study intends to show how, in very different 
ways, the silences and ruptures of memory which are 
produced in these readings are a remembering of a different 
form. 
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Ce livre n'est pas un document historique. Si 
la notion de hasard (comme la plupart des 
notions) ne paraissait pas absurde a ]'auteur, 
il dirait volontiers que toute reference a une 
epoque, un territoire OU une ethnie determines 
est fortuite. Les evenements relates 
pourraient surgir en tout lieu et en tout temps 
d~n-: l 'rune de n, importe quel homme, planete, 
mineral ... 
(Piotr Rawicz Le Sang de Ciel) 
Pas de mot, pas de terme, le langage cesse, je 
ne me suis pas retourne, derobe soudain a ma 
vue, soudain si pleinement absent, toi, si 
totalement dissipes, eux, evapores, Lui, Elle, 
annihile, moi, de la rarefaction de vide, de la 
quintessence de neant, m'avanqant vers le fond 
sans fond du non-etre, rien, plus rien, plus 
rien de rien, frappe brutalement, brusquement, 
a hurler, par ce 
silence 
(Serge Doubrovsky La Dispersion, p.333) 
Textes qui nous apprennent (sans que cela fasse 
l'objet d'un enseignement) a nous souvenir de 
ce qui desormais doit faire le fond de notre 
memoire, a tOUS 1 jeunes OU Vieux, juifs OU non-
juifs [sic] , si cette cassure insensee de 
1 'espece humaine en deux peu t, apres Auschwitz, 
encore faire sens. Cassure voulue par les 
antisemites et les nazis pour qui le juif 
signifie la repulsion, l'Autre dans toute son 
horreur, [ ... ], expulse, exile, extermine. 
(Sarah Kofman, Paroles Suffoquees, p.14 J 
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FOREWORD 
La fragmentation, marque d'une coherence d'autant plus ferme qu'il lui faudrait 
se defaire pour s'atteindre, non par un systeme disperse, ni la dispersion comme 
systeme; mais la mise en pieces (le dechirement) de ce qui n'a jamais preexiste 
(reellement ou idealementl comme ensemble, ni davanta~e ne pourra se rassembler 
dans quelque presence d'avenir que ce soit. L'espacement d'une temporalisation 
qui ne se saisit - fallacieusement - que comme absence de temps. 
(Maurice Blancbot L'Ecriture du Desastre, p.99) 
In an essay entitled "The Holocaust as Literary 
inspiration", well-known writer Eli Wiesel, Auschwitz 
survivor, makes the observation that memory's intervention 
in contemporary public discourse is in the form of the 
testimonial utterance. Implicit in his formulation is the 
idea that if memory gestures to the past, its articulation 
is in service of a particular vision of the future. Thus, 
he comments that, 
[ ••• J the Greeks invented tragedy, the 
Romans the epistle, and the 
Renaissance the sonnet, our generation 
invented a new literature, that of 
testimony. We have all been witnesses 
and we all feel we have to bear 
testimony for the future. {Felman & 
Laub,1992:5-6) 
Clearly then, Wiesel implies that after the Holocaust the 
discursive gesture becomes the testimonial. At the centre 
of this proposition is a break with traditional generic 
categorisations, precisely as testimonial response to that 
event, the Holocaust, which has precipated the rupture. 
Taking up Wiesel's formulation of testimony as 
innovative literary form, literary critic Shoshana Felman 
outlines what is at stake in such a formulation: 
As a relation to events, 
seems to be composed of 
pieces of a memory that 






not settled into understanding or 
acts that cannot be 
as knowledge nor 
remembrance, 
constructed 
assimilated into full cognition, 
events in excess of our frames of 
reference. (1992:5) 
Thus, as a discursive form, testimony comes to narrate 
memory's "bits and pieces", that is, its truth emerges in 
its representation of the shards of memory of an 
experience-at-the-limits. 
The aim of the present study is to examine these 
shards, the remnants of memory which are represented in 
Holocaust survivor narrative. What emerges in the course 
of this study is, however, an interrogation of the ways 
that these texts, testimonial narrative par excellence, 
come to reveal self-doubt, confusion and silence regarding 
their own status as testimony. Fundamental to the 
historical truth-claim of the survivor's text is his/her 
immediacy to the event, as eye-witness. Yet the narration 
of memory in the wake of literally un-believable trauma 
often proceeds in ways which paradoxically subvert the 
grounds of the survivor's claims to credibility and 
veracity. Through the examination of the ways in which 
memory is represented in Auschwitz survi var, Charlotte 
Delbo's trilogy, entitled Auschwitz et Apres, (Auschwitz 
and After) (1970a; 1970b; 1971), this study aims to 
demonstrate that such expressions of hesitation and doubt 
strain at the very cognitive limits which threaten to 
explode even the narrative framework of testimony. If 
testimonial narrative presents the fragments of memory as 
witness to a historical event that has literally defied 
imagination, then the silences and discontinuities which 
conversely emerge through that narration problematise the 
grounds of their own production. 
Forgetting what is remembered is as much a question of 
reception, of the addressee's reading and assimilating 
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testimony, as it is a question of representation. The 
trilogy which will be examined, comprising of three volumes 
successively entitled Aucun de nous ne reviendra (None of 
us will return) , Une Connaissance inutile (A Useless 
Knowledge) and Mesure de nos jours (Mesure of our days) 
reveal, in very different ways, that the silences and 
ruptures of memory, are precisely a remembering of a 
different form. Literary critic, George Steiner addresses 
this difference when he argues in his gloss of French 
philosopher Henri Lefebvre's theorisations of 
speech/silence that 11 [s] ilence has 'another speech than 
ordinary saying', (un autre Dire que le dire ordinaire), 
but it is meaningful speech nevertheless." 
(Steiner,1969:75) 
An essential insight into the way tha~ the addressee 
is implicated in the cognitive reception and assimilation 
of the events of the Holocaust is offered by Claude Lanzman 
in his description of his first meeting with eye-witness 
survivors. In his research which led up to the making of 
his film on the Holocaust, Shoah, he recounts how after 
consulting archives, books, journals, in short, all sources 
of scholarship which would provide him with a scholarly 
foundation he finally approached the survi vars only to 
discover that, 
{ ... Jil y avait un decalage absolu 
entre le savoir livresque que j'avais 
acquis et ce que me racontaient ces 
gens. Je ne comprenais plus rien. Il 
y avait d'abord la difficulte de les 
faire parler. Non qu'ils refusent de 
parler. Quelques-uns sont fous et 
incapables de rien transmettre. Mais 
ils avaient vecu des experiences 
tellement limites qu'ils ne pouvaient 
pas les communiquer. La premiere fois 
que j'ai vu Srebnik, le survivant de 
Chelmno { ... ]I il m'a fait un recit 
d'une confusion extraordinaire, auquel 
je n'ai rien compris. Il avait 
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tellement vecu dans 1 'horreur qu 'il 
etai t ecrase. (In an interview with 
Lanzmann in Chevrie et le 
Roux,1990:294) 
[ ... ] there was an absolute breach 
between the knowledge from the books 
which I had acquired and what these 
people were telling me. I no longer 
understood anything. There was the 
initial difficulty of making them 
speak. Not that they refused to 
speak. Some of them were mad and 
incapable of communicating anything. 
But they had lived such limit 
experiences that they were unable to 
communicate them. The first time that 
I saw Srebnik, the survivor from 
Chelmno [ ... ], he told me a story of 
extreme confusion of which I 
understood nothing. He had lived so 
much in the horror that he was wiped 
out . 1 
It is this decalage absolu (absolute breach) between the 
11 incredible" story of the survivor, which; outside of the 
cognitive structures of reason appears to be a story of 
11 madness 11 , of "confusion" and of non-sense and its 
historical assimilation through the confining limits of 
representational resources which frame reliable historical 
narratives. (White, 1978; Friedlander,1993) 
Between totalising historical accounts of the past, 
individual expressions of memory and collective 
commemorative gestures, the survivor's narration is often 
appropriated as an underpinning to a cultural, theological, 
or nationalistic grand-narrative of Memory (and in some 
cases, competing Memories). (Bedarida, 1993) This 
examination of the textual representation of memory aims, 
however, to analyse the expressions of silence, of 
disbelief, of discontinuity which reside within and between 
1 My translation of the extract from the interview with 
Lanzmann. 
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the "bits and pieces" of memory as a necessarily 
supplementary reading to the historical truths produced in 
responsible, if hegemonic, histories of the Holocaust. 
Its supplementarity resides in its retrieval of silenced 
voices, the unlistened to stories of the "mad", 11 confused 11 
memories which remain in the caesura of catastrophe. As 
such, the examination of memory which I have outlined 
intends to study the 11 forms of discontinuity" (Todorov, 
1994:171) which are presented in Holocaust survivor 
narrative. 
The first section of Chapter One offers a brief 
biographical background to Charlotte Delbo, before 
proceeding, in the second section, to examine the title of 
the trilogy, Auschwitz et Apres, and how it is implicated 
in a historical trajectory of theoretical debates which 
surround the study of the Holocaust. This examination 
articulates, by way of demonstration, the interdisciplinary 
underpinnings which inform this study's frames of 
analytical reference. The third section of this chapter 
sets up a theorisation of memory, based on a short essay 
written by Delbo. This theorisation examines the 
f unctionings of personal memory as embodied memories which 
are at the centre of all narrative representations of 
Holocaust survivor testimony. In this setting out of the 
processes of the personal memory of the survivor, the body 
is revealed as an important symbolic and referential 
presence which becomes central to thinking through the 
processes and narration of memory. 
Chapter Two examines the Aucun de nous ne Reviendra, 
the first volume of Delbo's trilogy as a setting out of an 
aesthetic programme for the representation of Holocaust 
memory. The first section examines how the crisis which 
the Holocaust presents to its representation is symptomatic 
of a fundamental impasse located in the survivor's 
simultaneous inability to speak and her/his need to speak, 
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to bear witness. The dynamics of this impasse is explored 
with reference to Gregory Bateson's theory of the double-
bind (1956} and the way that this explanatory framework 
operates as a mechanism which produces silences and 
disruptions within the narration itself. The second 
section of this chapter explores the tropes of these 
silences as they are produced in the narration of the 
Auschwitz experience in Delbo's texts which highlight, in 
turn, the radical alienation of the individual in the camps 
and the way in which language becomes implicated as an 
agency of the dehumanisation process and its 
representations. 
My analysis of the second volume, Une Connaissance 
Inutile, in Chapter Three, examines the way that Delbo's 
text refers to a literary corpus of poetic and dramatic 
texts, a national literary tradition. In this way, I 
proceed, in the first section of this chapter, to determine 
how the engagement of these "canonised" texts with Delbo's 
narration of the concentration-camp experience, reflects 
the way that the literary text becomes implicated in the 
historicisation, as rupture, of the historical event which 
it narrates. The second section of this chapter examines 
the way that representations of text, literary, 
dramatic, poetic, topographic and enumerative - as an aid 
to memory, become a trope of memory and of oral 
memorisation. This, in turn, offers some insight into what 
constitutes emotional and psychological resistance in the 
concentration camp. 
Mesure de nos jours, the final volume of the trilogy, 
is the subject of examinination in Chapter Four. The first 
section of this chapter focuses the signification of "after 
Auschwitz" on the individuals who survive, return and 
struggle to find meaning "after Auschwitz" in a world that 
of ten cannot acknowledge their return nor listen to their 
stories. · These survivor' s are represented as those "mad 11 
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and 11 confused" voices, referred to by Lanzmann, which are 
banished to the margins of collective memory. The second 
section examines the tropes which are employed in 
representing the experience of the discontinuity of return 
and survival as a radical ontological alienation, which, as 
we shall see, calls into question many conceptual 
assumptions which are central to contemporary theorisations 
of survivor testimony. 
The theoretical framework which informs this study is 
necessarily interdisciplinary. Literary, historical, 
historiographic, philosophical and psychoanalytical sources 
are consulted and critiqued through their enga9ement with 
the primary texts. In this way, interdisciplinarity 
functions as way of making-visible the materiality of 
theoretical approaches to Holocaust and genocide studies 
and, by extension, the possible limitations of these 
• 
positions. 
The engagement of this study with different 
disciplines is clearly reflected in its presentation of and 
participation in academic and cultural debates around the 
Holocaust. It should be noted that in order to effectively 
reflect the way that Charlotte Delbo's texts reveal what is 
at stake in her representation of Holocaust memory, my own 
methodological strategy has been purposefully to avoid 
resolution. Although I examine what is revealed through 
the problematisation of the generic categorisation of 
Delbo's texts and through the question of historical 
authenticity of her texts I do not attempt to resolve these 
questions. My contention is that resistance to generic 
categorisation of fictional or imaginative literature 
written by a survivor, bears witness to the extent of the 
dilemma that the Holocaust presents to representation, to 
assimilation. As such, this would constitute a historical 
truth in and of itself. 
The Holocaust has come to be referred to in many 
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different terms. Once again the very terms which name the 
events are problematised, anticipating difficulty in 
speaking about, remembering and representing the Holocaust. 
In order to reflect the interpretative strategy of my 
textual analyses which, in their examination of fragments, 
silences, discontinuities and ruptures, aim rather to raise 
questions and to open the texts up to further readings, I 
alternatively employ the terms Shoah, Holocaust, Lager, 
Auschwitz as well as the Auschwitz experience. 
It is hardly coincidental that this question of 
nameability of the Shoah is directly linked to the question 
of "knowing 11 , as historical, those events. Charlotte Delbo 
frames the theoretical questions relating to the 
knowability of an event situated at the faul tlines of 
representation as a question of language. Embedding the 
notions of knowability and nameability in the possibility 
of surviving trauma and then recalling it, she writes, 11 Je 
reviens I d'au dela de la connaissance I il faut maintenant 
desapprendre je vois bien qu'autrement / je ne pourrais 
plus vivre. 11 (1970b:l91) 2 (I have returned from a place 
beyond knowing/knowledge, now I have to unlearn, it is 
clear that otherwise I would no longer be able to live.) 
Can one reconstitute the scattered fragments of life, 
and the silence of shattering memories after surviving 
Auschwitz and then frame these questions as a literary 
project? How, then, can testimony be responsibly, 
ethically read and what are the limits of such readings? 
How is testimony to the survival of extreme trauma to be 
read fifty years later? 
2 Rosette Lamont has recently translated Delbo's trilogy 
into English. The English version has been published by Yale 
University Press (1995) . Having been unable to obtain a copy of 
Lamont's translation, I have, therefore, translated all quoted 
extracts from the trilogy myself, unless otherwise indicated. 
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CHAPTER I 
CHARLOTTE DELBO AND HOLOCAUST MEMORY 
L'oubli eEEacerait ce qui ne Eut jamais inscrit : rature par laquelle le non-ecrit 
semble avoir laisse une trace qu'il Eaudrait obliterer, glissement qui en vient 
a se construire un operateur par ou le il sans sujet, lisse et vain, s'englue, 
s'enduit dans l'abime dedouble du je evanescent, simule, imitation de rien, qui 
se Eigera dans le Moi certain duquel tout ordre revient. 
(Maurice Bla.nchot L'Ecriture du Desaetre,p.135) 
I. FROM RESISTANCE TO SURVIVAL 
Not widely known as a writer in France, Charlotte 
Delbo has been, till recently, even less known outside of 
France. 3 The lack of biographical information available 
concerning Charlotte Delbo is reflected in her relative 
anonymity and, as we will see, is disproportionate to the 
potential impact that her literary works should have on the 
major debates which have emerged in scholarship on the 
Shoah. 
Prior to her arrest, internment in Paris and 
deportation to Auschwitz, Delbo had been a member of the 
Communist Youth organisation and assistant to the renowned 
director, Louis Jouvet of the Theatre de l 'Athenee in 
Paris. Whilst touring with the theatrical company in 
Buenos-Aires in 1941 she read about the decapitation in 
Paris of her friend, Andre Woog, on allegations of 
3 This is all the more striking since Delbo's texts are 
published by Editions de Minuit, one of the most famous and 
reputable publishers of the post-Second World War era in France. 
Initially a Resistance press, Minuit later became specialist 
publishers of the Nouveau Roman, innovative literary form which 
challenged the limits of representation in the novel. I am 
indebted to Professor Jean-Louis Cornille for drawing my 
attention to these details. 
Lawrence Langer (1978) , Ellen Fine (1986) and Sidra Ezrachi 
{1980) have written about Charlotte Delbo and her texts in 
English. 
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possessing anti-nazi material. Apparently against the 
advice of Jouvet, Delbo decided to return to France, 
joining her husband, Communist activist.and intellectual, 
Georges Dudach, in his anti-nazi underground activities in 
the Communist network of the Resistance. After four months 
of living under assumed identities in Paris, she and Dudach 
were arrested by French police on 2 March 1942 and 
imprisoned at la Sante. Three months after Duda ch was 
executed by a firing squad on 23 May 1942 at Mont Valerien, 
Delbo was transferred to and kept prisoner in the 
Romainville fort. There she remained for nine months 
before finally being deported from Compiegne, in France, on 
24 January 1943. It was at Romainville where she made 
acquaintance with many of the compatriots who shared her 
experiences and living quarters at Auschwitz-Birkenau and 
whose voices emerge in these texts, dedicated to those who 
died as well as those who survived. 
Deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau for "Activites anti-
allemandes" {Delbo, 1965:13) (Anti-German activities) in a 
convoy with two hundred and twenty-nine other women, Delbo 
was to be one of forty-nine survivors of that convoy to 
survive and to return from Auschwitz. She attributes this 
relatively high number of survivors to the fact that there 
were no Jewish deportees in the convoy, a factor which 
would have greatly diminished the survival rate of the 
convoy, since the difference in treatment of Jewish 
deportees was great already from arrival. (Delbo, 1965:16) 
The convoy which transported Delbo to Auschwitz was 
comprised,' for the most part, of combatants and members of 
the French Resistance, it also included common law 
criminals and some women, who, through bureaucratic or 
judicial error, were included in the deportation. 
The second text which Delbo wrote on her return, le 
Convoi du 24 janvier (1965), sketches the biographies, in 
varying degrees of detail / of all ·of the women of the 
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convoy of that eponymous date and offers a sociological and 
ethnographic analysis of the convoy and its survival rate 
(16-19). According to her, that specific convoy was the 
last "political" convoy to arrive at Auschwitz. (20) 
Seventy three days after arriving at Auschwitz-
Birkenau seventy deportees remained of the original convoy, 
including Delbo, whose tattooed Auschwitz number was 31 
661. On 1 July 1943 she and seventeen compatriots were 
moved to Raisko, to work in a laboratory near to Auschwitz 
I, the main camp. Following an agreement with German 
industrial giant, I. G. Farben, German scientists had 
imported seeds of 11 kok-saghyz 11 , a strain of dandylion, back 
from Russia to see whether the latex contained in the roots 
of the plant could be cultivated in order to produce a 
rubber. In Raisko, vastly improved living and working 
conditions contributed to increasing the chances of her 
survival. Seven months after transfer to Raisko, ten 
deportees of the original convoy, including Delbo, were 
transferred to the women's camp of Ravensbruck. Between 7 
January 1944 and 16 August 1944 the remaining of the - at 
this point - fifty-four survivors of the original convoy 
were transferred to Ravensbruck. Following the liberation 
of Ravensbruck, Delbo returned to France, via Sweden, and 
so, on the 23 April 1945, three years after being arrested 
there, she finally returned to Paris. Forty-nine deportees 
from that January convoy had survived. 
After the war Delbo worked for the United Nations and, 
from the sixties, for the Centre National des Recherches 
Scientifiques in Paris in collaborat,ion with philosopher, 
Henri Lefebvre. In 1946 she wrote the first volume of her 
trilogy on Auschwitz. Entitled Aucun de nous ne Reviendra, 
this volume, a literary text, was put aside by Delbo for 
almost twenty years before being published. 
II. AUSCHWITZ ET APRES: SURVIVAL AS RESISTANCE 
SL.Lr v 1 v a..l 
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The Auschwitz et Apres trilogy is an autobiographical 
and biographical depiction of the concentration camp 
experience. The three volumes intersperse narrative 
vignettes of prose and poetry, conflating and juxtaposing 
a variety of genres and narrative strategies in a manner 
which, as we will see in my discussion of Holocaust memory, 
structurally resembles the difficult passage of memory from 
repression, selection and substitution to its articulation, 
narration and textual representation. 
In order to understand the ways in which Delbo's texts 
function as seminal to the debate regarding representation 
and aestheticisation of the Auschwitz experience, it is 
useful to examine how the title of Delbo's literary trilogy 
evokes just what is at stake in discussions regarding the 
Shoah and then to determine the importance of these texts 
regarding these discussions. 
The trilogy, Auschwitz et Apres, attempts to examine 
issues raised by the event of Auschwitz in Western 
consciousness from three different approaches. I would like 
to think through the significance of the title since it 
contains the explicit suggestion that the implications of 
"Auschwitz" resonate in eternal relation to and beyond 
Auschwitz, the event. Clearly, then, "after", the temporal 
deictic, can never be a neutral referent since it is 
uttered in perpetual reference to Auschwitz. A new 
beginning is precisely sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman's 
characterisation of the Shoah whose impact on Western 
consciousness is theorised as a temporal and modal rupture 
with Enlightenment project of Modernity. {Bauman, 1989) 
Possibly, one of the best-known formulations of a 
response to the Holocaust which defines the. resistance of 
Auschwitz to cognitive assimilation as, essentially, a 
problem of language has been that of Theodor Adorno whose 
well known dictum is an argument against the 
aestheticisation of the Shoah. "After Auschwitz," Adorno 
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has written, "it is no longer possible to write poems". 
(quoted in Felman & Laub, 1992:33) This proposition, oft-
cited and often read as an advocation of silence as the 
only adequate response in the face of Auschwitz, points to 
the essential dilemma in which the Shoah survivor finds 
him/herself. This dilemma, present in Adorno' s 
proposition, clearly suggests that if speech is a solvent 
whose agency radically dilutes the horrors, carnage, 
inhumanities and suffering of Auschwitz and its survivor, 
how much more is the dissimulation of poetic discourse's 
aestheticising impulse. Predicated on formulations such 
as Adorne's, aestheticising the Shoah came to be seen, from 
one point of view, as a betrayal of the memory of those who 
did not return, the unnamed, unburied, vanished dead. In 
the face of language and its limited representational 
resources, silence has been considered to be a more 
appropriate response. (Steiner, 1969: 76} This position 
has, initially, been empirically supported by the 
historical response of silence from the survivors, a 
response which, as we will see in Chapter Four, has often 
been a question of reception, a resistance to listening on 
the part of the addressee, and not purely a question of an 
unsayability on the part of the survivors. 
As Delbo's texts demonstrate, Adorne's dictum could 
be read not as a demand for silence, but as a demand for 
poetic discourse to make present its submission to 
Auschwitz and, in its emergence, to make present the traces 
of breakage, rupture and displacement inherent within the 
very structures of post-Auschwitz language. This is a 
position which is taken up later by Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard 
when he suggests that it is precisely the rupture or the 
collapse of language in the face of Auschwitz that must be 
represented, a move which entails a shift in the very 
representational strategies of discourse: 
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Le diff erend est l 'eta t instable et 
l'instant du langage ou quelque chose 
qui doit pouvoir etre mis en phrases 
ne peut pas l'etre encore. Cet etat 
comporte le silence qui est une phrase 
negative, mais il en appelle aussi a 
des phrases possibles en principe. Ce 
que l 'on nomme ordinairemen t 1 e 
sentiment signale cet etat. << On ne 
trouve pas ses mots >>, etc. Il faut 
beaucoup chercher pour trouver les 
nouvelles regles de formation et 
d'enchainement de phrases capables 
d'exprimer le differend que trahit le 
sentiment si l 'on ne veut pas que ce 
differend soit aussitot etouffe en un 
litige, et que l'alerte donnee par le 
sentiment ait ete inutile. C'est 
l'enjeu d'une litterature, d'une 
philosophie, peut-etre d'une 
politique, de temoigner des differends 
en leur trouvant des idiomes. 
(Lyotard, 1983:29-30) 
The diff erend is the unstable state 
and instant of language wherein 
something which must be able to be put 
into phrases cannot yet be. This 
state includes silence, which is a 
negative phrase, but it also calls 
upon phrases which are in principle 
possible. This state is signalled by 
what one ordinarily calls a feeling: 
"One cannot find the words," etc. A 
lot of searching must be done to find 
new rules for forming and linking 
phrases that are able to express the 
diff erend disclosed by the feeling, 
unless one wants this differend to 
smothered right away in a litigation 
and for the alarm sounded by the 
feeling to have been useless. What is 
at stake in literature, in a 
philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is 
to bear witness to differends by 
finding idioms for them. 
(Lyotard,1988:13) 
Adorno himself redefines and delimits an ethical 
aesthetic of Auschwitz in Negative Dialectics when he 
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states that, 
[p]erennial suffering has as much 
right to expression as a tortured man 
has to scream; hence it may have been 
wrong to say that after Auschwitz you 
could no longer write poems. 
(1973:362} 
In his clarification of his subject-position regarding ways 
of speaking about Auschwitz, that is, responses other than 
· silence as if referring to poet Paul Celan' s poetic 
language-at-the-limits - Adorno concedes that it is, in the 
final count, artistic response alone, such as that 
represented by the literary text, which can adequately 
approach the subject of the Shoah. 
TRUTH/TRUTHFULNESS/AUTHENTICITY: APPROACHES TO MEANING 
Delbo's texts assume particular importance when read 
as critical responses to contemporary theoretical 
approaches to Auschwitz. Read in the original French, the 
phrase, "Auschwitz et Apres" sets up a multiplicity of 
different, often contradictory, readings which are 
reflected in discussions of representation and historical 
memory. As "Auschwitz ... et apres?", the phrase becomes 
a construct which in its ironising, open-ended 
interrogative structure, continuously problematises itself 
as historical referent. As such the title of the trilogy 
announces its own subverting instability and introduces the 
ensuing conflation of discursive categories of truth 
(historical/juridical discourse) and verisimilitude 
(imaginative/literary discourse} in the narration of 
experience in extremis. Indeed, the very first page of 
written text in Aucun de nous ne reviendra, an epigraph, 
echoes this reading of the trilogy's title, plunging the 
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testimony into uncertainty: "Aujourd' hui, je ne suis pas 
sure que ce que j 1 ai ecrit soit vrai. Je suis sure que 
c'est veridique." (1970a) (Nowadays, I am not certain that 
what I have written is true, but I am certain that it 
happened/is authentic.) The French text employs the words 
verite (truth} and veridique (meaning both authentic and 
truthful in French) and places the epigraph on an 
unnumbered page in order to highlight the problematic of 
representation and historical truth in survivor narrative. 
The epigraph encapsulates the interplay between truth, 
reality and verisimilitude in representation. This 
formulation is a warning that what follows places the 
witness and her testimony at a the threshold of crisis. It 
also highlights the essential paradox which underpins both 
the discursivity of the "fact 11 of Auschwitz and the process 
of bearing witness, as a survivor to Auschwitz, a paradox 
which is played out in the narrative itself. 
The conflation of narrative categories in survivor 
narrative underlines the effects of trauma on memory and, 
by. extension, on the narration of memory. This collapse or 
overlap of narrative categories also underlines the ways 
that narrating memory are influenced by those factors which 
shape the survivor for it is at the point of overlap of 
imaginative and historical discourse that these factors 
come to be revealed. From the title, and followed by the 
texts themselves, the survivor 1 s essential dilemma emerges 
which demands the addressee to persistently re-evaluate 
categories and notions of historical discourse, fictional 
or imaginative discourse and historical truth. Delbo' s 
narratives cannot be committed to a master narrative of 
historical certainty and yet, it is precisely the survival 
of such a certainty to which they testify. Indeed, as 
Delbo' s trilogy will demonstrate, survivor testimony is 
constructed as one which is unable to reach closure in its 
perpetual speaking of unspeakability, of fragmentation. As 
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such, Shoah survivor narrative is constructed 
ambivalent, presenting itself as self-doubting, 
sometimes, even contradictory. 
as 
and 
Testimony which, emerges from ambiguity, disbelief, 
doubt and paradox is problematic not least because it 
challenges the consensual contract implicit in historical 
narration, its modes of representation and its reception. 
As Jean-Fram;:ois Lyotard reminds us, the empirical or 
objective "authentication" of historical evidence presented 
by survivor testimony is subverted by the very nature of 
the event of the Shoah. {1983:16) To be an "eye-witness" to 
the gas chambers and crematoria is a contradiction in 
terms, people cannot witness their own death. Lyotard's 
intention is to demonstrate the absurdity of the logic 
implicit in Holocaust revisionist "historian", Faurisson's 
syllogistic arguments which ignore the referential reality 
of Auschwitz (1983:16) 
The question which Delbo's trilogy raises, is how do 
we think through an event where all terms of reference 
become relative, unverifiable and hence, disputed, 
contended? 
difficult 
The title of the trilogy then, raises the 
and important question of what ethical 
considerations can provide the conceptual limitations to 
responsible scholarship of the Holocaust? Lyotard seems to 
suggest that scholars have to investigate innovative 
epistemologies in order to approach Auschwitz. In order to 
do this it is necessary, he writes, that the historian, 
[ ••• J rompe avec avec le monopole 
consenti au regime cogni tif des 
phrases sur l'histoire, et s'aventure 
a preter l'oreille a ce qui n'est pas 
presentable dans les regles de la 
connaissance. Toute realite comporte 
cette exigence pour autant qu'elle 
comporte des sens inconnus possibles. 
Auschwitz est la plus reelle des 
realites a cet egard. Son nom marque 
les conf ins ou la connaissance 
' 
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historique voit sa competence recusee. 
Il ne s'ensuit pas qu'on entre dans le 
non-sens. L' alternative n 'est pas : 
OU la signification etablie par la 
science, ou 1 1 absurdi te, mystique 
comprise [ ... ]. (Lyotard, 1983:92) 
[ ••• J break with the monopoly over 
history granted to the cognitive 
regimen of phrases, and he or she must 
venture forth by lending his or her 
ear to what is not presentable under 
the rules of knowledge. Every reality 
entails this exigency insofar as it 
entails possible unknown senses. 
Auschwitz is the most real of 
realities in this respect. Its name 
marks the confines wherein historical 
knowledge sees its competence 
impugned. It does not follow from 
that one falls into non-sense. The 
alternative is not: either the 
signification that learning [science} 
establishes, or absurdity, be it of 
the mystical kind [ ... J. (Lyotard, 
198:57-58) 
Saul Friedlander soberly reminds us that 
fragmentation of meanings generated 
postmodernist reading strategies can 




[ ... ] it is precisely the "Final 
Solution" which allows postmodernist 
thinking to question the validity of 
any totalizing view of history, of any 
reference to a definable 
metadiscourse, thus opening the way 
for a multiplicity of equally valid 
approaches. This very multiplicity, 
however, may lead to any aesthetic 
fantasy and one again runs counter to 
the need for establishing a stable 
truth as far as this past is 
concerned. (1992:5) 
Unchecked by ethical obligations and historical truths, 
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such readings can relativise the Holocaust and key into the 
ideological narratives .of negationist and denialist 
discourse. This brings us to the converse or counter-
reading of the trilogy's title as "Auschwitz .... so what?" 4 
which resonates in revisionist and denialist discourses 
which, in seizing upon the essential dilemma inherent in 
survivor testimony claim that the event must be, by logical 
extension, untrue because unverifiable. {Davidovicz, 1981; 
Vidal-Naquet, 1992; Fresco, 1994) 
Ultimately the phrase points to the essential futility 
of the experience which resists integration in human 
cognitive systems and, hence, resists all assignment of 
meaning. This understanding pre-empts the title of the 
second volume, Une Connaissance Inutile, "A useless or 
futile knowledge". The trilogy's title, read in the context 
of the title of this volume generates speculation as to the 
futility of bearing such a knowledge. Lifted off a phrase 
in a Camus' notebook {Langer, 1978:202) the original French 
text clearly articulates the difference between knowledge 
and cognition. Hence, the etymological formation of 
"connaissance" points, to cognition and the cognitive 
processes, as opposed to 11 savoir11 which signifies 
knowledge or, according to the Larousse, Dictionnaire de la 
langue fran<;aise, "[l'e]nsemble des connaissances acquises 
par l'etude". Thus the futility or senselessness of the 
Shoah qualifies both its knowability as well as its 
resistance to assimilation. Whether Auschwitz can be 
"known", that is, whether the survivor/witness, using 
available resources of language and cognitive structures, 
can make Auschwitz knowable, is one of the underpinning 
questions of all Shoah narrative. The question of 
knowledge raised by the title of this second volume frames 
4 In colloquial French, a statement which is followed by 
the question "et apres ? 11 translates, into English, as the 
dismissive "so what?". 
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the epistemological problematic which Auschwitz poses by 
constructing the narrative as a sustained meditation of 
interpersonal, historical and intertextual relationships in 
order to explore the representational resistance of 
Auschwitz. 
If Auschwitz has become an important reference point 
in contemporary debates on the role of memory in culture, 
religious studies, philosophy and historiography, the third 
volume evokes the disembodied bearers of that memory, the 
survivors themselves. Through a series of conversations, 
interviews, anecdotes, meditations in prose and poetry, 
this third and final volume, entitled, Mesure de nos Jours 
(Measure of our Days) , symbolically offers the survivor the 
last word in his/her appraisal of the post-Auschwitz 
condition. This volume presents the survivor as different 
to those survivors represented in the heroic narratives of 
resistance, survival, and healing/ integration. This serves 
as an important reminder that the ways in which memory is 
appropriated in collective representations of the past 
often dispossess the survivor of the experience which they 
have survived, threatening, once again, to silence them. 
By invoking the survivor as doomed-to-survive Mesure de nos 
Jours debunks many popular theories of survival of limit-
experiences and received notions of healing through telling 
the story, through closure. Having already contested the 
limits of narrative categories, the text's presentation of 
the doomed-to-survive survivor challenges the addressee's 
expectations of a teleological narrative, of a cathartic 
engagement with the text and its internal logic. 
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III. AUSCHWITZ MEMORY: BODIES/BORDERS/BOUNDARIES 
Central to this trilogy's preoccupation with 
representation both of the survivor and of the Auschwitz 
past is the way in which memory is individually 
articulated, narrated and received. The very act of 
ordering memory as a structured narrative, oral or written, 
is an act of editing. (Todorov, 1993; Langer, 1988) The 
sequence of images and events, the privileging of certain 
memories over others, the ways that generation, gender, 
culture, language, ethnicity and political conviction as 
well as trauma, grief, guilt and fear collectively shape 
memories, its sublimations and amnesiac lacunae (Grunebaum-
Ralph, 1996:17). Since the act of recollecting is one of 
ordering and selecting, of forgetting as well as 
remembering and of editing the way that something is 
remembered, Memory's impulse is, by extension, revisionist 
(Robbins, forthcoming) . Thus, personal memory and the 
narratives appropriated by collective memory suture the 
lacunary silences into a seamless, unproblematic Memory, a 
gesture which is both revisioning as well as anti-
Revisionist. It is important, however, to examine how the 
formalisation of memory in survivor narrative manifests, 
through its structural organisation, self-doubt, self-
conscious alienation and silence regarding its own status 
as testimony and, importantly, its historical authenticity. 
This concern is clearly demonstrated by the refrain of 11 ! 
was there, I saw with my own eyes and still, I could not 
believe what I saw" expressed in so many Holocaust survivor 
testimonies (oral and written) . This sentiment draws on 
the credibility of the eye-witness's empirical truth-claim, 
central to the establishment of a legalistic and juridical 
narrative of events, at the same time as it suggests that 
central to the nature of the Holocaust is a resistance to 
its cognitive assimilation. 
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Since individual memories are directly implicated in 
questions of representation in survivor narrative it would 
be helpful to turn, firstly, to one of Delbo's later texts, 
La memoire et les Jours (1995) (Memory and Days), where she 
discusses the operations of memory and of Holocaust 
survivor memory in particular. This discussion of memory, 
its discontinuities and disruptions, will be read back to 
the trilogy as a fulcrum around which my interpretative 
approaches to the texts will turn. 
It is important to consider Delbo' s discussion of 
memory in the context of the moment in which she publishes 
her text. La memoire et les Jours appears in 1995, fifty 
years after Delbo has been liberated from Ravensbruck. 
Publication takes place in an era of ageing survivors, 
against the backdrop of an increase in revisionist and 
denialist 'narratives as well as an explosion of 
publications, films, monuments, commemorations of the 
Holocaust as it is increasingly com.modified. As Auschwitz 
replicates, in the mass media, it belongs to everyone and 
it belongs to no-one. The past two decades could best be 
described as an era which has witnessed the fragmentation 
of the master-narrative of "The Holocaust" the 
dispersion of the meanings of the Auschwitz experience into 
contested and competing narratives. {Friedlander, 1993; 
Hartman, 1994; Stier, 1996) And yet the multiplication of 
narratives of memory has witnessed new narratives of 
amnesia. Thus, the beginning of the Historikerstreit (the 
historian's debate) in Germany in 1986 and American 
president, Ronald Reagan's controversial memorial visit to 
SS graves at Bitburg cemetery, are two examples which stand 
out as symptomatic of the historical relativisation which 
precipitates the explosion of competing Holocaust 
narratives onto the scene. 
The survivor's text emerges at a time when debates on 
normalisation, historicisation and historical relativism in 
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representations of the Holocaust and of memory on the 
academic and cultural scene could be seen to invalidate the 
survivor's experience of Auschwitz through multiple 
appropriations of the individual experience. 
Delbo's preoccupation with memory and its contexts of 
expression, reflected in the title of the text, needs then 
to be examined in the context of these challenges to 
essentialist narratives of Holocaust memory as well as to 
revisionist and denialist negations of the Holocaust. A 
conceptualisation of memory emerges, prefaced precisely as 
an intention to "explain the inexplicable", in La memoire 
et les Jours through the metaphor of a snake which 
routinely sheds its skin: 
Expliquer l'inexplicable. L'image du 
serpent qui laisse sa vieille peau 
pour en surgir, revetu d'une peau 
fraf che et luisante, peut venir a 
l'esprit. J'ai quitte a Auschwitz une 
peau usee elle sentait mauvais, 
cette peau - marquee de tous les coups 
qu'elle avait re9us, pour me retrouver 
habillee d'une belle peau propre, dans 
une mue moins rapide que celle du 
serpent, toutefois. {11) 5 
Explaining the inexplicable. The 
image of the snake which emerges from 
its old skin, clothed in a fresh and 
shiny skin, comes to mind. I left 
behind, at Auschwitz, a used skin - it 
smelled bad, that skin marked by all 
the blows that it had received, to 
find myself dressed in a clean new 
skin, in a moulting which was, all the 
same, less quick than the snake's. 
This biologically framed representation of memory betrays 
an awareness of the problematics of the premises on which 
5 All quotations from La Memoire et les jours, in this 
chapter, will be referenced by page number only. 
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memory is theorised, for, memory, like skin, must change 
with time, it ages and alters just as its representations 
and transmissions. As such, built into this metaphorical 
conceptualisation of memory is a self-reflectiveness, an 
element of doubt which is a fundamental component of both 
memory and its praxis and, hence, the truth-claims of the 
survivor-as-witness. It is important to recall that, in a 
discussion dealing with the dynamics of memory and the body 
as a site of memory, the body has historically been figured 
as a key trope in the representations of immutable 
difference constructed by biological/scientific race 
discourse of late nineteenth century to mid-twentieth 
century Western Europe, specifically in Germany and France. 
As a political prisoner of the Third Reich, Charlotte Delbo 
would know how this discourse functions as a marker 
singling out the different prisoner groups/strata in the 
concentration camp for different treatment. In addition, 
she would be aware of the function of this discourse in the 
carrying out of genocide against Jewish and Gypsy 
populations. 
Both the snake and its shed skin bear the trace of the 
other as a "memory" , by virtue of this previous organic 
embeddedness. Just as the snake's skin falls away from the 
snake, the survivor emerges from the Auschwitz experience. 
Auschwitz "falls away" like the dead skin, yet unlike the 
snake it remains wrapped around the survivor, separated, 
detached but enclosing. By illustrating how the new and 
old skins of the snake metaphorically represent the 
dynamics of memory and of remembering, Delbo presents the 
traces of Auschwitz and its memory as a bodily inscription, 
an impression in flesh, an embodied memory. In this way 
the body becomes the symbolic locus for conceptualising the 
materiality of memory and its referential operations in 
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textual, cultural and commemorative practices6 • In this 
way, "disembodying" Holocaust narratives of a collective, 
unsutured memory are personalised and reappropriated by the 
victims and survivors. 
The metaphor continues to describe how the snake's 
shed skin retains its "memory", that is, the trace of the 
snake, who, meanwhile, retains the memory of the skin 
through which it has passed and through which it will once 
again pass precisely because the process of shedding skin 
is a returning, ritualising occurrence. By gesturing to 
the way that the image of shed skin recalls the snake, the 
metaphor calls our attention to the metonymic operation of 
both the trope with which Auschwitz memory is figured as 
well as of memory itself. In this way, we are reminded 
that the representations and transmissions of memory can 
only rely on metonymic tropes in order to represent the 
subject remembered (or forgotten), in order to function as 
memorial or historical narratives. 
By referring to the process of sloughing, shedding, 
fading and disappearing skin, the metaphor explicitly sets 
up a temporal distinction which determines the visibility 
of the material traces of memory. In this way, memory as 
the faculty of recalling past experiences, is located, 
through the shedding skin metaphor, as a spacio-temporal 
construct. Thus, the less temporally immediate the Lager 
becomes for the (ageing) survivor, the less the survivor's 
skin retains the visible imprint of its submission to the 
Lager. The more the trace itself becomes absent the more 
Memory is charged with the responsibility of 
"authentically" signing or signposting the past. It would 
follow, then, that immediately after the survivor's return, 
the body which returns from Auschwitz (like the snake's old 
skin) bears the visible -and in the case of tattoos, 
6 This study, however, focuses only on textual 
representation and narration of memory. 
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indelible - traces of the camp. This temporal distinction, 
predicated on the fading of traces over the passing of 
time, highlights Delbo' s concern with the way in which 
memory facilitates the transposition of the materiality of 
an ~vent to its representation in narrative as historical. 
I would also suggest that Delbo's insistence on the 
presence of the "invisible" trace of trauma functions as a 
veiled gesture to the silences and dislocations within 
survivor narratives as sites of these absent traces. 
The significance of the site of the body, figured by 
the metaphor of the skin, in theorising memory impacts on 
discussions concerning the survival of limit-experiences 
and must be more closely examined. By comparing the 
snake's skin to that of the survivor's and then by 
employing the snake's skin as a metaphor for the dynamics 
of memory, Delbo conflates the faculty of recall with the 
flesh of the survivor, powerfully underlining the present 
absence of those who did not return, as well as evoking the 
altered, marked and damaged corporeality of those who did. 
Following the description of the snake shedding its skin, 
Delbo suggests that the flesh is a site inscribed with a 
memory of the senses, those receptors at the somatic 
boundaries. This recall of experience through sensation 
or impression on the senses, is conceptually clarified 
further When it iS defined aS II la memoire prOfOnde 11 
(13) (deep memory) and placed in opposition to and 
differentiated from "la memo ire ordinaire" ( 13) (common 
memory), 7 the faculty of recall which resides in the 
intellect and, therefore, in language. Deep memory recalls 
the sensory imprint of the camp: 
A Birkenau, la pluie faisait ressortir 
7 Both the translation of la memoire profonde as deep 
memory and la memoire ordinaire as common memory are Lawrence 
Langer's translations of Delbo's concepts of memory (1978) 
27 
l'odeur de diarrhee. C'est l'odeur la 
plus plus fetide que je connaisse. A 
Birkenau, la pluie rabattai t sur le 
camp, sur nous, la suie des 
crematoires et l 'odeur de chair qui 
brule. Nous en etions impregnes. (11) 
At Birkenau, the rain brought out the 
odour of diarrhea. It is the most 
fetid odour that I know. At Birkenau, 
the rain beat down on the camp, onto 
us, the soot of the crematoria and the 
odour of flesh which was burning. We 
were impregnated with it. 
The recurring imagery of skin in 
sensations and disf igurations would 
recollecting its 
suggest that a 
representation of memory, as a specifically sensory/sensual 
faculty, as organic tissue, literally embeds the traces of 
Auschwitz in the body and its sense organs. I will return 
to this presentation· of memory as bodily /embodied 
inscription further on in a demonstration of how this 
presentation functions as a mandate for the survivor to 
speak/testify on behalf of the dead. 
TORTURED MEMORY: THE SURVIVOR AND THE TRUE WITNESS 
Unlike the snake which separates and emerges from its 
sloughed skin, Delbo suggests that the survivor remains 
permanently enclosed by the ou~er layer of skin/memory and 
does not emerge from that shed skin/memory. This fleshy 
mask which has survived the camps, "impregnated" with the 
"soot of the crematoria" is, according to Delbo, both "la 
memoire et la peau de la memoire" (the memory and the skin 
of the memory) which is neither shed nor renewed and 
becomes a literally embodied memory of Auschwitz. (12 -13) 
For ·literary critic Rachel Ertel, the body's traces as 
testimony to Auschwitz are not symbolic but, rather, 
immanently material and literally embodied. Thus, in a 
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discussion of Claude Lanzmann's film on Holocaust memory, 
Shoah, she writes that 
Apres Shoah, il nous arrivera devant 
un objet tres ordinaire -un train, un 
camion , devant un paysage serein, 
d'etre pris d'un frisson, d'un spasme. 
Ce sera, dans notre corps, la memoire 
du genocide. (Ertel, 1990:54) 8 
After Shoah, faced with a very 
ordinary object - a train, a truck -, 
in front of a peaceful countryside, we 
will be shaken by a spasm or a shiver. 
This will be, in our bodies, the 
memory of the genocide. 
Although Ertel's remarks refer to the body-as-witness to 
genocide of a later generation of addressees, they resonate 
powerfully in Delbo's description of the survivor's body as 
living, organic memorial site, as both historical and 
personal. Moreover, it is this presentation of the memory 
of genocide inscribed on the body which endows the survivor 
with the emmissarial function of witness. 
As the enveloping impenetrable outer layer of 
Auschwitz memory, la memoire profonde retains the 
sensations and experiences of the Lager, intact and 
unmediated, and is presented as being an impermeable 
membrane which is separate and separating. As such deep 
memory defines the survivor as Survivor and emerges as the 
separating boundary between survivor and non-survivor. In 
a development of the original snake's skin metaphor, 
Delbo' s narrator in Mesure de nos Jours articulates the 
boundaries of survivor identity as layers of memory which 
are constructed as three successive masks. The face of 
Survivor: tired, used-up, ruined; the face from Auschwitz: 
alive, mobile; and a third face which covers over the 
others: a "passe-partout" mask which engages with the 
8 My translation 
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anxieties of a post-Auschwitz world. (1971:187) Referring 
to her co-survivors, the narrator suggests that [s]ans 
doute n'y a-t-il que nous qui voyions la verite de nos 
camarades, sans doute n'y a-t-il que nous qui voyions leur 
visage nu par en dessous [le masque]." (1971: 187) (no doubt 
it is us alone who saw the truth in our comrades, no doubt 
it is us alone who saw their naked face beneath [the 
mask].) Here, the survivor is constructed as the bearer of 
an incommunicable truth, embedded in the body as an 
invisible or esoteric mark whose presence functions as the 
dead victim's proxy to tell the story. 
By locating memory as an inscription on the body, 
Delbo not only recalls the bearers of the true memory of 
the camps, the literally effaced/defaced dead, she locates 
in the very flesh of the survivor the traces of the dead 
and, in doing so, the mandate to speak on their behalf. 
This is illustrated in Aucun de nous ne Reviendra where the 
narrator describes how men and women, who work in the 
drained marshes in springtime with sacks around their 
wastes, 
[ ... ] plangent la main dans la 
poussiere d'os humains qu'ils jettent 
a la volee en peinant sur les sillons 
avec le vent qui leur renvoie la 
poussiere au visage et le soir ils 
sont tout blancs, des rides marques 
par la sueur qui a coule sur la 
poussiere. (1970a:19) 
[ .. . ] sink their hands into the human 
bone meal which they spread in 
handfuls above the furrows with the 
wind which blows the dust back into 
their faces and at night they are all 
white, lines marked by the sweat which 
has trickled through the dust. 
Cinders of human remains trace the stories written on the 
very faces of the survivors. 
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Many survivors, writers, historians and philosophers 
have reiterated that the true witness to the Auschwitz 
experience are those who did not return from it. Thus, in 
The Drowned and the Saved, Primo Levi insists on the 
distinction between the "true witnesses", the drowned or 
those who died, and the saved, those who survived: 
I must repeat - we, the survivors, are 
not the true witnesses. This is an 
uncomfortable notion, of which I have 
become conscious little by little, 
reading the memoirs of others and 
reading mine at a distance of years. 
We survivors are not only an exiguous 
but also an anomalous minority: we are 
those who by their prevarications or 
abilities or good luck did not touch 
bottom. Those who did so, those who 
saw the Gorgon, have not returned to 
tell about it or have returned mute, 
but they are the 1 Muslims', the 
submerged, the complete witnesses, the 
ones whose deposition would have a 
general significance. They are the 
rule, we are the exception. 
(1989:63-64) 
Thus, the representation of memory as body empowers the 
narrative to bear collective witness on behalf of the dead 
whose absent presences are "impregnated" in the narration 
as the "soot of the crematoria". 
REMEMBERING THE BODY'S EFFACEMENT 
Re-presenting, re-inscribing the remnants of bodies, 
Delbo' s conceptualisation of memory represents a post-
Auschwitz reclamation or recovery of the body whose 
hegemonical boundaries have been transgressed in the Lager, 
by the Lager. Indeed Jean Amery's proposition (1986:21-40) 
that the violation of the corporeal boundaries of the body 
- in systematic torture - was fundamental to the raison 
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d I etre of National Socialist ideology is precisely the 
recognition of "wiping out" by assaulting the body: the 
individual is rendered "invisible"/powerless and stripped 
of potent will through the transgression/penetr~tion of 
that somatic frontier, the skin, in the first blow of 
torture. 
If the first moment of torture represents the 
unrecuperable sovereignty of the body and, so, of the 
individual as Other, then the concentration camp represents 
the systematic and progressive effacement of the entire 
body's presence prior to its biological death. 9 
I would suggest that the significance of the skin as 
trope to figure memory is underscored further if we 
consider that in the concentration camps the transgression 
or blurring of the body's boundaries is directly linked to 
the process of humiliation, degradation and dehumanisation 
of the prisoner. The individual's identity, indeed, the 
very notions of individuality and identity/identification 
are powerfully renegotiated in the concentrationary 
uni verse. For those deportees who were not immediately 
sent to the gas chambers following arrival in the death 
camps the shaving of hair on the head and entire body, the 
tattooing of numbers as identification and delousing 
treatments signify the beginning of a systematic process 
whereby the physical signs of humanness are dismantled 
through the negation, the desacralisation, of the body and 
its presence in the camp. Thus, standing in the camp 
yard, the first order given to the newly arrived prisoner, 
prior to shaving, classifying, and tattooing, is to 
undress, to expose the naked skin, to be stripped of the 
first sign of "human" social identity. This "coercion of 
nudity" (Levi, 1989: 90) dehumanises through recurrence. As 
9 Amery speaks of torture as a system where the tortured is 
an extension of the will of the torturer and that the torturer 
experiences her/his subjectivity as "expanded into the body" of 
the tortured (35) 
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Primo Levi points out, in the Lager "shaving was total and 
weekly; public and collective nudity was a recurrent 
condition, typical and laden with significance." (1989:90) 
Through the systematisation, ritualisation of deprivation, 
depravation, transgression of and assault to the body's 
presence, the physical markers of individual identity are 
obliterated and conventional terms of identification are 
defamiliarised, subverted. 
The image of the Musulman, the walking dead, 
identified by their haunting/haunted, gaunt faces, lifeless 
eyes, emaciated bodies and automaton-like movements stands 
out as a symbolic refrain of the body's obliteration, the 
effacement of the material self prior to physiological or 
clinical death in the camps. 
As a recurring figure in survivor accounts, the 
Musulman is represented as possessing neither an identity 
nor a name, effectively constructed as embodied memory of 
effacement. Thus, Delbo' s narrator describes the movements 
of such a woman as " [u]ne danse de mecanique. Un squelette 
de femme qui danse." (1970a:45) (a mechanical dance. A 
dancing skeleton of a woman.) Importantly, both the 
identity as well as the gender of the woman are erased and 
as the narration of her robotic dance progresses the 
narrator speculates as to whether she is"[ ... ] une de ces 
vieilles folles qui font peur aux enfants dans les squares. 
C'est une femme jeune, une jeune fille presque." (1970a:43) 
(one of these crazy old ladies who frighten children in 
parks. She is a young woman, a young girl almost.) In the 
following paragraph the same woman is 
[ ••• J enveloppe dans une couverture, un enfant, un 
gar9onnet. Une tete rasee tres petite, un visage 
OU saillent les machoires et l'arcade 
sourcilliere. Pieds nus, il sautille sans arret 
[ . .. J. Il veut agi ter les bras aussi pour se 
rechauffer. La couverture s'ecarte. C'est un 
femme. Un squelette de femme. Elle est nue. 
(1970a:44-45) 
[ ••• J wrapped in a blanket, a child, a little 
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boy. A tiny, shaven head, a face whose jaws and 
brow stand out. Barefoot, he jumps without 
stopping. He also wants to wave his arms in 
order to stay warm. The blanket falls open. It 
is a woman. The skeleton of a woman. She is 
nude. 
By transexualising the woman from old woman, young girl, 
small boy and young woman, the narrative effectively 
constructs the Musulman as the essential witness-as-
effaced-memory, encompassing those "walking dead" who were 
literally disfigured by emaciation, disease and torture as 
well as the Jewish deportees who passed from the camps' 
station platforms directly to the gas chambers: the old, 
the children, the sick and frail and the pregnant women. 
DISMEMBERED BODIES, DISPLACED MEMORIES 
After biological death, bodies are incinerated, 
altered as human remains. It is after death that the body 
becomes truly effaced as body, as memory of a body, 
stripped of its "human" referentiality, and commodified as 
"material" in a process of exchange whereby the 
dismemberment/re-memberment of body parts effectively 
erases memory by transposing another identity onto those 
remains. 10 The identity of the body is recalled, not as 
the death of a person, but as a commodified object. ·This 
would, in effect, bring about a double displacement of 
memory for the dismemberment/re-memberment of body parts 
simultaneously covers over the body's identity as a dead 
person as well as the history of how and why the person 
died. 
Comrnodif ication of body parts as a strategy which 
displaces memory is clearly illustrated when Delbo's 
10 In the language of the Nazi bureaucracy the term 
employed for human remains is Materiel. 
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narrator describes how in Auschwitz [ ... ] au printemps des 
hommes et des femmes repandent les cendres sur les marais 
asseches pour la premiere fois laboures et f ertilisent le 
sol avec du phosphate humain [,] (1970a:l8), ([ ... ] in the 
spring men and women scatter the ashes over the marshes, 
drained and ploughed for the first time, and fertilise the 
soil with human phosphate) . In a perversion of burial 
rites as memorial practice the use of human remains as 
fertiliser effectively replaces/re-places the memory of the 
victims through a linguistic and material exchange which 
literally disperses the memory of the victims. Primo Levi 
supplements Delbo's narration of the obliteration of victim 
memory with a literal image of walking over the remains of 
the victim when he notes that: 
[t]he human ashes coming from the 
crematoria, tons daily, were easily 
recognised as such, because they of ten 
contained teeth or vertebrae. 
Nevertheless, they were employed for 
several purposes: as fill for swamp 
lands, as thermal insulation between 
the walls of wooden buildings. as 
phosphate fertiliser: and especially 
notable, they were used instead of 
gravel to cover the paths of the SS 
village located near the camp. I 
couldn't say whether out of pure 
callousness or because, due to its 
origins, it was regarded as material 
. to be trampled on. (Levi, 1989, p.100) 
The use of human hair for upholstering furniture and 
skin for making lampshades underscore how the 
dismemberment of the body represents the literal 
dismantling of the material vestiges of individual humanity 
as such. These images of the dismemberment (and 
reconstitution in different form) of human remains are 
central to many representations of the Holocaust. These 
images are powerfully evoked by Alain Resnais and Jean 
Cayrol in their famous cinematic indictment of fascism -
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essentially symbolised, in their opinion, by the Nazi 
concentration camp system in their film, Nuit et 
Brouillard. 11 The notion of dismantled humanity, 
articulated in the dismemberment and reconstitution of the 
body as 11 stuff" is best summed up by Theodor Adorno who 
states that 11 in the concentration camps it is no longer an 
individual who died, but a specimen [ ... ] 11 • (Adorno, 
1973:362) 
COLLAPSING MEMORIES, NARRATING MEMORIES 
The identification of and distinction between the two 
memories which Delbo makes is central to the narrative 
project itself for deep memory 
[ ... ] garde les sensations, les 
empreintes physiques. C' est la 
memoire des sens. Car ce ne sont pas 
les mots qui sont gonfles de charge 
emotionnelle. Sinon, quelqu'un qui a 
ete torture par la soif pendant des 
semaines ne pourrai t pl us j amais dire: 
«J' ai soif. Faisons une tasse de 
the.» Le mot aussi s'est dedouble. {14) 
[ ... ] retains the sensations, the 
physical imprints. This is the memory 
of the senses. For it is not the 
words which are filled with emotional 
charge. Otherwise, someone who had 
been tortured by thirst for weeks on 
end would never again be able to say, 
"I am thirsty. Let's make a cup of 
tea. 11 The word itself has also split. 
11 This film performs a simultaneous effacement of the 
memory of the dismembered Jewish body. We are reminded that, on 
the hierarchy of the camps, "the Jews are at the very bottom. 
Then come the victims of the Night and Fog Decree, political 
prisoners, common criminals, and, above them, the Kapo; still 
higher is the SS, and highest of all, the Commandant." {Avisar, 
1988: 8) The film's title effectively silences the memory of 
those camp inmates who were "lower" on the hierarchy of the 
camps. Moreover, Jewish genocide is not specifically mentioned 
in the film, eliding the murder of the Jews into a universalised 
cinematic narrative of the Holocaust. 
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Through this operation of a linguistic truncation which 
enacts a separation between the survivor, the Auschwitz 
experience and its return in deep memory, Delbo suggests 
that a primary memory which defies historicisation and 
resists narrativisation can be identified in survivor 
narrative. Thus, la memoire profonde comes to represent a 
perpetual present time of the Lager, what literary critic 
Lawrence Langer calls a "disintegrating time". (1994: 72) 
Indeed, Eli Wiesel presents the anti-narrativising movement 
of la memoire profonde as an imploding temporality when he 
notes that "Auschwitz is the death of time, the end of 
creation [ ... ] " (Wiesel, 1978: 198) . Thus, the very temporal 
structure of deep memory represents an anti-historicising 
current which challenges the return or the "after 
Auschwitz" life-world of the survivor, by continuously 
threatening to plunge the survivor into the Lager. Hence, 
when Delbo's survivor/narrator acknowledges that when deep 
memory unexpectedly and spontaneously punctures her 
reconstructed uni verse she fears that 11 le camp me rattrape" 
(13) (the camp catches me again). Through its undistilled 
virtualisation of the horror and trauma of the camp 
experience, the sensory memory which is la memoire 
profonde, replaces the sensation itself and re-places the 
survivor back in the camp. The motif of the recurring 
dream, narrated, in Mesure de nos Jours, functions, as we 
will see further on, as a narrative of threatened re-
placement. Here, we are presented with a shifting from 
representation to reality which emerges when the 
distantiating constructs of common memory are no longer in 
place such as in dreams, delirium, ill-health, moments of 
mental/emotional "collapse". Illustrating this point, we 
turn to the same text where a Jewish survivor, Ida, 
narrates, her survival, return and reconstructed life-world 
as a mirror of "normality". She describes how, after her 
having returned and discovered that she is the sole 
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remaining member of her entire family, she marries and has 
a child. Just when it appears that everything is going 
well, she describes how an unforeseen and insurmountable 
anxiety grips her and threatens to destroy her replicated 
life-world. "Ma gorge s'etranglait, ma poitrine etait 
ecrasee dans un cerceau de fer, mon coeur m'etouffait. Je 
me suis mise a crier de terreur", she tells.us (1971:19). 
(My throat was being strangled, my chest was crushed by a 
hoop of iron, my heart was smothering me. I began to shout 
in terror.) She is hospitalised, "treated" and returns home 
to discover that the original anguish takes the form of a 
split consciousness. "Quand j 'ai repris mes esprits, j 'ai 
eu un choc", (When I returned to my senses, I got a fright) 
she continues (1971:119). At this point Ida/the narrator 
brackets her statement of shock with a discovery, in direct 
speech and in the present tense, enacting, in turn, a 
return to the camp which is narrated as a shift in temporal 
consciousness: 
<<Pourquoi suis-je ici? Qu'est-ce que 
je fais ici? Je suis enfermee. On va 
me garder enf ermee. » J' ai eu peur. 
Attendre et laisser passer l'occasion, 
non. Je devais fuir. Vite. En un 
clin d'oeil ma decision etait prise. 
J'ai enfile ma robe de chambre et j'ai 
saute par la fenetre. [ ... J J'avais 
voulu fuir. D'ailleurs, c'est 
difficile a expliquer. J'etais double 
et je ne parvenais pas a reunir mes 
doubles. (1971:119-120) 
"Why am I here? What am I doing here? 
I am locked up. I will be kept locked 
up." Should I wait and let the 
opportunity pass? No. I had to flee. 
Quickly. In a wink my decision was 
made. I took off my dressing-gown and 
I jumped out of the window. [ ... ] I 
had wanted to flee. Besides. it is 
difficult to explain. I was double 
and I did not manage to bring my 
doubles together. 
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Deep memory and the language which represents it 
precipitates the expression of both a re-placement of the 
narrator in the camp and her threatened subjectivity. By 
projecting the narrator back to the camp, the narration of 
deep memory threatens the very fabric of the survivor's 
reconstructed univers·e, metaphorically signified by the 
"dressing-gown", and explodes existing interpretative and 
narrative frameworks ("I jumped out of the window"). 
The trilogy presents survivors in varying stages of 
struggle with their memories. Indeed the very notion of a 
survival narrative, a traditionally heroic genre of 
narrative, is subverted by these representations of 
survival as perpetually doomed consciousness. Thus, when 
the division between deep and common memory is blurred, the 
texts present survival as sustained (as opposed to post-) 
emotional, psychological and emotional trauma, a perpetual 
suffering of debilitating and pathological illness. 
Indeed, certain vignettes in Mesure de nos Jours narrate 
anamnesis precisely as amnesia. However, when the 
boundaries of separation which are set up by the clear 
distinction and opposition between the two memories Delbo's 
survivor/narrator is presented as ontologically different, 
split, from the prisoner-self in Auschwitz: 
Au contraire de ceux dont la vie s'est 
arretee au seuil du retour, qui depuis 
vi vent en survie, moi j 'ai le 
sentiment que celle qui etait au camp, 
ce n'est pas moi, ce n'est pas la 
personne qui est la, en face de vous. 
Non, c'est trap incroyable. Et tout 
ce qui est arrive a cette autre, celle 
d 'Auschwitz ne me gene pas, ne se mele 
pas de ma vie. Comme si ce n 'etai t 
pas moi du tout. Sans cette coupure, 
je n'aurais pas pu revivre. (13) 
As opposed to those whose life stopped 
at the threshold of the return, who 
1 i ve · as survivors, I have the 
impression that the person who was in 
the camp is nqt me, she is not the 
person who is there, in front of you. 
No that is too 
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unbelievable/incredible. And 
everything that happened to this 
other, that person at Auschwitz, does 
not trouble me, does not become mixed 
up with my life. As if she was not me 
at all. Without this cut, I would not 
be able to live again. 
Other anecdotal presentations of survivors manifest 
the survivor as profoundly anguished, awaiting the release 
offered by death and unable to distinguish between the self 
in Auschwitz and the survivor. Thus, Mado concludes in 
Mesure de nos Jours (1971), that since all her comrades who 
died at Auschwitz were stronger and more resolved than her, 
she, by sheer logic, could not have survived in the sense 
of being animated by any signs of life other than 
physiological. Her narration presents survival as a post-
Auschwitz, pre-death purgatory. Thus, punctuating her 
narration as evidence to this suspended state of limbo is 
the refrain "Je ne suis pas vivante" (I am not 
alive/living) (1971) Clearly then, by thinking through a 
morphology of personal memory, Delbo suggests that both 
survival and memory is irreducible, subjective and 
resistant to essentialising explanations. 
COMMON MEMORY, HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND NARRATING 
RUPTURE 
Common memory is described as an "external" memory 
which resides in the intellect, in thought and in language. 
As such, it would seem that common memory is the faculty of 
recall which enacts the spacio-temporal distanciation 
between the survivor and the Lager, the consciousness of 
which permits a narration, however problematic that 
narration may be. Common memory is therefore constituted 
by and through a historical consciousness which enables a 
speaking of Auschwitz. Hence, " [ .. J lorsque je vous parle 
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d'Auschwitz ce n'est pas de la memoire profonde que 
viennent mes paroles. Les paroles viennent de la memoire 
externe, si je puis dire, la memoire intellectuelle, la 
memoire de la pensee. II (14) ( [ ... ] when I speak to you 
about Auschwitz my words do not come from deep memory. The 
words come from external memory, so to speak, intellectual 
memory, memory of thought.) Clearly, the two memories of 
the survivor emerge as parallel 'sites of recall which 
constitute opposing modalities of spacio-temporal 
consciousness. While common memory facilitates speaking, 
enabling return, deep memory threatens integrity. 
It is significant that Delbo locates la memoire 
ordinaire in the 11 external 11 or common space of language, of 
intellect. This would imply that ordinary memory, while 
challenging the boundaries of representability, can both 
frame narration and be narrated. By narratabili ty of 
ordinary memory, I mean that the survivor account is able 
to be placed in a temporal framework whose linearity, 
chronology or circularity bears out a consciousness of 
historical time, time of narration, narrative time and the 
discursive distance between these temporal modalities. 
The organisation and temporal structuration of Delbo's 
texts is significant regarding the narrativity of common 
memory. The thematic treatment of Auschwitz is different 
in each volume yet in all three texts the narrative is 
structured through a series of narrative vignettes 
interspersed with poetry in verse and prose. The 
specifically anti-linear structure of the first and third 
volumes presents a temporality which is neither progressive 
nor chronological, manifesting a narration which 
structurally represents common memory punctured by the 
traumatising, collapsing moments which trace deep memory. 
In Aucun de nous ne Reviendra, the narrator describes 
a scene during morning roll-call at Auschwitz where she 
watches a woman being killed by the dog of an SS guard. 
She punctuates this narration with the comment that 11 [ ••• ] 
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maintenant je suis dans un cafe a ecrire cette histoire 
car cela devient une histoire." (1970a:45) (now I am in a 
cafe writing this story - for this is becoming a story) . 
A little further on she notes that " [ ... ] nous restons 
debout dans la neige. Immobiles dans la plaine immobile. 
Et maintenant je suis dans un cafe a ecrire ceci." 
(1970a:45) (we remain standing in the snow. Motionless on 
the motionless plain. And now I am in a cafe writing 
.. 
this.) The narration of the event breaks down, yet at the 
faultlines of representation, the resources of common 
memory which are invoked to narrate the collapse are the 
constitutive terms of the narration itself. Thus, the 
narrator signals the breakdown of the testimony by drawing 
attention to its discursive framework: the becoming of a 
story. By presenting the narration as "mere story" the 
narrator succeeds in making visible the limits of "story-
telling" in narrating Auschwitz. Hence, the "story" 
becomes the presentation of collapse of the narration whose 
progression is interrupted by the compression signified by 
the "motionlessness" of both temporal and spacial 
consciousness which has emerged at this point. 
Delbo's narratives are presented as shot through with 
' the tension engendered between the impulse of two memories 
one producing a narration; the other collapsing a 
narration - which are present and continuously overlap, 
and sometimes are mutually indistinguishable, in the 
narrator/survivor's consciousness and in·the narrative. In 
this way, the narration of Auschwitz proceeds through a 
structure whose organisation imitates the effects of 
massive trauma on the narration of memory. 
Delbo' s notion of common memory seems to straddle 
seemingly conflicting positions regarding debates on 
communicability and representability of the Auschwitz 
experience. Surviving the concentration camps and 
consecrating a testimony as a specifically literary text 
reveal Delbo's conviction that memory of the Shoah resides 
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in the trajectory of the literary text and its canonic 
status in historical consciousness. Supporting Theodor 
Adorno' s reformulated conviction that perhaps it only 
artistic representation which, however limited, can respond 
to Auschwitz, Delbo' s exploration of imaginative discourse 
and its possibilities as an approach to historicisation and 
transmission of the event of the Shoah raises important 
questions regarding literary form and historical truth, or 
more precisely, literary form as historical truth (White, 
1978). In an interview with the French actuality magazine, 
L'Express (1966), Delbo gestures to the resource offered by 
common memory's idiom: 
Certains ont dit que la deportation ne 
pouvait pas entrer dans la 
litterature, que c'etait trop 
terrible, que l'on n'avait pas le 
droit d'y toucher ... Dire ·9a, c'est 
diminuer la litterature, je crois 
qu 'el le est assez grande pour tout 
englober. Un ecrivain doit ecrire sur 
ce qui le touche. J'y suis allee, 
pourquoi n'aurais-je pas le droit 
d'ecrire la-dessus ce que j'ai envie 
d'ecrire? Il n'y a pas de mots pour 
le dire. Eh bien! vous n'avez qu'a en 
trouver rien ne doi t echapper au 
langage. 
Certain people have said that the 
deportation was not able to become 
literature, that it was too terrible, 
that no-one had the right to touch 
it ... To say that is to diminish 
literature, I believe that literature 
is big enough to encompass everything. 
A writer has to write what touches 
her/him. I went there, why shouldn't 
I have the right to write about 
whatever I feel like writing? No 
words can express it. Well then, you 
only have to find them - nothing has 
to escape language. 
Delbo's statement is important in that it challenges 
received notions of incommunicability. What her texts 
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reveal, rather, is a rendering immanent of something 
indefinable, incommunicable, unnameable. Her narrative 
strategy, echoed in this newspaper interview, proceeds from 
a narration of fragments, of silences and interrupted 
continuity, and yet, they do not disperse signification 
into a Borgesian mirror of infinite word-play and endless 
meaning. Coherent meaning is produced through the 
narration of fragments which are underpinned by the very 
referential reality named in the title of the trilogy: 
Auschwitz and After. Thus, Delbo' s belief in the 
inclusivity of literature, in literature's ability to 
adequately present survival of and experience in the camps 
suggests that the challenge to representation is not for 
lack or poverty of resources within the literary 
system/canon, 
produced at 
Delbo's common memory. Literature is 
the faultlines of human experience and 
imagination. If the faultlines are extended, or if human 
experience is reconstituted along different faul tlines, 
new imaginary and representational strategies must be 
produced. In this way, Delbo suggests that it is the 
creators and contributors of the literary and historical 
canons who are charged with examining innovative 
representational modes. By focusing on the role of the 
artist, Delbo emphasises how it is the communicative 
capacity of common memory's resources which underlies the 
problematic representation and narration of the Auschwitz 
experience. Shoshana Felman has persuasively argued that 
testimonial narrative, which blurs the boundaries of 
conventional narrative categories, responds to Delbo' s call 
to explore new representational modes. (Felman & Laub, 
1992) 
It becomes evident that Delbo's conflation of memory 
and skin is in itself a narration of memory whose enacted 
remembrance becomes a powerful gesture of resistance which 
negates the very essence of 'the Nazi aim: to erase every 
trace of racially/genetically abhorrent existence and to 
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negate the very possibility of bearing witness to genocide, 
that is, to erase the memory of the annihilation. 
Illustrating this point clearly in his Poznan speech, 
Heinrich Himmler refers to the Nazi genocidal endeavour as 
being [ ... ] a page of glory in our history which has never 
to be written and is never to be written [ ... ] ." 1 This 
now famous reference to a never-to-be written history 
refers simultaneously · to the Nazi enterprise of 
extermination of target-groups: "Jews", "Gypsies", 
"homosexuals", "mentally ill" (LaCapra, 1994: 88), to the 
endeavour to ensure that no witnesses remained to testify 
to that enterprise, and, finally to the resistance to 
representation in language of those very events. 
In a reference to Auschwitz, German philosopher Jurgen 
Habermas hints at this notion of the unrepresentable in the 
writing of a history of Auschwitz, of history after 
Auschwitz, when he suggests that "Auschwitz has changed the 
basis for the continuity of the conditions of life within 
history and this not only in Germany". (Quoted in 
Friedlander, 1993: 49) To speak, then, as a survivor of 
Auschwitz, about Auschwitz is to edify resistance to the 
effacement of history-as-memory. 
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CHAPTER II 
AUCUN DE NOUS NE REVIENDRA 12 
Garder le silence. Le silence ne se garde pas, il est sans egard pour l'oeuvre qui pretendrait 
le garder - il est l'exigence d'une attente qui n'a rien a attendre, d'un langage qui, se supposant 
totalite de discours, se depenserait d'un coup, se desunirait, se fragmenterait sans fin. 
(Maurice Bll!Jlcbot, L'Ecriture du Desastre, p.51) 
I. SHATTERED/SHATTERING MEMORY: A PROGRAMME FOR 
REPRESENTATION 
The first volume of the trilogy is Delbo/the 
narrator's account of the first weeks in Auschwitz, but in 
its fragmented form and unsettling style, this volume will 
be read as the setting out of an aesthetic programme for 
the representation of Holocaust memory and the silencing 
ruptures of deep memory. 
When the narrator of Aucun de nous ne Reviendra (None 
of us will Return) says on the final numbered page of text 
that " [ ... ] nous avons perdu la memoire I I aucun de nous ne 
reviendra." ( 182) 13 ( [ ••• ] we have lost our memory. None of 
us will return), she is suggesting that memory which has 
been lost is obviously not the faculty of recollection 
itself, but the medium of referential language which frames 
a shattered and shattering remembering, which renders 
fragmentation immanent. By examining the way in which 
memory functions in narrative as its own subverting, self-
doubting counter-impulse we can understand how the 
survivor, as a witness, perpetually finds her/himself on 
the threshold of contradictory and paralysing injunctions 
which problematise both memorialisation as well as the act 
12 A first draft of this chapter was presented as a paper 
entitled, Charlotte Delbo: Language, crisis and identity after 
Auschwitz, at the "Literary Responses to the Holocaust" 
conference, University of Cape Town, 11-12 August, 1994. 
13 All quotations from Aucun de nous ne reviendra, in this 
chapter, will be referenced by page number only. 
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of bearing witness. 
A clue to understanding how the crisis of survival and 
memory is articulated around language and identity is 
provided by the title of this first volume. The "return" 
to which the title, Aucun de nous ne Reviendra refers is 
literally to the certainty of "life" from the probability 
of death, a return to an integrated self which is presented 
as a return to language but not as a return to "wholeness". 
Return to language, in these texts, is understood as the 
making visible, the uttering of the traces of fracture 
represented by survival of limit-experiences. Thus, by 
juxtaposing the notions of an integrated identity and a 
hesitating language, the psychoanalytically framed 
proposition that by narrating an event we come to "master" 
or to possess it is demonstrated to be both authentic in 
its unconditional validation of the survivor and the 
survivor's testimony and invalid in its supposition that 
telling, narrating necessarily precedes a healing of that 
trauma. The relationship between the identity of the 
survivor as a speaking subject and her /his return to 
language is therefore interconnected and important in the 
narration of this text. 
By return to language I mean to both figurative and 
literal referential language, inherent in Delbo's 
definition of "common memory" which, until the watershed 
trauma signified by Auschwitz, had been bound to the 
historic or poetic reality which it represented. 
Contemporary literary theory (for example, Barthes, 1972; 
Kristeva, 1974; Foucault,· 1975; Lyotard, 1983; Foucault, 
1975; Derrida, 1977) has demonstrated that the relationship 
between language and the reality which it produces is 
contingent and arbitrary and has been placed in a state of 
conflict, ambiguity, and self-conscious irony. Thus, if we 
understand language, in a post-Auschwitz world, as having 
lost its "innocence", it is precisely this "idyllic" state 
of language (Kofman, 1987 :23) to which none of us will 
47 
return. 
THE DOUBLE-BIND OF REPRESENTATION 
Central to an examination of Aucun de Nous ne 
Reviendra is an analysis of how both the fragmentary nature 
of memory as well as the dispersing nature of silence 
impacts on the literary representation of the Auschwitz 
experience in Delbo's trilogy. This examination is 
preceded by a consideration of Gregory Bateson's theory of 
the double-bind which will then be read back to the 
survivor/narrator's "return to language" as a way of 
representing, in the wake of massive trauma, the silences 
of memory, or rather, memory as fragmentation. 
The notion of the double-bind has evolved through 
behavioural theory's formulation of a theoretical framework 
for the study of .,schizophrenia. The most notable exponent 
of the double-bind hypothesis has been Gregory Bateson 
(1956) whose theorisation is based, significantly, on 
communications analysis. The scene is set for the 
hypothesis of the double-bind when the communication 
pat terns derived from the theory of Logical Types 
between mother and child break down and produce a 
pathological reaction (in the child) whose most radical 
manifestation of a pathology is schizophrenia. According 
to Bateson's theory, the double-bind situation relies on a 
series of contradictory injunctions, alternatively negative 
and positive; verbal and non-verbal; literal and non-
literal, which place conflicting demands on the 
addressee/ "victim" (sic) (Bateson, 1956: 253) . A tertiary 
negative injunction prohibits the addressee from leaving 
the space of conflict with the effect of paralysing the 
potential for reaction. Thus, the addressee becomes 
immobilised at the very threshold of response. Moreover, 
the double-bind situation arises when the addressee of the 
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seemingly contradictory injunctions understands the 
injunctions ~s literal when they are produced and intended 
as metaphorical. By demonstrating how communication of the 
message generates its own breach, Bateson shows how the 
double-bind is constructed as a problem of language and 
meaning. 
The notion of the double-bind is a useful 
interpretative tool in examining how Delbo's ruptured 
narrations function as formal constituents which collapse 
the possibility of both teleological narratives and linear 
narrations. Fragmented memories, constructed as such in 
response to massive trauma, are represented through the 
very form which resists them. (Felman & Laub, 1992:57-74) 
The double-bind therefore demonstrates how a point of 
conflict upon which Delbo's narrative is contingent enacts 
the very dilemma which it attempts to represent and which, 
in turn, reflects the survivor/witness's struggle with 
credibility and self-doubt· in post-Auschwitz narrative. 
Hence, if we understand the formal features of the 
narrative as resembling the structure of the double-bind 
situation, Delbo's narratives aesthetically render the very 
crisis or rupture which resist representation. 
Delbo precedes the narration proper with an epigraph 
on an unnumbered page: "Aujourd'hui, je ne suis pas sure 
que ce que j'ai ecrit soit vrai. Je suis sure que c'est 
veridique." (Today, I am not sure if what I have written is 
true. I am certain that it is truthful/authentic.) Like 
the epigraph at the beginning of the text the final page 
of text is also unnumbered and bears one short sentence: 
"Aucun de nous n 'aurai t du revenir." (None of us should 
have returned.) By following and preceding the narrative 
proper with these paratextual avertissements (warnings), 
Delbo is constituting her narrative between a subjective 
expression of doubt and an expression of disbelief which, 
by subverting the forensic certainty of first-hand memory 
signified by the narratorial status of survivor-witness, 
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highlights the conflicting and destabilising mechanisms 
inherent in the very process which constructs narrative-as-
testimony. Thus, the narrative which is placed within 
these paratextual parentheses has to be read in the light 
of this problematisation of truth modalities raised by the 
prologue and epilogue. In this way, Delbo seems to suggest 
that the essence of post-Auschwitz narrative resides in a 
non-closure where something remains both unsaid and 
' 
unsayable. Geoffrey Hartman refers to this idea of the 
unsayable when he invokes Jean-Frarn;:ois Lyotard's 
suggestion that post-Auschwitz narrative must "present the 
existence of the unpresentable" (Hartman, 1992:321). 
SILENCE: DEEP MEMORY ON THE THRESHOLD OF TESTIMONY 
In her book, Paroles Suffoquees (1987), dedicated to 
her father who died in Auschwitz, Sara Kofman moves towards 
a striking definition of what it means to write after 
Auschwitz. Motivated by an ethical imperative that no 
narrative (denoted by the French word "recit") is possible 
after Auschwitz, Kofman's critique examines the possibility 
of a post-Auschwitz aesthetics through her reading of 
Maurice Blanchet' s L' Idylle (The Idyll) and Apres coup 
(After the Event) . What is this ethical imperative? 
Shoshana Felman suggests it is a demand that post-Auschwitz 
narrative bears both the traces of rupture and negation 
imposed by the Auschwitz experience with previously 
immutable values represented by the Enlightenment legacy in 
Western consciousness (Felman & Laub, 1992) . This means 
that narrative qua narrative bears witness to the event of 
Auschwitz, as well as to the traces of the contradictions 
inherent in the process of bearing witness. In this way 
the complexities of telling and writing engendered firstly 
by the survivor/witness's claim to silence, and secondly by 
the impulse to testify to the event witnessed, would be 
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underscored. 
Finding no adequate rendering offered by the 
distorting and limiting modes of representation and 
experiencing a betrayal of the sanctity and magnitude of 
the experience which only silence upholds, the survivor 
resorts to being a silent witness. On the other hand, to 
testify on behalf of the self and on behalf of the dead as 
well as to validate the survivor's crossing from the fate 
of Auschwitz to the arbitrary fate of life, impel the 
survivor/witness to tell the experience. Articulation of 
memory in Shoah survivor narrative, then, bears out 
multiple dilemmas raised by this near-impossibility of 
speaking about the event. As we have seen, the title to 
the trilogy already evokes one of the essential dilemmas of 
the survivor/witness, who find themselves at the threshold 
of contradictory injunctions to remain silent in the face 
of the unutterable as well as to bear witness for the dead 
and returning self. 
Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard outlines the ways in which 
silence is implicated in the testimonial utterance when he 
writes that, 
Le silence ne signale pas quelle est 
l'instance niee, il signale qu'une ou 
des instances sont niees. Les 
survivapts se taisent, et l 'on peut 
entendre (1) que la situation en 
question (le cas) n'est pas l'affaire 
du destinataire (il n 'a pas la 
competence, ou il ne merite pas qu'on 
lui en par le, etc.) ,. ou (2) qu 'elle 
n'a pas eu lieu (c'est qu'entend 
Faurisson) / OU (3) qu'il n'y a rien a 
en dire (elle est insensee, 
inexprimable) ,. ou (4) que ce n 'est 
pas l'affaire des survivants d'en 
parler (ils n'en sont pas dignes, 
etc.). Ou plusieurs de ces negations 
ensemble. (Lyotard, 1983:31) 
Silence does not indicate which 
instance is denied, it signals the 
denial of one or more of the 
instances. The survivors remain 
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silent, and it can be understood 1) 
that the situation in question (the 
case) is not the addressee's business 
(he or she lacks the competence, or he 
or she is not worthy of being spoken 
to about it, etc.); or 2) that it 
never took place (this is what 
Faurisson understands); or 3) that 
there is nothing to say about it (the 
situation is senseless, 
inexpressible); or 4) that it is not 
the survivors' business to be talking 
about it (they are not worthy, etc . ) 
Or, several of these negations 
together.). (Lyotard, 1988:14) 
Clearly then, the survivor/narrator desires to testify and 
yet is unable to. Silence imprisons the survivor/narrator 
at a crossroads of multiple contradictory injunctions: to 
remain silent in the face of the unutterable for language 
cannot adequately represent the memories; to speak and to 
bear witness for the vanished and the dead as well as for 
the returning/surviving self. Lyotard, however, goes 
further by implicating the addressee, and by extension, the 
reception of testimony, in the silencing of the survivor's 
story, an important consideration which contests received 
ideas regarding the historical silence of the survivor and 
which will be examined further in Chapter Four. 
It is precisely and only through language, the 
survivor's resource of "common memory", that the telling of 
the self and the telling of the dead after Auschwitz can be 
narrated. Such a narration would necessarily separate the 
self or the survivor/narrator from the dead, those "silent 
others", and would therefore facilitate the survivor's 
inscription of the self in the world of the living. In 
this way the very narrative process of telling the story of 
the dead, silenced anonymous - literally effaced - in the 
context of their death save for their tattooed numbers, 
becomes a mourning, that is, the ordering of an eulogizing 
ritual whose enactment facilitates the speaking subject's 
survival as a return to "wholeness" through language. 
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Besides facilitating this re-inscription of the 
individual into the world of the living, telling erects a 
memorial for the dead. Telling the story and remembering 
the dead become the self-same act. This memorialising 
function of testimony fulfils the survivor's self-imposed 
mandate to return precisely in order to tell the stories of 
the dead and so to inscribe them into a collective memory, 
into a historical consciousness. In this way memorialising 
embeds a ritualised/ritualising mourning, a eulogising 
testimony into the survivor's testimony. 
II. CRISIS OF NAMING: DYING EFFACES DEATH 
At the beginning of the text, the question of 
language, of an unsayable testimony, is constituted as a 
crisis of naming. The narration of contested 
representation as a crisis of naming disputes, in turn, the 
proposition that the writing of death in Auschwitz can be 
a eulogising inscription. In this way, the narrative defies 
a rhe'toric of death at the same time as it edifies a 
textual memorial for those who died. 
When the train transports arrive at Auschwitz the 
narrator suggests that the new arrivals 
[ • •• J voudraient savoir ou ils sont. 
Ils ne savent pas que c 'est ici le 
centre de l'Europe. Ils cherchent la 
plaque de la gare. C'est une gare qui 
n'a pas de nom. (12) 
[ ... ] would 1 ike to know where they 
are. They do not know that this is the 
centre of Europe. They look for the 
name of the station. It is a station 
which has no name. A station which for 
them will never have a name. 
Later, Auschwitz is described as a town which has no name. 
By separating herself from the nameless "them", those who 
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will never return, who will never bear witness, the 
narrator demonstrates the survivor/witness's concern with 
the representation of unnameability. To name after 
Auschwitz, then, is to speak about unnameability, in other 
words, to bring into question the ways in which we think 
about the world, the ways in which we name. 
This problem of language and intelligibility resonates 
throughout the narrative. Describing the scene of a dying 
prisoner attempting to climb a snowbank in order to suck 
some water from the snow and then, turning to her fellow 
prisoners for help, we read that "[s]a main s'agite une 
fois encore comme un cri - et· elle ne crie pas. Dans 
quelle langue crierait-elle si elle criait?" (46-47) ( [h] er 
hand waves once again like a cry - and she does not cry 
out. In what language would she cry if she were to cry 
out?) Only the body bears traces of the decipherable 
signs of dying, of approaching death. Thus, 
[ ... ] la mart se peint sur le visage, 
s'y plaque implacablement et il n'est 
pas besoin que nos regards se 
rencontrent pour que nous comprenions 
toutes en regardant Suzanne Rose 
qu 'elle va mourir, en regardant 
Mounette qu'elle va mourir. La mart 
est marquee a la peau callee aux 
pommettes, a la peau callee aux 
orbites, a la peau callee aux 
maxillaires. (107) 
[ ... ] death presents itself on the 
face, it announces itself implacably 
and there is not necessary that our 
glances meet for all of us to 
understand by looking at Suzanne Rose, 
that she is going to die, by looking 
at Mounette, that she is going to die. 
Death is traced on the skin clinging 
to the cheekbones, on the skin 
clinging to the eyesockets, on the 
skin clinging to the jawbones. 
The repetition of "la peau" (the skin) serves to underline 
how the body functions as the locus of the obliterating and 
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transfiguring violence perpetrated by the concentrationary 
system against the individual. Moreover, I would suggest 
that the repetition of "la peau" serves to enumerate the 
material signs of death as a way to re-embody the dead in 
the testimonial narrative. Significantly, in this 
instance, re-embodying the dead is preceded by naming 
those prisoners who bear the signs of approaching death. 
Later, however, the narrator's nameless neighbour is dying 
beside her and calls to her. The narrator asks: 
Appelle-t-elle? Pourquoi appelle-t-
elle? Elle a eu tout d'un coup la mort 
sur son visage, la mort violette aux 
ail es du nez, la mort au fond des 
orbites, la mort dans ses doigts que 
se tordent et se nouent comme des 
brindilles que mord la flamme, et elle 
dit dans une langue inconnue des 
paroles que je n'entends pas. (181) 
Is she calling? Why is she calling? 
All of a sudden she has death on her 
face, violet death on the sides of her 
nostrils, death at the depths of her 
eye sockets, death in her fingers that 
twist and crumple like twigs devoured 
by a flame, and she speaks in an 
unknown tongue words which I do not 
hear. 
Here, language's primal communicative function is lost, the 
intermediary between speaker and listener has been 
irrevocably altered and the ungraspable language serves 
rather to highlight the alienation of the individual in her 
death. The face, nostrils, eye sockets and fingers are 
inscribed with the testimony of their own destruction, an 
inscription resisted by the unknown tongue which is 
language. By presenting death in Auschwitz as irreducible 
to language but as possessing, at the same time, its own 
unknowable system of signification, the narrator implies 
that the narration of death in the camps, while belonging 
to its own hermetic (unnameable) logic, defies a poetics of 
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death. In this way, death in Auschwitz narrates the 
process of dying as an impenetrable, unknowable and 
solitary experience (Amery, 1986:17). Thus, the trope of 
the crisis of naming, figured by the "unknown language" of 
death manifests the narrator/survivor's concern not to 
ascribe to death in Auschwitz a meaning. Jean-Frarn;ois 
Lyotard' s statement that " 'Auschwitz' est 1 1 interdi t de la 
belle mort [,]" (Lyotard, 1983: 149) ("Auschwitz is the 
forbiddance of the beautiful death [,] ") (Lyotard, 1988: 100) 
clearly echoes the narrator/survivor's concern to avoid a 
rhetoric of death in Auschwitz. Such a rhetoric is to give 
those who died a beautiful death, to ascribe a sense to 
their death and therefore to death in Auschwitz. At the 
same time, a rhetoric of death in the death camps and in 
the concentration camps is impossible. Illustrating this 
point, Jean Amery comments on the breakdown of death as 
aesthetic construct in the camps: 
For death in its literary, 
philosophic, or 
musical form there was no place in 
Auschwitz. No bridge led from death 
in Auschwitz to Death in Venice. Every 
poetic evocation of death became 
intolerable 1 whether it was Hesse / s 
"Dear Brother Death" or that of Rilke, 
who sang: "Oh Lord, give each his own 
death." The aesthetic view of death 
had revealed itself to the 
intellectual as part of an aesthetic 
mode of life; where the latter had 
been all but forgotten, the former was 
nothing but an elegant trifle. In the 
camp no Tristan music accompanied 
death, only the roaring of the SS and 
the Kapos. (1986:16-17) 
In the face of the collapse of representational 
resources with which to write about death/dying in 
Auschwitz, Delbo's narrator brings attention rather to this 
very collapse of representation. She describes how the 
56 
physical signs of death: "les langues gonflent noires, les 
bouches pourrissent" (180) (the swollen black tongues, the 
rotting mouths) resist the signification that language 
claims to assign to them. Hence, "Toutes les paroles sont 
depuis longtemps fletries I Tous les mots sont depuis 
longtemps decolores" (180) (All words have for a longtime 
become faded I All words have for a longtime become 
discoloured.) Neither written nor spoken language (denoted 
bye the French distinction between "paroles" and "mots") has 
the same referential capacity to figuratively render death 
after the Shoah. By juxtaposing the attempt to narrate the 
signs of death with the ironic presentation of the 
aesthetic impossibility of transmitting these signs in 
poetic verse, the narrator makes visible the limits of her 
own story. 
DYSFUNCTIONAL THROATS: THE STORY OF AN UNTOLD STORY 
Placed, so to speak, at the threshold of language, 
place of conflict, tension and contradiction imposed by the 
ethical imperative, writing after Auschwitz therefore 
testifies to its own impossible articulation. Referring to 
Robert Antelme's testament to the Lager, L'Espece Humaine, 
Kofman characterises the writing of Auschwitz as well as 
writing after Auschwitz as a contradictory impulse: A 
frenetic desire to tell, which Kofman significantly 
describes as un delire de paroles {Kofman, 1988: 44) ( a 
delirium of words), and at the same time an inability to 
speak. Such a writing is, precisely, the writing out of a 
double-bind. Fraught with tension, the process of writing 
after Auschwitz is, 
[ ... ] un etrange double-bind : une 
revendication infinie de parler, un 
devoir parler a l'infini, s'imposant 
avec une force irrepressible - et une 
impossibilite quasi physique de parler 
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: une suffocation·; une parole nouee, 
exigee et interdite, parce que trop 
longtemps rentree, arretee, restee 
dans la gorge et qui vous fait 
etouffer, perdre respiration, vous 
asphyxie, vous ote la possibilite meme 
de commencer. Devoir parler sans 
pouvoir parler [ .. . ) (Kofman, 1988:46) 
[a] double-bind which is the infinite 
revindication of speech, a command to 
speak which endlessly imposes itself 
with an irrepressible strength and ?n 
almost physical impossibility to 
speak: a suffocating, a choking, a 
demanding and forbidden language, 
which returns, stops and remains in 
the throat, suffocating, smothering, 
negating even the possibility of 
beginning. To have to speak and not 
being able to speak [ . .. ] . 14 
The contradiction and difficulty inherent in the process of 
bearing witness as well as the paradoxical role of language 
in this process is characterised metaphorically by the 
physical motion of choking, a motion significantly 
generated at the physiological point of vocalisation. The 
trope of the disfigured and fragmented body functions here 
as a projection of a witnessing interrupted by inevitable 
death. Kofman's description of choking, signified by the 
wounded and dysfunctional throat resonates throughout 
Delbo's text. 
In a description of the emptying out of "block 25", 
the dreaded transit block of the old, sick, mad, infirm and 
selected prisoners on the way to the gas chambers, the 
narrator remarks that the remaining live prisoners alighted 
the truck and they " [ ... ] hurlaient parce qu 'ell es savaient 
mais leS COrdeS VOCaleS S 1 etaient brisees danS leur gorge. II 
(57) ( [ ... J screamed because they knew, but their vocal 
cords had fractured in their throats.") In this way the 
dysfunctional throat becomes the symbol of witnessing the 
annihilation of the self and never bearing witness to that 
14 My translation 
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death. 
In another instance the same prisoner attempting to 
drink water from the snow is attacked and killed by a 
guard-dog on the order of an SS guard and we read: 
Le chien bondi t sur la femme, lui 
pl ante ses crocs dans la gorge. Et 
nous ne bougeons pas, engl uees dans 
une espece de visqueux qui nous 
empeche d'ebaucher meme un geste 
comme dans un reve. La femme crie. Un 
cri arrache. Nous ne savons pas si le 
cri vient d'elle ou de nous, de sa 
gorge crevee ou de la n6tre. Je sens 
les crocs du chien a ma gorge. Je 
crie. Je hurle; Aucun don ne sort de 
moi. Le silence du reve. {48) 
The dog pounces on the woman, sinks 
its teeth into her throat. And we do 
not move, stuck in a viscous substance 
that prevents us from making the even 
a gesture - as in a dream. The woman 
screams. A sustained scream. We do 
not know if the cry comes from her or 
from us, from her punctured throat or 
from ours. I feel the teeth of the dog 
at my throat. I scream. I shriek. Not 
a sound comes out of me. The silence 
of dreams. 
The conflation of narrator and prisoner as well as of dream 
and reality highlights the narrative threshold crossed by 
the survivor/witness from the living of her own death 
enacted here through death of the mauled prisoner, to the 
narration of the experience. 
The following extract, which, again, is underpinned by 
the image of the ravaged throat, is, significantly, a 
description of the narrator's nightmare. 
Les pieuvres nous etreignaient de 
leurs muscles visqueux et nous ne 
degagions un bras que pour etre 
etranglees par un tentacle qui 
s'enroulait autour du cou, serrait les 
vertebres, les serrait a les craquer, 
les vertebres, la trachee, 
l'oesophage, le larynx, le pharynx et 
tous ces conduits qu 'il y a dans le 
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COLI. les serrai t a les briser. Il 
fallait liberer la gorge et, pour se 
delivrer de l'etranglement, ceder les 
bras, les jambes, la taille [ ... ] (87) 
The octopi were strangling us with 
their viscous muscles and we freed an 
arm only to be choked by a tentacle 
that wrapped itself around our necks, 
squeezed the vertebrae, squeezed them 
until they snapped. The vertebrae, the 
trachea, the oesophagus, the larynx, 
the pharynx and all the passages of 
the throat, squeezed them till they 
broke. We had to free our throats in 
order to save ourselves from 
strangulation, we had to sacrifice our 
arms, our legs, our waists[ ... ]. 
i 
Survival is contingent upon freeing the passages of the 
throat, that is, upon telling the story. Here the 
narrator's nightmare provides a detailed description of the 
threat to each part of the anatomy which is used in 
vocalisation/giving voice. Once again, the enumeration and 
dislocation of body parts serve to stress that, after 
Auschwitz, transmission proceeds through the articulation 
of rupture and dislocation. However, the inverted 
order/sense signified by the nightmare universe and the 
context of description of the threatened witness, obviates 
the possibility of articulation, and the mud threatens to 
pore into the narrator's throat, nose, eyes and ears. 
Witnessing Auschwitz is silenced as the sense organs, locus 
of "deep memory's inscriptions on the body are drowned out. 
The nightmare of suffocation of assault to the organs 
of vocalisation is the narration of a threat to the telling 
of the story, to surviving in order to speak, of an 
unsuccessful witnessing. 
BURNING THIRST AND THE NEED TO BEAR WITNESS 
Two 
narrate, 
of the many vignettes 
under the title, LA 
comprising this volume 
SOIF (The thirst) , the 
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prisoner's experience of a tormenting and unrelenting 
thirst. Before examining the way in which the thirst 
functions as a metaphor for one of the constitutive 
elements of the double-bind situation, the survivor's 
internalised injunction to survive - improbable in itself -
in order to bear witness to the Shoah, I would like to 
examine how the trope of thirst is introduced in Delbo's 
text. In Shoshana Felman's.discussion of Paul Celan's poem 
Todesfuge the metaphor of the action of drinking is linked, 
through an association of images, to the act of writing 
(Felman & Laub, 1992:30). Significantly, Felman points out 
that, 
[ ... ] the act of drinking, 
traditionally a poetic metaphor for 
yearning, for romantic thirst and for 
desire, is here transformed into the 
surprisingly abusive figure of an 
endless torture and a limitless 
exposure [ ... 1 ( 1992: 30) 
It is precisely this transformation which Felman comments 
on that Delbo's narrator presents as the possibility of an 
unfulfilled witnessing (the death of the narrator) . 
Drinking, trope of physical and metaphysical yearning, of 
life-infusing desire - signifying here the possibility of 
bearing witness as the certainty of survival - is subverted 
by the narration of unending thirst, of the perpetual 
denial of drinking. Thus, the narrator precedes the 
narration of thirst in Auschwitz precisely with a 
presentation of the traditional narrative genres which will 
be subverted by the trope of thirst in the camp. She 
writes: 
La soif c'est le recit des 
explorateurs, vous savez, dans les 
livres de notre enfance. C'est dans 
le desert. Ceux qui voient des mirages 
et marches vers l'insaisissable oasis. 
Ils ont soif trois jours. Le chapitre 
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pathetique du livre. A la fin du 
chapitre, la caravane du 
ravitaillement arrive, elle s'etait 
egaree sur les pistes brouillees par 
la tempete. Les explorateurs crevent 
les outres, ils boivent. Ils boivent 
et ils n'ont plus soif. (114) 
Thirst is the narrative of the 
explorers, you know, in the books of 
our childhood. It is in the desert. 
Those who see the mirages and walk 
towards the unreachable oasis. For 
three days they are thirsty. The 
pathetic chapter of the book. At the 
end of the chapter, the caravan 
arrives with fresh provisions, it had 
lost its way on the slopes, clouded by 
the storm. The explorers burst the 
goatskins, they drink. They drink and 
they are no longer thirsty. 
Thirst in the Lager, however, has no respite. It is "le 
soif du marais" (114) (the thirst of the marsh) which is 
more burning than the thirst of the desert, in the face of 
which, "[l]a raison chancelle. La raison est terrassee par 




114) (Reason waivers. Reason is flattened by 
Reason can resist everything, it yields to 
Clearly then, it is not only a literary tradition 
of heroic narratives ("le recit des explorateurs" and "les 
livres de notre enfance 11 ) of triumph and victory, 
represented by the climactic imbibing of the libidinal, 
life-giving liquid counterpointed by the narration of 
struggle ("Le chapi tre pathetique") against physical 
hardship, psychological torment and cosmic elements which 
is being challenged. What is contested here is the very 
epistemological foundation which underpins the 
literary/historical tradition of these narratives: reason. 
If the narration of the Holocaust disrupts reason, it 
follows then that not only is thirst in Auschwitz a 
narrative trope with which to figure the corollary of 
Felman' s drinking/writing proposition, that is, to 
represent the impossibility of surviving in order to write, 
but a defiance of the grounds through which a writing of 
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survival produces traditional conceptions of truth. By 
presenting the writing of improbable survival, signified by 
the unquenchable thirst, as a breach with Reason, the 
narrator of Aucun de nous ne Reviendra, pre-empts survival 
itself as "unreasonable" and the reception of the 
survivor's narration as "unbelievable". The challenge of 
narrating and of representing the endurance and survival of 
massive trauma is that the utterance threatens to drift 
into a discourse which is outside of the language/reason 
construct, that is, into madness: 
Et le regard part a la derive, c'est 
le regard de la folie. Les autres 
di sent: << Elle est folle, elle est 
devenue fol le pendant la nui t », et 
elles font appel aux mots qui doivent 
reveiller la raison. (115) 
And the gaze drifts off, it is the 
gaze of madness. The others say, "She 
is mad, she went mad in the night", 
and they .appeal to words which are 
supposed to awaken reason. 
Self-doubting memory is narrated as the I/eye-witness's 
testimony of madness. The representation of disbelieved 
testimony - uttered and read as a madness - as the listless 
gaze of madness ("le regard part a la derive") inverts the 
authority of the eye-witness by placing her testimony 
outside of reason. In this way, the narrator's utterance 
of selfhood - as I-witness - constituted by the gaze of 
crazed thirst, once again presents the traces of memory as 
a banished testimony. 
As an impulse to testify we could read the yearning to 
drink as a metaphorical life-giving need to bear witness: 
just as water is the fundamental physical requirement for 
life, so the need to transmit, to articulate testimony is 
a fundamental psychical requirement for life after 
survival. Anticipating this libidinally-charged duty of 
testimony, the narrator presents the imploring pleas of 
the women in Auschwitz block 25, destined for the gas 
chambers, as cries to drink water. "On les voyai t aux 
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grillages des fenetres," (They could be seen through the 
wire mesh of the windows) she writes, "Elles suppliaient : 
<< A boire, A boire. >> Il y a des specres qui parlent. 11 
(32) (They begged, "To drink, to drink." It is ghosts who 
speak) . By shifting from the past imperfect tense 
( "voyait" and "suppliaient") of narrative time to the 
present tense ( 11parlent 11 ) 1 the historical moment of 
telling, the narrator conflates the representation of the 
past, the living women (then) and the present, the dead 
women (now). In this way, the trope of unfulfilled thirst 
comes to signify the never-to-be heard testimony as the 
expression of a yearning to survive in order to bear 
witness. The presence of the dead as ghosts which "speak" 
in the text becomes the story, rather, of the narrator's 
survival. However, as the telling of unquenchable thirst, 
the account simultaneously contests that survival and the 
success of its narration. Moreover, by presenting thirst 
as memory banished to the discourse of madness, the 
narrator anticipates her survival as an unacknowledged 
return and a disbelieved testimony. Thus, the narrator's 
mouth 11 [ ••• ] n 'est pas meme humectee et toujours les 
paroles se refusent" (115) . { [ ... ] is not even moist and 
still the words refuse to come.) 
The trope of burning thirst metaphorically figures the 
desire and inability to testify coherently, "reasonably" as 
dislocated body parts. In this way the narrator once again 
frames silence as disjointed body parts. Thus, incoherence 
is produced through physiological breakdown, through the 
silencing of the body parts which articulate, which produce 
sound: 
Le matin au reveil, les levres parlent 
et aucun son ne sort des levres. 
L'angoisse s'empare de tout votre etre 
[ ... ]. Est-ce cela, d'etre mort? Les 
levres essaient de parler, la bouche 
est paralysee. La bouche ne forme pas 
de paroles quand elle est seche, 
qu'elle n'a plus de salive. [ ... ] Les 
muscles de la bouche veulent tenter 
les mouvements de l 'articulation et 
; 
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n'articulent pas. (115) 
On awakening in the mornings, lips 
speak and no sound emerges from the 
lips. Anguish seizes your whole being 
[ ... ] . Is it this, to be dead? The 
lips try to speak, the mouth is 
paralysed. The mouth does not form 
words when it is dry, when it has no 
more saliva. [ ... ] The mouth muscles 
want to attempt the articulation 
movements and do not articulate. 
Referential speech and the logical processes of reason 
collapse, yet the narration of this collapse is the 
simultaneous narration of the anxiety of the unacknowledged 
return, symbolised by survival as another type of death. 
("Est-ce cela, d'etre mort? 11 ) Clearly, such a narration is 
the anticipation of a rejected testimony by a disbelieving 
world, the anticipation of 11 le desespoir de l'impuissance 
a leur dire l'angoisse ·qui m'a etreinte, l'impression 
d'etre morte et de le savoir. 11 (115) (the despair which 
comes from the powerlessness of not being able to tell them 
about the anguish which has gripped me, the impression of 
being dead and of knowing it.) 
REPRESENTING POWERLESSNESS: PARALYSED BODIES, SILENT 
TESTIMONY 
A recurring recollection which is central to countless 
survivor accounts of the concentration camps is of the 
devastating experience of the biting East European winter. 
In Delbo' s text, the narration of the cold becomes a 
representational device permitting the narration of the 
disruption enacted by deep memory's silence. At the same 
time, however, the glacial landscape and frozen bodies 
become a metaphor for the powerlessness, the voicelessness 
of the prisoner, who, enclosed in what survivor, David 
Rousset has described as the "univers concentrationnaire" 
(1946) (concentrationary universe}, is subject to the will 
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of the Nazi system. 
Immobility and paralysis-induced silence is symbolised 
by the frozen, numbed body and mirrored by the vastness of 
the frozen expanse which is the glacial landscape within 
and outside of the camp. "La lumiere est toujours 
immobile, blessante, froide. C'est la lumiere d'un astre 
mort. Et l'immensite glacee, a l'infini eblouissante, est 
d'une planete morte. 11 (55) {The light is always immobile, 
cutting, cold. It is the light of a dead star. And the 
frozen expanse, infinitely dazzling, is of a dead planet.) 
The prisoners are paralysed by the ice in which they are 
caught, they are statues of frost, "inertes, insensibles, 
nous avons perdu tous les sens de la vie" {55) (inert, 
unfeeling, we have lost all the senses of life"). Standing 
for hours at roll call, the narrator notes that, 
[q] uinze mille femmes tapent du pied 
et cela ne fait aucun bruit. Le 
silence est solidifie en froid. La 
lumiere est immobile. Nous sommes 
dans un milieu ou le temps est aboli. 
Nous ne savons pas si nous sommes, 
seulement la glace, la lumiere, la 
neige aveuglante, et nous, dans cette 
glace, dans cette lumiere, dans ce 
silence. (53) 
[f] if teen thousand women stamp their 
feet and it makes no noise. The 
silence is solidified into cold. The 
light is immobile. We are in a place 
where time is abolished. We do not 
know if we exist, only the ice, the 
light, the blinding snow, and us, in 
this ice, in this light, in this 
silence. 
Immured thus in the silence, the ice and the light, the 
prisoners are inscribed into another life, or as the 
narrator describes, " soumises a la respiration d'une autre 
vie, a la mort vivante [ ... ]."(55) (subjugated by the 
breath of another life, a life of the living death) . This 
living death signifies the negation of the presence of 
language through the presentation of the pure opposites of 
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the signs through which language yields meaning. These are 
the silence, the ice and the light. 
After describing a scene in Auschwitz where the living 
inmates of "block 25" have to load the corpses of the block 
into a crematorium bound truck before getting onto the 
truck, having been selected for extermination themselves, 
the narrator metonymically represents the women as frozen 
statues of unmaterialised screams. We read that, 
[el lles [les femmes] crient. Elles 
crient et nous n'entendons rien. Cet 
air froid et sec devrai t etre 
conducteur si nous etions dans le 
milieu terrestre ordinaire. Elles 
crient vers nous sans qu 'aucun son 
nous parvienne. Leurs bouches crient, 
leurs bras tendus vers nous crient, et 
tout d'elles. Chaque corps est un 
cri. Autant de torches qui £lambent 
en eris de terreur, de eris qui ont 
pris corps de femmes. Chacune est un 
cri materialise, -un hurlement - qu'on 
n'entend pas. (55-56) 
[t]hey [the women] cry. They cry and 
we hear nothing. This cold and dry 
air would be a conductor if we were in 
an ordinary terrestrial environment. 
They cry in our direction yet no sound 
reaches us. Their mouths cry, their 
arms stretched out towards us cry, and 
all of them. Each body is a cry. So 
many torches burning with cries of 
terror, cries which have taken the 
form of women. Each one is a 
materialised cry, a scream that 
cannot be heard. 
Once again, the narrator seeks to place in doubt the very 
strategies she proposes for the narration of the Auschwitz 
experience. Thus, this extract raises the important 
question regarding the transmissibility of the story of the 
annihilated presence of the "true witnesses" . 
Representation of the body as locus of a collective, 
cryptic cry highlights the limitations of its converse 
signification: the body's absence becoming the negative 
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presence of silence-as-trace within this testimony to mass 
murder . 15 By placing the aims of this memorial/textual 
project in doubt, the narrator places the very possibility 
of the textual transmission of silence ( "un conducteur"} 
into question. As such, the addressee is once again 
reminded that the true witness cannot speak and as such 
remains, in the face of posterity, the absolutely 
disempowered, the truly effaced. 
In an article significantly entitled, Un cri ne 
s' imprime pas (1993} (A Cry cannot be Printed), Anna 
Langfus, survivor and writer, has written that the literary 
transposition of memory is problematic not least because it 
is a writing over, a palimpsest on the memory of the true 
witness. Delbo' s narrator demonstrates clearly in the very 
terms of her narration that this dilemma remains insoluble 
and testifies, rather, to the dilemma itself. 
The unheard, collectively embodied scream also 
functions as an image of individual alienation in the 
Lager: 
Chaque visage est ecrit avec un telle 
precision dans la lumiere de glace, 
sur le bleu du ciel, qu'il s'y marque 
pour l'eternite. Pour l'eternite, des 
tetes rasees, pressees les unes contre 
les autres, qui eclatent de eris, des 
bouches tordues de eris qu'on n'entend 
pas, des mains agi tees dans un cri 
muet. Les hurlements restent ecrits 
sur le bleu du ciel. (57} 
Each face is inscribed with stark 
precision in the frozen light, on the 
blue of the sky, that it is marked 
15 The negative presence of silence-as-trace evokes Jacques 
Derrida's proposition that, " [s] i un lieu meme s 'encercle de feu 
(tombe en cendre finalement, tombe en tante que nom), il n'est 
plus. Reste la cendre. If a place is itself surrounded by fire 
(falls finally to ash, into a cinder tomb), it no longer is. 
Cinder remains [ ... ]." (1991: 39} Derrida's statement, gestures, 
in turn, to Claude Lanzmann's description of the Holocaust as 
surrounded by a ring of fire and his subsequent suggestion that 
representation can only proceed through the presentation of the 
silence-as-trace. (Deguy, 1990) 
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there for eternity. For eternity, 
shaven heads squashed together, which 
burst into cries, mouths twisted by 
cries that are not heard, hands waving 
in a mute cry. The screams remain 
inscribed on the blue of the sky. 
In this crepuscular universe which witnesses the implosion 
of temporal consciousness, the death-like state of 
paralysis and temporal suspension evoked by the frozen body 
serve paradoxically to heighten the alienation of the 
individual, of each face rendered silent in the midst of 
collective muteness. By alienation of the individual, I do 
not mean of the psychically or physically whole individual. 
Throughout the narrative the body is neveL represented as 
an integrated whole, only as disparate parts and organs. 
Clearly, then, the image of body fragmentation is a 
metaphor for the fragmented, dehumanized and dislocated 
self, that is, the self both in and after Auschwitz. 
VIOLENCE TO LANGUAGE/VIOLENT LANGUAGE: ARTICULATING POWER 
Thematically counterpointed to the mute immobility and 
frozen silence of the prisoner are the senseless, 
amorphous but actualised screams of the oppressor. 
For Delbo, words have lost their meaning in Auschwitz 
and language in l'univers concentrationnaire becomes its 
own inverse: it becomes the expression of madness, of non-
sense, of non-reason and of confusion. In part a response 
which resists the allocation of meaning to Auschwitz, the 
presentation of language as violent noise and non-sense 
underlines the violence done to language whose capacity to 
express the new realities of the Lager is coercively 
wrought through the neologising of a Lagerjargon: a 
polyglot and multi-lingual jargon. (Levi, 1988: 74 -79; 
Friedlander, 1980:103-111) 
The text characterises the representatives of the 
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Lager as brutal noise. This is underlined in a comment on 
the brutality and unpredictability of the SS guards, kapos 
and Anweiserins. They supervise the work details labouring 
in the marshes, and are referred to as "screams", that is, 
they possess the power of the voice, which, outside of 
language, becomes a vocalisation of immanent violence. 
Unlike the unmaterialised, silent screams as which she 
continuously characterises the prisoners, the screams of 
the others, to whom she also refers as "the furies", are 
endless and overwhelming in volume. They are 
Les hurlements. Les hurlements. Les 
hurlements qui hurlent jusqu 'aux 
confins invisibles du marais. [ ... ] 
[CJ riant, criant toujours les memes 
mots, les memes injures repetees dans 
cette langue incomprehensible [ ... ] . 
(77) 
Screams. Screams. Screams that scream 
to the invisible limits of the marsh. 
[ ... ]yelling, always yelling the same 
words, the same insults repeated in 
the same incomprehensible 
language [ ... ] . ( 53) 
The violence of the SS, the Anweiserins, the kapos, is 
represented through a language which becomes, in itself, 
an agent of violence. In a description of night in the 
Lager, the narrator describes how 
[ ... ] les cauchemars se levent, 
prennen t f orme dans l 'ombre, de to us 
les etagements montent les plaintes et 
les gemissements des corps meurtris 
qui luttent contre la boue, contre les 
faces d'hyenes hurlantes : Weiter, 
weiter, car ces hyenes hurlent ces 
mots-la et il n'y a plus que la 
ressource de se blottir sur soi-meme 
[ .•• ] • (90) 
[ ... J the nightmares come up, take 
farm in the shadows, from all the 
bunks the moans and groans rise from 
the bruised bodies which fight against 
the mud, against the faces of 
screaming hyenas: Weiter, weiter, for 
these hyenas scream those words and 
the only resource that remains is to 
retreat into oneself. 
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Clearly, Kofman' s 11 delire de paroles" (Kofman, 1988 :45) 
(delirium of words), the frenetic desire to bear witness, 
as a survivor, is not the linguistic excess described in 
the nightly dream deliria. The brutal vocality - evoked 
through the repetition of 11 weiter" - of the SS, the kapos 
and the Anweiserins compounds the prisoner's powerlessness. 
I have previously examined the way in which the trope 
of immobility functions as a metaphor of an imploding or 
auto-consuming silence of the prisoner. In this extract, 
silence, a response to "hyenes hurlent ces mots-la" (hyenas 
scream those words), is produced through a recoiling 
inwards ("se blottir sur soi-meme", retreat into oneself). 
NUMERATION: TRANSACTING POWER 
As we have seen, the narration of time in Auschwitz 
manifests a circularity, a simultaneously compressed and 
expanded temporality which reflects the experience of the 
camp as a suspended timelessness predicated on the hermetic 
logic of the concentrationary space, where 11 [l] e silence 
est solidifie en froid. La lumiere est immobile. Nous 
sommes dans un milieu oil le temps est aboli." (53) (the 
silence is solidified into cold. The light is immobile. We 
are in a space where time is abolished.) Delbo' s text 
confronts the narration of space, its surfaces, its 
contents and its objects in renegotiated terms of 
representation. I would suggest that one of the ways that 
the narration of space operates is not as a semiotics of 
the topography of the milieu of the concentration camp but 
as the narration of the material commodification of the 
human presence in the Lager whereby the individual is 
transformed into an anonymous, faceless collective whose 
value is measurable and quantifiable. Common memory as 
communication, represented by referential language, is 
disrupted in the camp, but the narration of the 
relationship between people and one another and between 
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people and space sets up the simultaneous transformation 
and transvaluation of prisoners from individuals to a 
faceless collectivity based on the exchange of language as 
communication for numeration as communication. Moreover, 
this transformation is sustained by a system of logic: a 
bureaucracy whose numerate language transacts its power 
over the effaced agent of the prisoner's body. Social 
historian, Michel Foucault's theorisation of the politics 
of the body is useful in this regard16 : 
On y traiterait du <<Corps politique>> 
comme ensemble des elements materiels 
et des techniques que servent d'armes, 
de relais, de voies de communication 
de points d'appui aux relations de 
pouvoir et de savoir qui investissent 
les corps humains et les assujetissent 
en en faisant des objets de savoir. 
(1975:33) 
One would be concerned with the 'body 
politic' , as a set of material 
elements and techniques that serve as 
weapons, relays, relations that invest 
human bodies and subjugate them by 
turning them into objects of 
knowledge. (1979:28) 
In the Lager the body's agency is transformed by the very 
numbers inscribed onto it. In Chapter One the significance 
of presenting memory as an em-bodied recollection is 
examined with reference to the negation of the body's 
presence in the Lager. Levi's contention regarding the 
body's effacement is that the "coercion of nudity" is part 
of an intentional and systematic dehumanisation process, 
stripping the individual and her/his body of all signs of 
humanness, reinforcing, thus, the biological superiority of 
the oppressor. (Levi, 1989:90) For Levi, the prisoner's 
body becomes the locus on which power is practised. Here, 
however, the text continues on this trajectory by exploring 
the dehumanisation process as part of a system which 
16 See also Feldman, 1991 and Deleuze & Guattari, 1972 
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replaces the terms which signify negative (or non-) human 
presence with the positive referents of capital: not only 
is the prisoner invalidated as human being in life prior to 
inevitable death, s/he is commodif ied, reinvented as 
"stuff". This transformation occurs as a transaction on 
the body the moment that the prisoner's arm is indelibly 
tattooed with her/his new identity: the number. Thus, 
"ft] ous etaient marques au bras d'un numero / indelebile / 
Tous devaient mourir nus I Le tatouage identif iai t les 
marts et les mortes. 11 (24) ([e]veryone was inscribed on the 
arm with a number I indelible I Everyone had to die naked 
I Tattooing identified the dead men and the dead women.) 
numeration the tattooed When naming collapses, 
inscription on the body -
which is, in turn, the 
emerges as a means to identify 
body's testimony to its own 
subjugation. As such, numeration articulates a politics 
of identification which is central to the power practices 
governing and regulating the camp hierarchy. As a system 
of identification, tattooed numbers become a parody of 
naming, replacing conventional terms of identification. In 
this way numbers, as the bureaucratic or institutional 
language of power, become central to the way that meaning 
is produced in the Lager. 
Fundamental to the practice of power in the camp is 
the ritualisation of the transformative enactment of this 
language which is played out in the Lager in the infamous 
roll-call, repeated twice daily. It is therefore the 
roll- call that becomes, " [ ... ] in our dreams of 
'afterwards'[ ... ] the very emblem of the Lager, summing up 
in itself the fatigue, cold, hunger and frustration." 
(Levi, 1988:92) Primo Levi describes the roll-call thus: 
It certainly was not a nominal roll-
call which with thousands or tens of 
thousands of prisoners would have been 
impossible: all the more so because 
they were never ref erred to by name 
but only by the five or six digits on 
the registration number. It was 
Zahlappell, a complicated and 
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laborious counting-call which had to 
take into consideration prisoners 
transferred to other camps or to the 
infirmary the evening before and those 
who had died during the night because 
the present number must square exactly 
with the figures of the preceding day. 
(Levi, 1988:91} 
According to the logic of numeration as communication the 
euphemistic language produced through the will to power of 
the Nazi vision, the dead are identified and identifiable 
all the more so that they are dead. In the inverted logic 
of the Lager represented by this language system of 
numbers, the dead count. Thus, human presence is negated 
through the articulation of an accounting in the language 
of the bureaucrat. 
into commodity in 
Demonstrating the 
Moreover, the presence is transformed 
the process of naming by numbering. 
dynamics of this transformation, we 
examine Delbo's narrator's description of roll-call: 
Alors les colonnes se forment en 
carres. Dix par dix, sur dix rangs. 
Un carre apres l 'autre. Un damier 
gris sur · 1a neige etincelante. La 
derniere colonne. Le dernier carre 
s 'immobilise. Des eris pour que la 
bordure du damier soit bien nette sur 
la neige. Les SS gardent les coins. 
Que veulent-ils faire? Un officier a 
cheval passe. Il regarde les carres 
parfaits que dessinent quinze mille 
femmes sur la neige. Il tourne bride, 
satisfai t. Les eris cessent. Les 
sentinelles commencent a faire les 
cent pas autour des carres. (52} 
Then the columns form themselves into 
squares. Ten by ten, in rows of ten. 
One square after the next. A grey 
draughtboard on the sparkling snow. 
The last column. The last square 
comes to a stop. Shouts so that the 
border of the draughtboard should be 
sharp against the snow. The SS look 
after the corners. What do they want 
to do? An officer on horse-back 
passes. He observes the perfect 
squares which fifteen thousand women 













Dehumanisation, transaction of power in which the body's 
agency is revealed in this extract, is narrated as the 
parody of the very language which negates that presence. 
The narration presents the prisoner's body as an extended 
subjectivity of the Nazi oppressor. In this way the 
prisoner's body becomes directly implicated in the 
cosmology of the Nazi vision. As such, the prisoner's body 
is transformed into an agent of that organisational vision, 
and then, into the signified structuration of that vision: 
the bodies become geometrical squares. 
Clearly, every criterion which can measure, account, 
quantify and therefore impact, according to the logic of 
numeration, on the outcome of the situation can be plotted 
along the quantifying axes of a mathematical graph. In 
another vignette, entitled 11 L'appel" (the roll-call), the 
narrator knows that a counting error, signified by a 
prolonged roll-call, means imminent danger. Clearly then 
counting and accounting produces meanings which language 
cannot not. Thus, "[q]uand il se prolonge," she writes, " 
c'est qu'il ya quelque chose. Erreur de compte ou danger. 
Quelle sorte de danger? On ne le sait jamais. Un danger. 11 
(86) The SS passes in front of the rows of women and stops 
in front of a row of Greek women. Here he asks which women 
are between the ages of twenty and thirty who have bore a 
live infant. From the signifying system of the procedures 
of the roll-call, the narrator can infer that "[Ill faut 
renouveler les cobayes du block d'experiences. Les 
Grecques viennent d'arriver. Nous, nous sommes la depuis 
trop longtemps. Quelque semaines. Trop maigres ou trop 
affaiblies pour qu'on nous ouvre le ventre." (86) (It is 
necessary to renew the guinea-pigs in the experimentation 
block. The Greeks have just arrived. We, we have been 
here for too long. A few weeks. Too thin or too weak to 
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have our stomachs opened.) The presence of the prisoners 
at roll-call are the collective agency enacting the 
transformation of the way that the body signifies. In the 
space/place of the roll-call, the Greek women are 
transformed by these statistical signif iers into laboratory 
guinea-pigs. 
Reduced to noise and mutually incomprehensible babble, 
language collapses in the camps. It is numeration - now 
transformed into a system of commodifying transactions -
which permits communication. Following the trajectory of 
this logic, the only time in the text where dialogue is 
explicitly presented as verbal interchange (the word, 
"dialogue", appears as title to the vignette) communication 
is replaced by the promise of material transaction. As a 
new signifying system, this commodifying language of 
numbering in the Lager permits "communication" or verbal 
exchange. Thus, under the title "DIALOGUE", the narrator 
writes 
<< Oh! Sally, tu as pense a ce que je 
t 'ai demande? » Sally court sur la 
Lagers trasse. A sa mi se, on voi t 
qu'elle travaille aux Effekts. C'est 
le commando qui trie, inventorie, 
range tout ce que contiennent les 
bagages des juifs, les bagages que les 
arrivants laissent sur le quai. 
Celles qui travaillent aux Effekts ont 
de tout. 
<<Oui, ma cherie, j'y ai pense, mais il 
n'y en a pas en ce moment. Il n'est 
pas arrive de convoi depuis huit 
jours. On en attend un cette nui t. 
De Hongrie. Il etait temps, .nous 
n'avions plus rien. Au revoir. A 
demain. J'aurai ton savon.» 
On vient d'installer l'eau dans le 
camp. (154) 
"Oh! Sally, have you thought about 
what I have asked you? 11 Sally was 
running along Lagerstrasse. From her 
appearance, one can see that she works 
in Effekts. That is the commando that 
sorts, stocklists and arranges all the 
contents of the luggage of the Jews, 
the luggage which the arrivals leave 
on the platform. Those who work in 
76 
Effekts have everything. 
"Yes, dear, I thought about it, but 
their isn't any at the moment. 
There's been no convoys .for eight 
days. We are expecting one tonight. 
From Hungary. It's about time, we 
haven't anything left any more. Bye. 
Till tomorrow. I'll have your soap." 
Water has just been installed in the 
camp. 
The terms which enable the dialogue to proceed, are the 
promise of exchange of commodities, the logic of material 
gain taken to the limit. In this way, numeration, the 
Lager's technology of communication elides the identity, 
source and origin of the luggage of the "convoys" and 
implicates these convoys in their future prof it as 
commodity. Language, as "communication", only succeeds 
when the logic of numerati ve language, symbol of the 
industrialisation and commodif ication of death, underpins 
its agency. 
Aucun de nous ne Reviendra comes to be shown as a 
significant text precisely because it sets out a programme 
for giving testimony within the literary text by 
articulating survival and the conditions which precede it 
as a crisis of both language and of identity. Through the 
structural and thematic representation of fragmentation, it 
is precisely the making "present the existence of the 




UNE CONNAISSANCE INUTILE 
<< Il n'est d'ex:plosion qu'un 11.vre. >> un livre : un livre parmi d'autres, ou 
un livre renvoyant au Liber unique, dernier et essentiel, ou plus justement le 
Livre majuscule qui est toujours n' importe quel livre, deja sans importance ou au-
deliil. de l'important. << Explosion >>, un livre; ce qui veut dire que le livre 
n'est pas le rassemblement laborieux d'une totalite enfin obtenue, mais a pour 
etre l 'eclatement bruyant, silencieux, qui sans lui ne Se produirait (ne 
s'affirmerait pas), tandis qu'appartenant lui-meme a l'etre eclate, violemment 
deborde, mis hors etre, il $' indique comme Sa propre violence d' exclusion, le 
refus fulgurant du plausible: le dehors en son devenir d'eclat. [ •.. ] Peut-etre 
faudrait-il citer, avertissement toujours inedit, le mots vivifiants d'un poete 
tres proche : << Bcoutez, pretez l'oreille : .m8me tres a l'ecart, des 11.vres 
aimis, des 11.vres essentiels ont commence de rliler. >> (Rene Char.) 
(Maurice Blancbot L'Ecriture du Desastre, p.190) 
TBE BOOK BECOMES WITNESS 
The second volume of the Auschwitz et Apres trilogy, 
presents the survivor/narrator's experience of living 
through and surviving Auschwitz and then Ravensbruck as an 
exploration of narration of the Holocaust as an 
intertextual dialogue. In this way, the text approaches 
questions of historicisation and canonisation through the 
optic of ~ntertextuality, where the text becomes the corpus 
on which memory is inscribed. Moreover citation is also 
examined as a strategy of resistance in Auschwitz which 
explores the role of memory in relation to literature both 
in Auschwitz and in the wake of the Holocaust. 
Beginning this volume with a quote by poet and writer, 
Paul Claudel, followed by numerous instances of references 
to and rewriting and citation of other French writers, 
playwrights and poets, the narrative is, therefore, 
constituted as a dialogue with other literary texts. 
I would say that by gesturing to other literary texts, 
this narrative, raises the question as to its own status as 
Auschwitz narrative within the canon of French literature 
and, by extension the canonic impulse of the testimonial 
text as well as to its own citeability as a circulating 
text. Ultimately, the historicisation of the testimonial 
text occurs through the canonisation of the text and/or 
through intertextual dialogue, that is, through its 
inclusion in the structures and modes, critiqued and 
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contested, of transmitted knowledge. 17 Historian, Dominick 
LaCapra reminds us however, in a psychoanalytically framed 
proposition, that the canonic impulse in Holocaust 
narratives should be examined in relat.ion to the 
repressions or elisions produced as an avoidance or 
marginalisation mechanism set up by such an impulse 
(LaCapra, 1994:23). LaCapra notes that 
In the case of traumatic events, 
canonization involves the mitigation 
or covering over of wounds and 
creating the impression that nothing 
really disruptive has occurred. Thus 
one forecloses that possibility of 
mourning, renders impossible a 
critical engagement with the past, and 
impedes the recognition of problems 
(including the return of the 
repressed). (1994:23) 
Clearly, the urge to canonic status as a normalisation 
strategy of narratives of Holocaust memory covers over 
aspects of that memory which are both threatening and 
painful as well as resistant to foreclosure. At the same 
time, however, readings of Holocaust narratives in relation 
to canons and counter-canons bring new understandings to 
perennially cited texts. The self-reflectivity of Delbo's 
narratives has the contrapuntal effect of defamiliarising 
the works which are cited and engaged with. In this way 
her texts highlight the disruption which the canonic 
inclusion of Holocaust narrative entails. It can be 
assumed then, that by raising the issue of canonicity and 
by evoking the texts of the "great poets" of the French 
literary pantheon, Delbo's text presents an argument both 
for incorporation in the canons (or in the discussions that 
surround them) as well as for the destabilisation of these 
17 The debates around the politics of canonicity and 
canonisation are outside of the scope of this study and therefore 
will not be explored. In this regard see LaCapra, 1994. 
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canons. Thus, in the same way that the description of 
thirst experienced in Auschwitz in Aucun de nous ne 
Reviendra proceeds through the initial subversion of 
traditional genres which narrate stories of thirst and 
survival, so too the gesture to canonic inclusion brings 
into question the very authority and epistemological 
grounds on which canons are constituted. 
Perhaps Delbo' s text seeks to insert itself in a 
literary tradition precisely because Shoah literature as 
literary 11 paragenre 11 is a removal of the Shoah from history 
and an obliteration of the survivor's voice - a double 
death of the victim. 
Published by Les Editions de Minuit under the rubric 
of their series, "Documents", a category which supports the 
truth-claim of the writer as a witness to the historical 
event, the format and categorisation of Auschwitz et Apres 
become mechanisms of another displacement. The publisher's 
categorisation, then, can be seen as a decision not to 
engage in the problematising and fracturing issues raised 
by the choice of writing poetry, fictional and documentary 
vignettes. The classification of the text as historical 
document becomes an act which ref uses the text entry into 
the category of "Literature 11 and thus, into the canons of 
the literary text itself. In this way, the title of this 
volume Une Connaissance Inutile (A Useless/Futile 
Knowledge), points to its own exclusion from a canonicity 
which it is trying to achieve. I would argue that it is 
precisely by constructing an intertext of canonised 
literary references and quotations, as a way of endorsing 
the transmission of Holocaust memory, that the text tries 
to achieve canonicity. 
In an interview with a journalist from L'Express 
newspaper (1966), Delbo refers specifically to this text 
when she states that, "On a acquis des connaissances, c'est 
vrai, mais des connaissances qui ne peuvent pas servir, 
parce que c'est une experience hors de la vie." (Different 
knowledge was acquired, it is true, but such a knowledge 
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cannot serve, becaase it is an experience which is outside 
of life.) As Lawrence Langer observes, the title of this 
second volume, alluded to in Delbo's interview with 
L'Express, is lifted off a phrase that Albert Camus entered 
into his notebook, significantly in response to a novel 
that he was reading: "Only death is true knowledge. But at 
the same time it is what makes knowledge useless: it's 
progress is sterile." (Langer, 1978:202). As such, Camus' 
own contributions to the literary representation of the 
trauma of war and of the alienation of survivors and 
witnesses to atrocity is evoked. · After Auschwitz, this 
representatation resonates with an historical accumulation 
of very different meanings or contestations of meaning. 
Moreover, by naming her text as a citation of a celebrated, 
canonised author and public intellectual (with the 
appropriate literary credentials) Delbo demonstrates how 
citation could function as a paternalistic introduction (or 
exclusion) of a problematic text into the canonised 
corpus. 18 In this way the citeability of this text, that 
is, its circulation as text, named after Camus' phrase, is 
ensured. 
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE DOUBLE-BIND: CITATION 
Delbo engages directly in the challenge to language in 
representing Auschwitz as well as to Shoah narrative's 
canonic exclusion by once again structuring the text 
around a double-impasse, a double-bind, site of fracture 
and displacement par excellence. On the first unnumbered 
page of text, that is, as a paratextual warning we read: 
18 One could speculate as to whether Francois Mauriac's 
preface to Elie Wiesel's La Nuit (1958) functioned as a 
paternalistic gesture of literary endorsement which pre-empted 
the canonic status, in turn, of Wiesel's text. Ironically, 
however, Wiesel received the Nobel Peace Prize and not the 
Literature Prize, an acknowledgement which invalidates his 
testimony as literary. 
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"Nous arrivions de trap loin pour meriter votre croyance" 
Paul CLAUDEL. l.9 (We were arriving from too far away to 
deserve your belief) Placed within the rupture which is 
the double-bind, the structural dislocation of the text 
comes to represent the post-Auschwitz testimonial impulse 
to contradictory injunctions. As in the first volume, 
Aucun de nous ne Reviendra, the double-bind highlights the 
dangers of presuming meaning by situating the shifting 
sands of signification within the fracture set up by the 
interplay of verite and veridique. It is important to 
note, with reference to intertextuality as a strategy to 
both stabilise and destabilise meaning as a mode of 
demonstrating the problematics of representation, that the 
epigraph20 which introduced Aucun de nous ne Reviendra is 
discovered by historian, Annette Wieviorka (1992), to be a 
citation of poet Paul Eluard's Armes de la douleur: 
Je dis ce que je vois, 
Ce que je sais 
Ce qui est vrai 
(186) 
I say what I see 
What I know 
what is true21 
Once again eye-witness truth-claims which underpin the 
seamlessness of tradional or legalistic testimonial 
narratives are problematised. Truth, veracity and 
credibility are not given primacy over memory of Auschwitz 
in representations of those memories but are contested by 
a narrative that seeks to explore the epistemological 
implications of narrating memory. The grounds of knowledge 
19 All quotations from Une Connaissance Inutile, in this 
chapter, will be referenced by page number only. 
20 Auj ourd 'hui, j e ne suis pas sure que ce que j 'ai ecri t 
soit vrai. Je suis sure que c'est veridique. 
21 My translation of Eluard's poem 
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whose scrutiny is pointed towards in the titles of both the 
trilogy and this volume itself are directly challenged by 
this specular mise en abime of "croyance", (belief) in the 
Claudel citation. The text emerges from the publishing 
house bearing all the signs of a self-proclaiming 
"historical document", a documentary narrative and eye-
witness testimony, yet the very first words constitute a 
literary quotation, that is, they are ascribed to another, 
their utterance preceding - historically and literarily-
the text that follows. 
The final page of written text is also unnumbered and 
corresponds structurally to the initial Claudel citation. 
This page, outside of the narrative proper, functions as a 
paratextual "last word" which places the authority of the 
text which precedes it into question: 
Je reviens 
d'au-dela de la connaissance 
il faut maintenant desapprendre 
j e v o is bi en 
qu'autrement 
je ne pourrais plus vivre 
Et puis 
mieux vaut ne pas y croire 
a ces histoires de revenants 
plus jamais vous ne dormirez 
si jamais vous le croyez 
ces spectres revenants 
qui reviennent 
sans pouvoir meme 
expliquer comment. 
I am returning 
from beyond knowledge 
Now it is necessary to unlearn 
I see that well/clearly otherwise 
I would no longer be able to live 
And besides 
It is better rather to not believe 
these stories of ghosts 
you will never sleep again 
if you ever believe 
these returning spectres 
wh,o return 
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without even being able 
to explain how. 
Each stanza takes up one side of Claudel / s classically 
symmetrical statement which introduces the text. Thus, "Je 
reviens d 'au dela" takes up the introductory statement 
"nous arrivions de trop loin" and rewrites it in the light 
of the survivor's chance return. The survivor, after 
Auschwitz, returns alone ( 11 Je 11 , I), fragmented, dislocated, 
as opposed to the returning community ("nous", we) of 
Claudel which implies a shared/shareable experience. The 
return is present and continuous ( "reviens 11 I returning) 
for the traces of Auschwitz are inscribed on the returning 
survivor as an event with no end, an event without limits, 
an event which is "au dela" (beyond) / and therefore not 
bound by the distant yet finite borders implied by the 
descriptive "trop loin" (too far) . Beyond the 
transcription and transmission of the memory, that is, 
beyond the act of return uttered by the narrator within the 
temporal immediacy contained by the present tense of the 
narrative ("reviens 11 and 11 reviennent") the written word 
itself continues to return in post-Auschwitz narrative 
branded by its submission to the death-camp. The very 
narration of memory enacts a return which, in turn, marks 
the process of 11 desapprendre 11 (unlearning) . In the inverted 
logic of the Shoah universe to "learn" the teachings of the 
death-camp are to learn silence, paralysis, dissimulation· 
and death. Thus, the process of bearing witness, 
fragmentary, dislocated as it is, becomes the enterprise to 
11 desapprendre 11 (unlearn), whereby the survivor facilitates, 
by writing the fissure of the eternally returning self and 
the dead, the reinsertion of'herself in language and in the 
world of the living, ("qu'autrement I je ne pourrais plus 
vivre") (otherwise I I would no longer be able to live) 
The second part of Claudel's statement, ( 11 pour meriter 
votre croyance", to merit your belief) is taken up in the 
second stanza and casts the survivor's story as a narration 
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of "fantasy", as ghost stories ("histoires de revenants") 
anticipating return from the Lager as the tale of the 
incredible story told to a disbelieving world. As a 
rewriting/reciting, of the Claudel quotation at the 
beginning, the returning survivors words become the final 
palimpsest inscribing the traces of their own impossible 
transmission on the utterance of a signifying 
representative of the received literary canon. The self-
reflexive doubt expressed in these lines therefore 
destabilises both the fictionality and the historicality of 
the preceding text. 
APOLLINAIRE, POETRY, COMMON MEMORY: AN INTERTEX:TUAL 
DIALOGUE 
As a narrative which contests the possibility of 
beautiful language after the Shoah, the text submits poetic 
discourse to the traces of the Shoah through an 
intertextual dialogue with representatives of the poetic 
canons. 
It is clear that as a consecrated document, that is, 
a printed text which has been submitted to the writer, 
editor and publisher's demands, the text's ordering of the 
narrator's memory as dislocated linkages, connections and 
relationships serves to highlight the epistemological 
problematic presented by the Shoah from the optic of the 
written text specifically. It would seem then, that the 
sustained dialogue with literary texts points specifically 
to the citeability of the earlier texts and, by extension, 
to citation as a means to suggest, to gesture towards the 
unknowable. Citation, thus creates an intertext which once 
again places signification into question. Yet, it is 
through citation that the text comes to be consecrated. 
According to a book review of Delbo's recently 
translated texts, Delbo wrote the three volumes of ·her 
Aucun de Nous ne Reviendra immediately following her 
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liberation from Ravensbruck. (Houlding, 1995) The 
manuscript was then put away and finally, published almost 
twenty years later because, according to its author's 
desire, "it had to withstand the test of time. It had to 
travel far into the future." (Houlding, 1995:3) Now, the 
historical moment in which the text is edified offers no 
literary or written precedent for the framing of Holocaust 
survivor memory. It is a moment marked by a public 
discomfort and resistance to listening to or reading the 
transcribed memories of the survivor. The autobiographical 
memoirs which proliferate in the late forties, the fifties 
and sixties have not yet been published. I would argue 
then that it is precisely due to this lack of written or 
published survivor narratives that Charlotte Delbo turns to 
the literary paradigm in order to provide a narrative model 
which could frame the matrix of memory and which could, in 
turn, be subverted and critiqued. Citation and 
inter·textual reference create a multilayered narrative 
which turns on itself, on its own means of construction and 
challenges the modes of representation which the literary 
paradigm provides. Thus, the intertext becomes the 
cognitive abyss, space of rupture, displacement and non-
closure par excellence. In this way Delbo creates an 
"anti-aesthetic" - the representational resource of common 
memory - of the Shoah in a similar way to poet Paul Celan's 
poetics. 
Writing herself, through her memory, into the 
survivor's twilight world which is living and writing on a 
threshold, the narrator inscribes the survivor's voice onto 
the literary tradition. To speak of a literary tradition 
after Auschwitz is legitimised, thus, when spoken in 
relation to Auschwitz. And so the narrator/Delbo writes: 





Je suis remontee du desespoir 
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La memoire m'est revenue 
et avec elle une souf france 
qui m'a fait m'en retourner 
a la patrie de l'inconnu 
I too had dreamed 
of sorrows 
and of alcohols 
then 
before 
I have come back from despair 
My memory has returned 
and with it a suffering 
which has made me go back 
to the homeland of the unknown 
The allusion to Apollinaire's collection of poems, 
"Alcools" establishes a dialogue with the poetic texts 
within the collection, strands of which run through this 
entire volume. However, it is the anteriorisation of this 
relationship marked by 11 autrefois 11 and "avant" which 
resonates and impacts upon its utterance in the present. 
"I too" aligns the narrator/Delbo with the pre-Auschwitz 
infatuation with Maurice Blanchot's "idyllic" or beautiful 
language. The use of the past perfect tense delineates 
the trajectory of poetic language tropes through rupture 
from a poetics of despair "then", "before" the Shoah to a 
self-referential witnessing of its own demise. Thus, the 
demise of beautiful language rests in its inability to name 
the returning survivor's suffering or to frame her 
returning memories and whose metaphorical "patrie" 
(home/homeland) is unknown and eternally unknowable. 
As a gesture of subversive and subverting irony, 
intertextual reference, constructed at the beginning of the 
text as the first pivot of the double-bind, is constructed 
here as a eulogy to a compatriot who dies in Auschwitz. 
What it becomes, however, is a eulogy to the narrator's 
venerated poets and, by extension, to the tropes of 
figurative language which constitute both the reference and 
the eulogy: 
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A YVONNE BLECH 
Nous etions ivres d'Apollinaire 
et de Claudel 
vous souvient-il? 
C'est le debut d'un poeme 
dont je voulais me souvenir 
pour vous le dire 
J'ai oublie taus les mots 
ma memoire s'est egaree 
dans les delabres des jours passes 
ma memoire s'en est allee 
et nos ivresses anciennes 
Apollinaire et Claudel 
meurent ici avec nous 
FOR YVONNE BLECH 
We were intoxicated by Apollinaire 
and by Claudel 
Do you remember him? 
It's the beginning of a poem 
which I wanted to recall 
so that I could tell it to you 
I have forgotten all the words 
My memo~y has gone astray 
in the midst the ruins of past days 
my memory has gone away 
and our former passions 
Apollinaire and Claudel 
die here with us 
We know that Yvonne Blech was transported along with Delbo 
to Auschwitz (Delbo, 1965:43) so the memorial function of 
this dedication gestures towards its own non-fictionality, 
to its historicity. As a historical referent it also 
blurs the distinctions between narrative categories, 
between fiction and reality. As a commemoration of one who 
died in Auschwitz which is articulated in an intertextual 
zone of citation, this poem disrupts through its operation 
of blurring and conflating narrative genres. 
This poem, dedicated to Yvonne Blech, evokes 
Apollinaire's cycle of poems entitled "Poemes a Yvonne" 
(541) (Poems for Yvonne) in his collection, "Le Guetteur 
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Melancolique" (537) (The Melancholic Look-out) . 22 In 
publisher, Gallimard's Pleiade edition, the title of this 
collection, "Le Guetteur Melancolique" precedes the 
following lines on a separate page which, in turn, precede 
the first poem of the cycle dedicated to the "Yvonne" of 
Apollinaire: 
Et toi mon coeur pourquoi bats-tu 
Comme un guetteur melancolique 
J 1 observe la nuit et la mart 
(539) 
And you my heart why do you beat 
Like a melancholic watch 
I observe night and death23 
By evoking this collection, the narrative highlights the 
incredible, yet accidental irony created by poetic 
language, that is, an irony despite itself. Ironic because 
the intertextual reference gestures to a poetic statement 
which after Auschwitz becomes a eulogy its own demise as 
"pure" poetry. However, by engaging Apollinaire's text in 
dialogue, Delbo's text raises the narrative dilemma of who 
the text is addressed to if survivors' language points 
insistently to its own "patrie de 1 1 inconnu", to its own 
unnameable landscape which implicates its addressee/s in 
that problematic of naming. 
The question of addressee to the poetic text-as-
memory is raised by Shoshana Felman in her citation of Paul 
Celan's Meridian Speech where he compares the poetic 
project to sending "a message in a bottle" (Felman & 
Laub,1992:37). Delbo's text's self-conscious address is to 
her dead friend, II a Yvonne Blech" I who is directly 
addressed as a "vous", a you-object of speech. In the same 
22 All references to Apollinaire's poetry are from his 
Oeuvres Poetiques (1956) 
23 My translation 
89 
way as Apollinaire's prescient utterance operates, it is 
through an accidental irony brought about by the 
narrator/Delbo's survival that the dead friend comes to be 
addressed, to be named, and so, to be inscribed onto this 
unnameable/unnaming landscape. Apollinaire's utterance, as 
utterance of the Auschwitz survivor, in turn, accumulates 
an irony which highlights the absolute arbitrariness of 
survival. The survivor could indeed ponder the chance 
which causes the heart to continue beating as it waits for 
its own inevitable night. 
Apollinaire's collection "Guetteur Melancolique" is 
dedicated to a love-object, his "voisine divine" {543), his 
beloved neighbour. In her name, Poemes a Yvonne, {542) he 
dedicates his cycle, and as "Lettre-Poemes" { 545-546) 
(Letter-Poems), he constructs his verse. His collection 
of "poemes inedits" {unedited poems) contains a poem 
entitled "Carte Postale a Yvonne" (852) {Postcards to 
Yvonne) and the collection of 11 Poemes a la Marraine" (Poems 
for the godmother) contains a poem entitled "Pour 
Y.B". {549) Thus, the narrator's "A Yvonne Blech" addresses 
.both a historical addressee as well as a corpus of poetry 
which, in turn, are the objects of an addressing utterance 
whose tropes of production are known and knowable. 
Through its dialogue with poems which are expressions 
of unrequited emotion, the narrator's poem articulates its 
engagement with the personal, the relational and the 
emotional, important subtexts of this volume. In this way, 
diverse definitions and functions of poetic language and 
its fictional and historical addressees, are raised and 
engaged in within this intertextual space. 
It is precisely through citation that the death of 
"beautiful language" is marked. By referring outside of 
the impenetrable and hermetic universe of the Shoah, the 
breakage, the rupture is signified. "Apollinaire et 
Claudel I meurent ici avec nous" {Apollinaire and Claude! 
I die here with us) brings all poetry and all literature 
to Auschwitz. 
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Apollinaire and Claudel represent here the corpus of 
classic literary creation (precisely because of their 
difference, their incomparability as poets, writers and 
intellectuals) . It would seem then that the palimpsest of 
poetry is the gesture of the post-Auschwitz document to 
insert itself within this corpus of literary work, the 
canonic impulse which becomes the ultimate reinsertion of 
the self and the text into a language which, precisely 
because it is marked by the fragmentation of the trauma of 
Auschwitz, contests the very contingency of canonicity. 
POLITICS OF LANGUAGE: DUPLICITY AND SURVIVAL 
Poetic language has to first be submitted to Auschwitz 
before it can represent a new poetic language-at-the-
limits. It is from this optic that language, its ruptures, 
breakdowns and violently forged new boundaries are 
represented, in this volume. ·In Aucun de nous ne Reviendra 
the figurative tropes which represent language (brutal, 
incomprehensible vocality) and silence (glacial, frozen 
immobility) serve to highlight the radical alienation of 
the individual in the face of the onslaught of the camp on 
the human experience and its shattering of the 
possibilities of poetic language. Primo Levi encapsulates 
this idea when he · comments that 11 [i] t is an obvious 
observation that where violence is inflicted on man, it is 
also inflicted on language [ ... ] 11 (Levi, 1988: 76) . In Une 
Connaissance Inutile, however, representations of language 
manifest the way poetics become politics of language. 
Thus, the narrator of Une Connaissance Inutile presents the 
politics of language in the Lager in an anecdote where the . 
author and addressee of a love-letter which is intercepted 
are executed by firing squad following interrogation by the 




[ ... ] parce que, pour la Gestapo, tout 
etait code, et les mots d'amour 
traduisaient forcement des mots 
d'ordre politiques. [ ... ] Dans la 
lettre de Lily a son fiance, il y 
avait cette phrase: << Nous sommes la 
comme des plantes riches de vie et de 
seve, comme des plantes qui voudraient 
pousser et vivre, et je ne peux pas 
m 'empecher de pens er que ces plan tes 
ne doivent pas vivre.» C'est un des 
hommes qui travaillent a la Politische 
qui nous l 'a dit. (78) 
[ ••• J because, for the Gestapo, 
everything was code, and words of' love 
necessarily translated into words of a 
political nature. [ ... ] In Lily's 
letter to her fiancA,. there was this 
sentence: "We are like plants which 
are resplendent/rich with life and 
sap, like plants that would like to 
grow and live, and I can't prevent 
myself from thinking that these plants 
should not live. 11 It was one of the 
men who works at the Poli tische who 
told us this. 
In the logic of the concentrationary universe language of 
love, represented by the love poem, is necessarily 
political because language in Auschwitz articulates power 
through dissimulation, euphemism and paraphrase. 
Representation therefore highlights the ways in which 
language intervenes and modulates the interactions of the 
prisoner in the camp. Hence, the politics of language 
emerges through a narration of the role of language in 
relation to the vertical and lateral dispositions of power 
in the concentration camp. Moreover, if language is 
represented here through descriptions of the prisoner in 
relationship with others, it emerges as a mode of organised 
resistance to the Nazi system. 
In the first paragraph of narrative, entitled "Les 
Hommes" (The Men) the narrator describes her and her co-
prisoners / relationships with the men interned at 
Auschwitz, we read 11 [n]ous leur [les hommes] jetions des 
billets par-dessus le grillage, nous dejouions la 
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surveillance pour echanger avec eux quelques mots. 11 ( 9) (We 
used to throw notes to them (the men) through the fence, we 
used to evade the guards/surveillance in order to 
exchange/swap a few words with them.) Language's 
communicative function, that is, dialogue as gesture of 
communion which is the human gaze recognising itself in the 
other within Auschwitz is read as a necessity for survival 
(precisely because of the fatal consequences risked if 
discovered) and, as such, as a commodity of exchange. 
Besides the risks of discovery which modulates 
communication in the Lager, the mutual incomprehensibility 
of the inmates' mother tongues compounds the impingement on 
communication/communion. 
As historical narrative, this volume offers details of 
the survivor's daily struggle to live within the death-
camp. Yet it is as literary artifact, that the text bears 
witness to the traces of Auschwitz on language. In its 
submission to Auschwitz, language bears the indelible trace 
of its violent submission to the death-camp. The "grillage" 
(wire-fence) becomes the symbolic barrier, the imprinted 
trace which encloses language and through which language is 
"thrown" in its search for an interlocutor. I would 
suggest that the barbed-wire· fence and electrified wire 
fence have become symbols of the Shoah in contemporary 
cultural representations precisely because they symbolise 
the hermetically enclosed and, therefore, impenetrable 
experience of the death-camp. 
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, if 
Auschwitz becomes the locus of assault on humanity and on 
the language of humanity, the representation of SS guards 
and the Anweiserins in the text is significant. Once again 
language and violence are conflated to personify the SS 
guards, Anweiserens and Blockaltesters as brutal and 
brutalising vocal eruptions, that is, as shrieks and 
screams which are violently ejaculated. In turn, this 
representation personifies language itself as violent, a 
claim supported by the image of language as projectile 
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which is suggested by the gesture of the note throwing to 
the men. Thus, their language becomes the symbol of 
their brutality: 
C' etai t une poli tique allemande {la 
chef de colonne] , qui hurlai t sans 
jamais reprendre souffle. Ce que 
cette femme pouvai t hurler . .. Elle 
hurlait sans raison visible, elle 
hurlait en s'agitant, de la tete, des 
mains I du baton et el le frappai t a 
tort et a travers I puis cessai t de 
s'agiter tout en continuant a hurler -
des ordres incomprehensibles et 
inexecutables --{ ... ] (52-53) 
It was a German political prisoner 
[the head of the column] , who shrieked 
without ever taking a breath. What 
she was able to shriek ... She shrieked 
for no clear reason, she shrieked 
whilst shaking her head, her hands, 
her truncheon and she struck out 
wildly and randomly, then she stopped 
shaking all· the while continuing to 
shriek incomprehensible and 
inexecutable orders - - [ ... ] 
Nude in a barrack at Birkenau, prior to her transfer 
to Raisko, the narrator and some of her compatriots have to 
undergo a medical examination and "[u]ne SS revient avec la 
chef du block, Allemande hysterique qui ne cesse de hurler 
[ ... ] ". (103) ( {a]n SS woman returns with the head of the 
block, a hysterical German woman who does not stop 
shouting.) Language, violence and non-reason are conflated 
and embodied by the "hysterical 11 German perpetrator. In 
turn she is seen as possessing a language which is not 
enunciated but, rather, which erupts as a barrage of 
inarticulate blows which impact upon the very matrix of 
language. 
Language, characterised by violence, by non-sense and 
non-reason is often represented as the dislocated mouth. 
Thus, for example, during the transfer of the narrator and 
certain of her compatriots from their barracks at Auschwitz 
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I to Birkenau (Auschwitz II) and then on to Ravensbruck 
they are driven by "le SS a la sale gueule" (102) (a foul-
mouthed SS) . 
The mouth, jaw, tongue and lips become the site of 
both rupture and representation of rupture. When "Le 
medecin SS nous fait tirer la langue" (103) (The SS doctor 
made us pull our tongues) the polysemic play on words which 
emerges through the French word "la langue 11 11 the SS 
doctor makes us stick out our tongues" as well as "the SS 
doctor pulls out/extracts our tongues/language" - highlights 
the transformation of language and meaning in the death-
camp and in its representation in the survivor's text, for 
the healing and curing associations of the doctor, 11 le 
medecin" are immediately subverted by the qualification 
"SS 11 , combining to create a new historical referent. The 
signification of the image of the narrator who "sticks out 
[herJ tongue", is revealed in the way language and its 
edification as printed word is used to defy the logic of 
Nazi ideology the extraction of the tongue, the 
definitive preclusion of inmates bearing witness- which is 
to survive, return and bear witness (and hence the gesture 
of defiance) . The narrator's tongue is symbolically 
restored, her language is restituted but emerges forever 
altered on the other side of the 11 grillage". Paul Celan 
evokes this idea of language emerging, after Auschwitz 
through the intermediary of violence when he notes, in his 
famous Bremen speech of 1958, that language "had to go 
through terrifying silence, through the thousand darknesses 
of murderous speech. It went through."· (quoted in Colin, 
1991:49) 
In order to reinforce the isolation of the individual 
as part of the systematic assault on his/her humanity as 
well as to curtail the possibility of organised resistance, 
the circulation of language, that is, communication 
verbal and written - inside the Lager is tightly controlled 
and necessarily restricted. While all contact with the 
outside world for Jews, Gypsies and the Nacht und Nebel 
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politicals is prohibited, within the Lager, it is severely 
restricted. Primo Levi comments that it is precisely this 
prohibition of communication which most strongly emphasises 
his profound sense of alienation in Auschwitz: 
The weekly hour when our "political" 
companions received mail from home was 
for us the saddest, when we felt the 
whole burden of being different, 
estranged, cut off from our country, 
indeed from the human face. It was 
the hour when we felt the tattoo burn 
like a wound, and the certainty that 
none of us would return overwhelmed us 
like an avalanche of mud. In any 
case, even if we had been allowed to 
write a letter - to whom would we have 
addressed it? The families of the 
Jews of Europe were submerged or 
dispersed or destroyed. {Levi, 
1988:81) 
Censorship of communication in Auschwitz must be read 
in the context, then, of the dehumanising onslaught of the 
camp on the individual and as a reinforcement of its 
hermetic experience as 11 the kingdorr( of night". (Wiesel, 
1958) 
The narrator perpetually highlights the 
dissimulating nature of language in the camp. She 
describes how when she and some · of her compatriots are 
transferred to Ravensbruck they are required to sign papers 
which state that they have not been maltreated, that they 
have not been ill and that they have had all their 
possessions returned to them. (104) No doubt, the signs and 
legends posted around Auschwitz underline the way that 
language is implicated in the deceptive and destabilising 
self-presentation of the Lager. Hence, the legend "Arbeit 
Macht Frei 11 (Work makes free), appearing above the gates of 
Auschwitz, greeting the labour details on their way out and 
back in to the camp each day demonstrates how the absurdity 
of language functions as mechanism of deception in the 
death-camp. Here, the irony of the legend emerges through 
its setting in a particular historical and topographical 
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context which, in turn, reveals a self-parodying impulse of 
language which has become self-referential. Language 
points, in its grotesque parody of bureaucratic modes of 
representation in civic discourse, to nothing but itself as 
both meaningless and contentless. 
The essential unfamiliarity and strangeness of 
language submitted to the will of the concentrationary 
universe, is noted by the narrator in the first paragraph 
of the chapter, Les Hammes, "Nous 1 es aimions. Nous 1 e 
leur disions des yeux1 jamais des levres. Cela leur aurait 
semble etrange". (9) (We loved them. We told them this 
with our eyes, never with our lips. That would have seemed 
strange/unfamiliar/foreign to them.) Thus, to write and 
say love in Auschwitz is to find a new way of writing and 
speaking about emotion for the instruments of enunciation, 
11 des levres 11 (the lips), are paralysed by both a loss of 
language caused by the definitive and absolute rupture with 
the past and with referential language. 
II. MOLIERE READ THROUGH AUSCHWITZ 
Language emerges f rem the Lager altered. As such 
testimonial narrative as communicative and performati ve 
impulses are recast after Auschwitz. Through the constant 
interplay of narrative and intertext Delbo's post-Auschwitz 
narrative rereads and recasts pre-Auschwitz literature in 
the light of the Auschwitz experience, a gesture which 
resonates both with Shoshana Felman' s claim of crisis 
marking all post-Auschwitz artistic production as well as 
with canonic insertion of that production (Felman & Laub, 
1992). It is the literary persona of French classicist 
playwright, Moliere and his final play, Le Malade 
imaginaire1 (and further in the narrative, Moliere' s Le 
Misanthrope) which become the structuring reference points 
of this volume's meditation on the nature of relationships 
and intertextual dialogue after Auschwitz and the 
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understandings of testimonial narrative that it produces. 
The narrator recounts how after being transferred to 
Raisko (where the living conditions were more bearable) her 
compatriots and herself, racked by typhus, hunger and 
exhaustion, decide to stage a piece of theatre. In 
Auschwitz, inversion of the pre-Holocaust 
social/political/cultural order, Moliere's le Malade 
imaginaire (the imaginary sick I the hypochondriac) , reread 
and rewritten in the concentrationary space of rupture of 
reality with the imaginary, becomes 1 'imaginaire malade, an 
illness of the imaginary, that is, an illness of the 
imaginary mode. In this way Delbo creates an intertext 
which presents the covert rewriting and staging of 
Moliere's dramatic piece as an engagement with the notion 
of un-imagine-ability as well as with the concept of 
psychological resistance in the camp. 
Before narrating the event of reconstructing this play 
from memory and staging it, with all the danger this 
necessarily entailed, the narrator describes how, in 
Auschwitz, in the sustained assault against the individual 
and his/her humanity in the mud, blood and diarrhea, the 
imaginary mode, the intellectual mode and the modes of 
inner life which formerly sustained, fortified and 
strengthened the individual are the first resources to 
dissipate, to prove to be illusory. 
Vous direz qu 'on peut tout enlever a 
un etre humain sauf sa faculte de 
pens er et d' imaginer. Vous ne savez 
pas. On peut faire d'un etre humain 
un squelette ou gargouille la 
diarrhee, lui 6ter le temps de penser, 
la force de penser. L'imaginaire est 
le premier luxe du corps qui re<;oit 
assez de nourriture, jouit d'une 
frange de temps libre, dispose de 
rudiments pour fa<;onner ses reves. A 
Auschwitz on ne revai t pas, on 
delirait. (90) 
You will say that one can take 
everything from a human being except 
for her faculty to think and to 
imagine. You do not know. One can 
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make a human being into a skeleton 
where diarrhea gurgles, take away her 
time to think, her strength to think. 
The imaginary is the first luxury of 
the body which receives enough 
nourishment, enjoys a margin of free 
time, is furnished with the basics 
with which to build her dreams . In 
Auschwitz one did not dream, one had 
deliria. 
It is no small irony that in 1673 at the third 
representation of Le Malade imaginaire, Moliere, the 
playwright, had a seizure and died whilst performing in the 
role of the protagonist, Argan, the hypochondriac himself. 
This last dramatic work of Moliere is a parody of the fear 
of illness - a metaphor for bourgeois values of the time -
and the unethical and protectionist practices of medical 
science which exploits those fears - a metaphor for the 
unchallenged foundations of knowledge. The inversion of 
historical fact and dramatic fiction conflate the borders 
of real and imaginary which in turn serves to highlight the 
dissonance of a narration of theatre set in Auschwitz at 
the same time as it underlines the very real danger -
certain death - of being discovered in the process of 
staging the play. 
The narrator expresses little doubt that her transfer 
to the laboratory at Raisko contributes in no small way to 
her group's ability to stage the dramatic piece. Moreover, 
the staging of the piece symbolises a momentary reprieve 
from certain death since it is a consequence of 
approximately one hundred prisoners from Birkenau, 
Auschwitz II (the death-camp), who are chemists, 
biologists, botanists, agriculturalists, translators, 
illustrators and laboratory workers being transferred to 
Raisko. As such, it is an emblem of the coincidental or 
"unheroic" nature of resistance to the camp. In this way 
the narrator suggests that pre-Holocaust narrative models 
of heroic resistance are inappropriate if we are to 
understand what exactly constitutes resistance in the 
Lager. 
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Thus, she is part 
[ ... ] d' un peti t groupe qui avai t 
survecu a six mois du camp de la mort 
et avait ete envoye a quelque distance 
de la, dans ce commando priviligie. 
Il y avait des paillasses pour dormir, 
de l 'eau pour se laver. Le travail 
etait moins dur, quelquefois a l'abri, 
quelquefois assis. [ ... ] [A]pres 
quelques temps, nous reprenions 
apparence humaine. (88-89) 
[ ... ] of a little group who had 
survived six months of the death camp 
and had been sent some distance from 
there, in this privileged commando. 
There were straw mattresses on which 
to sleep, water with which to wash 
oneself. The work was less hard, 
sometimes under shelter, sometimes 
sitting. [ ... ] [A] fter some time, we 
took on a human appearance again. 
Human appearance translates into active resistance by 
exploiting the benefits of one free hour each evening and 
sometimes Sundays in order to stage a dramatic production. 
As literary critic, Ellen Fine, comments, "[i]n a dominion 
designed to annihilate all traces of the thinking mind, 
literature became a vehicle of human communion, a weapon of 
transcendence, and an act of defiance." (Fine, 1986:79) 
As the day of the illicitly staged spectacle approaches, 
the troupe make a poster, a notice for the play. The 
narrator asks the rhetorical question whether a poster 
should be necessary if those who could attend (inmates of 
those barracks) already knew. 
C' est qu 'enfin nous sommes dans 
l 'illusion. Une affiche en couleurs 
ou on lit : << Le Malade imaginaire, 
d'apres Moliere, par Claudette. 
Costumes de Cecile. Mise en scene de 
Charlotte. Agencement scenique et 
accessoires de Carmen. >> Suit la 
distribution, avec Lulu dans le role 
d'Argan. Mais notre piece etait en 
quatre actes. Nous n'etions pas 
100 
arrivees a retrouver la coupe de 
Moliere. (92-93) 
It is because, finally, we are in the 
illusion. A poster in colours where 
one reads, "Le Malade imaginaire, 
according to Moliere, by Claudette. 
Costumes by Cecile. Directed by 
Charlotte. Stage direction and 
accessories by Carmen. 11 Followed by 
the cast with Lulu in the role of 
Argan. But our play was in four acts. 
We did not succeed in recalling 
Moliere's interval. 
Claudette, compatriot and French political prisoner, who as 
an illustrator has access to pencil and paper in this 
biogenetic, agricultural laboratory begins to transcribe 
le Malade imaginaire ("d'apres Moliere", according to 
Moliere) from memory. In this way Moliere is written 
through a double intermediary : memory and Auschwitz, a 
writing through which can only radically transform the 
text. It is precisely because 11 nous sommes dans 
l 'illusion" (we are in the illusion) that art emerges 
altered, that "[dJans l 'obscurite, 
prenait une etrange resonance. 11 (92) 
une intonation juste 
([i]n the darkness, a 
correct intonation took on a strange resonance.) Trans-
scription of dramatic narrative, in this context, is the 
literal passage of Moliere and his dramatic text through 
the "grillage" of Auschwitz. 
Writing, rehearsing and staging Moliere in Auschwitz 
becomes a task fraught with practical difficulties which 
include the inability to access any theatrical artifice 
with which to accentuate the illusion. As the narrator 
points out, being ill with typhus, being racked by hunger 
and rehearsing in a dark and frozen barrack after work and 
after supper 11 [ ••• ] puisqu 'on disai t le souper pour deux 
cents grammes de pain dur et sept grammes de margarine 
[ ••• ] 
11 (92) (since one said supper for two hundred grams of 
hard bread and seven grams of margerine) further underlines 
these difficulties. In this way the shift from reality to 
dramatic fiction is inverted and the dramatic devices which 
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accentuate the boundaries between the two before Auschwitz, 
now cause them to blur. This is highlighted when the 
narrator describes the way the doctors' faces, "bilieux a 
merveille"(94) (marvellously bilious-looking), are made up 
in 11 [u]ne poudre jaune vert, dont je ne sais pas la 
composition, peut-etre un insecticide [ ... ] 11 (93) (a yellow 
green powder of which I do not know the composition, 
perhaps an insecticide) . 
Clearly the staging of Moliere in Auschwitz {and later 
in the narrative, in Ravensbruck) comes to represent the 
submission of the performative gesture - here, the dramatic 
text to the historical cleavage symbolised by the 
Auschwitz experience. As such, the theatrical gesture -
symbolically grafted onto the very testimonial narrative 
which attests to that rupture - 11 performs 11 as its own 
testimony to life in the concentration camp. It is also 
Moliere, who, although a critic of his own epoch, is the 
symbolic historical representative of the Classicist Mind 
and its cartesian conception of language and reason as a 
stable unchallenged syntagmatic relationship. This 
heritage is, in turn, subverted, reread and reperformed in 
Auschwitz 11 [ • .'.] sans que les cheminees aient cesse de 
fumer leur fumee de chair humaine [ .. J 11 { 96) . ( [ ... ] without 
the chimneys ceasing to smoke their smoke of human. 
flesh[ ... ]) Emphasised by the representation of the 
writing of the play within the Auschwitz laboratory which, 
as a laboratory represents the space where the paradigm of 
rationalist-empiricist thought reaches its apotheosis, the 
classicist and later rationalist conception of language, as 
system of fixed and stable meanings, is cast in doubt 
through its submission to the Lager. By narrating the 
production of the play against the background of crematoria 
burning human flesh, the tropes of figurative language and 
artificiality of theatrical devices refer self-consciously 
and perpetually back to their own illusory status as 
artifice. 
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TOMBSTONES AND TEXTS: MEMORY AS RESISTANCE, AS SURVIVAL 
In the description of and response to their triumphant 
production of le Malade imaginaire the narrator states that 
{c] 'est magnifique parce que quelques repliques de Moliere, 
ressurgies intactes de notre memoire, revivent inalterees, 
chargees de leur pouvoir magique et inexplicable. 11 ( 95) 
([i]t is magnificent because some of Moliere's lines, which 
resurged intact in our memory relive, unaltered, charged 
with their magical and inexplicable power.) Words, which 
have become inadequate signif iers and constantly point to 
their own demise as stable referents within literary 
narrative are at the same time a representation to a return 
to a reciting, commemorating and memorialising language. 
It is the ability for the literary tradition to function 
orally as a literal memorising and memorialising aid, that 
is evoked by the magical and inexplicable power of which 
the narrator speaks. 
The first volume characterises the loss of language as 
a crisis of naming. This volume, however, anticipates the 
loss of language as an amnesia, a forgetting. As such, the 
narrator volume characterises the fear of memory-loss 
precisely as a compulsion to name, to date, to locate, to 
recall. Thus, according to the narrator, to remember the 
literary text is to remain in language. This concern with 
the loss of memory is an expression of the effects of 
trauma on the faculty of recall and a narration of the 
past: 
Je pourrais dire la date exacte 
puisque CI etai t le soixante-septieme 
jour de notre arrivee et que nous 
avions pris beaucoup de peine a 
compter ainsi les jours a partir de 
l 'arrivee qui etait le mercredi 27 
janvier, pour essayer au moins de nous 
rappeler les dates. Les dates? 
Quelles dates et quelle importance 
cela avai t-il que ce soi t vendredi ou 
samedi, 1 'anni versaire de ceci ou de 
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cela? Les dates qu'il fallait se 
rappeler, c'etait la mart d'Yvonne ou 
la mart de Suzanne, la mart de Rdsette 
ou celle de Marcelle . . Nous voulions 
toujours etre en mesure de dire: << Une 
telle est morte le ... >> quand on nous 
le demanderait si jamais nous 
revenions. Aussi tenions-nous compte 
scrupuleux des jours. Il y avait de 
longues discussions entre nous quand 
nous n'etions pas d'accord sur le 
compte. Mais il me semble que notre 
compte etait juste. Nous verifiions 
cons tammen t : 
«Non, les cbiens, c'etait avant-bier, 
pas bier.>> Le dimancbe, les colonnes 
ne sortaient pas du camp. Cela 
donnait un repere et permettait de 
retablir le compte quand nous avians 
perdu le fil des jours. (57) 
I was able to say the exact date since 
it was the sixty ninth day since we 
arrived and because we had made a 
great effort to count thus the days 
from arrival, which was Wednesday 27 
January, in order to at least try to 
remember the dates. The dates? Which 
dates and what difference would it 
make if the birthday of so-and-so was 
on a Friday or Saturday? The dates we 
had to remember, were Yvonne's death, 
Suzanne's death, Rosette's death or 
Marcelle's. We always wanted to be in 
a position to say "So-and-so died on 
the ... " when we would be asked if we 
ever returned. We also kept a 
fastidious/meticulous count bf the 
days. We used to have long 
discussions between ourselves when we 
disagreed on a count. But it seems to 
me that our count was correct. We 
constantly verified: "No, the dogs, 
that was the day before yesterday, not 
yesterday." On Sundays, the columns 
never left the camp. That provided a 
point of reference and allowed us to 
reestablish the count when we had lost 
the thread. 
What is narrated is a concern for the very testimonial 
project itself. Poetry, drama, telephone numbers, dates 
provide the undiscriminated material of memory precisely in 
104 
order to bear witness after return. In this way, the 
narrator's compulsion to remember anticipates the 
survivor's self-imposed injunction to bear witness. 
In relation to an edification of memory as the 
anticipation of a testimonial narrative, the literal 
connotations of intertextual dialogue, of citation and 
rewriting come to be revealed. As a narrative which 
implicates other texts by citation, it is the simultaneous 
narration of a re-citation. Intertextuality, thus, is 
resuscitated through its engagement with orality. The 
literary text is presented, then, as an aid to memory, as 
the projection of a framework which would somehow offer 
narrative continuity after Auschwitz, when that continuity 
is breached. The received literary tradition is invoked by 
the narrator as a "mnemotechnics" (Yates, 1966: 11), a 
memorisation technique. As re-citation, intertextuality 
functions as an egalitarian impulse which provides an non-
discriminating text-based resource for memorisation. In 
this way, the text functions as a challenge to the elitist 
power-knowledge significations of canonic organisation. 
The narrator comments how the naming of places, dating 
of events, recreation of the topographic relations of metro 
maps and recitation of both poetry and drama from recall 
manifest a disregard for discriminating against different 
registers and genres which provide memory's matrix. She 
frames her re-citation exercises as a fear of losing her 
memory: 
Depuis Auschwitz, j'avais peur de 
perdre la memoire. Perdre la memoire, 
c'est se perdre soi-meme, c'est n'etre 
plus soi. Et j 'avais invente toutes 
sortes d'exercices pour faire 
travailler ma memoire: me rappeler 
tous les numeros de telephone que 
j'avais sus, toutes les stations d'une 
ligne de metro, toutes les boutiques 
de la rue Caumartin, entre 1 1 Athenee 
et le metro Havre-Caumartin. J'avais 
reussi, au prix d'efforts infinis, a 
me rappeler cinquante-sept poemes. 
J' avais tellement peur de les voir 
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SI echapper que je me les reci tais tOUS 
chaque jour, tous l'un apres l'autre, 
pendant 1 1 appel. J' avais eu tant de 
peine a 1 es retrouver ! Il m 1 avai t 
f allu parfois des jours pour un seul 
vers, pour un seul mot, qui refusaient 
de revenir. (124) 
Since Auschwitz, I am afraid of losing 
my memory. To lose ones's memory is 
to lose oneself, it is to no longer be 
oneself. And I invented all sorts of 
exercises to make my memory work: I 
recalled all the telephone numbers 
which I had known, all the stations on 
a metro line, all the shops on rue 
Caumartin between the Athenee and 
Havre-Caumartin metro station. I had 
succeeded, at the price of endless 
effort, to recall fifty seven poems. 
I was so afraid to see· them flee that 
I recited them all every day, all one 
after the other, during the roll-
calls. I had gone through much 
pain/effort to find them again. 
Sometimes it would take days to 
recover a single line, a single word 
which refused to come back to me. 
Literary text, as a narrative aid to reconstitute 
the processes of "common memory" which, anticipating the 
consecration of a testimonial narrative, is attached value 
in the context of the Lager because in its defiance of the 
dehumanisation campaign of the Lager, it accrues to it the 
potential for resistance. It is in the light of the 
signification of resistance that the narrator recounts how 
she trades her ration of bread for a copy of Le Misanthrope 
(the Miser}, another of Moliere's plays. Charged with the 
responsibility of reading the text to her compatriots, she 
receives a portion of each woman's bread ration to make up 
the one that she had bartered. 
The reading of the text functions as a collective and 
shared gesture of psychological and emotional upliftment, 
centred around the vocalising voice. Memorising the entire 
text, however, is revealed as an individual and solitary 
gesture which once again interrupts communion. This 
emphasises the isolation of the individual in the Lager, 
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stripped of the emotional and psychological resources of 
the past, while simultaneously constituting an emotional 
and psychological resource, however tenuous, within the 
Lager. This is illustrated when the narrator describes how 
memorisation exercises provide an emotional/psychological 
11 shield 11 in order to endure roll-call: 
J'ai appris Le Misanthrope par coeur, 
un fragment chaque soir, que je me 
repetais a l'appel du lendemain matin. 
Bientot j 'ai su toute la piece, qui 
durai t presque tout "1 1 appel. Et 
jusqu'au depart, j'ai garde la 
brochure dans ma gorge. (125) 
I learnt Le Misanthrope by heart, one 
fragment each evening, which I 
repeated at the roll-call of the 
following morning. And right until 
leaving, I kept the booklet under my 
collar/in my throat. 
If we recall philosopher Hannah Arendt's definition of the 
misanthrope as someone who 11 finds no one with whom he 'cares 
to share the world, that he regards nobody as worthy of 
rejoicing with him in the world and nature and the cosmos" 
(Arendt, 1973: 32) / the irony of the narration of the 
reading for her compatriots is emphasised. As a form of 
resistance, then, the function of the literary text is two-
fold: as a sharing, a communion of inmates, it functions as 
a collectively asserted resistance against the logic of 
Arendt' s misanthrope; as an internal resource for the 
individual it functions as an assertion of the will to 
remain, against all odds, human (Fine, 1986) . 
Framed as a meditation on the nature of relationships 
in the camps, interpersonal and intertextual, this volume 
consecrates a narration which engages with and addresses 
notions of what constitutes resistance in the Lager, how 
discourse of emotion is politicised and how canonicity is 
central to the transmissibility of the past as well as to 
the debated on historicisation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MESURE DE NOS JOURS 
Douleur, elle desunit, mais non pas d'une maniere visible 
(par une dislocation ou une disjonction qui serait 
spectaculaire) : d'une maniere silenciuse, faisant taire le 
bruit derriere les paroles. La douleure perpetuelle, perdue, 
oubliee. Ellene rend pas la pensee douloureuse. Ellene se 
laisse pas porter secours. Sour ire pensif du visage non 
devisageable que le ciel la terre disparus, le jour la nuit 
passes l'un dans l'autre, laissent a celui qui ne regarde 
plus et qui, voue au retour, ne partira jamais. 
(Maurice Blanchot L'Ecriture du Desastre, p.220) 
THE SURVIVOR'S LAST WORD 
After attempting to present memory of the 
concentration camp experience and its conflicting 
encounters with transmissability in the first and second 
volumes of the trilogy, the narrator returns, in the third 
and final volume of the trilogy, entitled, Mesure de nos 
Jours (Measure of our Days), to the survivors themselves in 
an attempt to examine the ways in which the survivor is 
implicated in narration of the silences, fragments and 
discontinuities of Holocaust narrative. 
The vignettes of Mesure de nos Jours are named after 
the survivors whose post-Auschwitz stories constitute the 
ensuing narrative. This gesture of commemorative naming: 
Gilberte, Mado, Marie-Louise, Ida, Loulou, Poupette, 
Germaine, Jacques, Gaby, Louise and Fran9oise, recalls the 
uniquely and painfully positioned survivor, who, emerging 
from the Lager alive, is passed over for the commemorative 
dedication reserved for the 11 true witnesses", the dead. 
Presented as (primarily) a collection of interviews in 
the first person, narrative voice functions in this text as 
the symbolic restitution of the "last word" to the 
survivor. Hence, this volume comes to re-embody Holocaust 
memory, disappropriated as experience from the survivor by 
competing narratives of collectivised and totalised 
versions of the past. 
testament to trauma, 
In this way, this text emerges as a 
to the difficult, and sometimes, 
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impossible task of mending a shattered life, and to the 
very materiality of the consequences of surviving and 
remembering. 
Each micronarrative, each survivor's story, comes· to 
be shown as emblematic, in its individual way, of the 
rupture, the discontinuities, the ruins, the scars and the 
phantoms which both haunt and animate the survivors who are 
often presented as merely 11 imitating" the gestures of 
living, expressed as "ce moi-la qui imite la vie" 24 (47) 
(that me there who imitates life} Written more than 
twenty years after the war, this text is seminal in the 
readings it produces which relate to the role of memory and 
language in the survivor's post-Auschwitz existence. 
By presenting the survivor as doomed-to-survive, that 
is, survival as pathology, I would say that Delbo's 
narrator contests the narrative hegemony of Holocaust 
testimonies which, in their linearity, stable subjectivity 
and seamless recourse to a unitary Memory, construct tragic 
and heroic narratives of inspiration, courage, triumph. 
The marginalised voices represented by these 
micronarratives articulate moral ambivalence regarding 
survival, survival as terminal illness; return as amnesia, 
and the experience of being shunned by local communities on 
return. Their narratives contest the possibilities of 
heroic action at the same time as they challenge facile 
labels of passivity and victimhood. As such these self-
presentations come to challenge the inspirational altruism 
of both heroic survivor narratives as well as Resistance 
narratives of courage and bravery. Without diminishing the 
immense importance of such narratives, or of their power 
precisely as testimony to astonishing human courage and 
bravery, I would say that this volume's presentations of 
the survivor and his/her existence, body and memory, 
constitute, rather, representations of rejected or 
historically silenced versions of survival. 
24 All quotations from Mesure de nos jours, in this 
chapter, will be referenced by page number only. 
109 
SURVIVOR MEMORY: THE TRAIN BACK AND THE BURIAL 
Towards the end of the text an event is recounted by 
Charlotte, the fictional/autobiographical narrator of all 
three instalments of the trilogy, which is central to the 
representations of the survivor in this narrative. The 
survivors / whose names appear throughout the trilogy as co-
deportees and inmates ·in Auschwitz, Raisko, and 
Ravensbruck, reunite almost two decades later in a vignette 
significantly entitled "L'enterrement" (185) (The burial). 
The title of this micro-narrative symbolically raises the 
question as to whether the past could be buried, whether 
memories could be laid to rest. The representations of the 
survivor which precede this vignette, suggest clearly that 
repression of the past only momentarily precedes its 
return. 25 
The reunited survivors take a train journey in order 
to attend the funeral of Germaine, survivor/compatriot and 
friend who has died of a terminal illness. The 
conversations which are narrated during this final train 
journey gather together the conceptual strands presented in 
the preceding narratives. Train journey, death, disease, 
loss and mourning - signif iers whose representations have 
been subverted after the Shoah - are superficially restored 
as cultural and social referents. However, since language 
has emerged through the grillage of the Auschwitz 
experience, the irony inherent in these 
generates another accumulation of meanings 
signif iers 
which are 
constituted in relation to the preceding narratives. In 
this way these referents can be read as the constitution in 
the narrative process itself of self-referential tropes of 
a common memory of Auschwitz. 
The central motif which unites these survivors is 
Germaine's terminal illness followed by her death. Perhaps 
25 See also Lacapra, 1994 and Friedlander, 1993 and 1994. 
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the representation of terminal illness can be understood as 
metaphoric reinsertion of the somatic presence of the 
survivor as the re-embodied memory of the-disfigurement and 
breakage which precedes his/her emergence from the Lager. 
I would also argue that the trope of terminal illness could 
be understood as a representation of the memory of 
Auschwitz as terminal disease. Such a representation 
gestures to the unredemptive materiality of the pain, 
trauma and loneliness of the survivor. Thus, Louise 
narrates how her husband's aches, pains, ailments and 
diseases cast him, twenty years later, as the eternal 
deportee and their home as an infirmary. (176) 
Marceline's story is the narration of survival as the 
repression of memory which returns each year in her body, 
as her "anniversaire de typhus" (183) (typhus anniversary). 
She recounts how her husband's scientific theories and 
explanations of the Holocaust translate into the belief 
that the psychological and physiological functioning of the 
human being is able to overcome even the most extreme 
trauma. "La preuve qu'il en est ainsi, he says, c'est que 
tu es revenue" (183) (The proof that is so is that you have 
returned) and that she should not be a 
"prisonnier" (prisoner) of "[c] es souvenirs terribles" 
(these terrible memories). (183) Yet every year, at more or 
less the same time, 
[ ... ] je suis prise d'une grosse 
fievre qui dure des jours. Aucun 
medicament n'y fait rien. Les 
analyses de laboratoire, les 
radiographies ne revelent rien. Mon 
medecin y perd son latin. Ma maladie 
n'a pas de nom. [ ... ] C'est 
inexplicable. Cela commence toujours 
de la meme' fac;:on violent mal de 
tete, maux de ventre, temperature qui 
monte d'un coup. (183) 
I am gripped by a great fever which 
lasts for days. No medication can do 
anything. Laboratory analyses and X-
rays do not reveal anything. My 
doctor loses his Latin to it. My 
sickness does ·not have a name. It is 
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unexplainable. It always begins in 
the same way: a violent headache, sore 
stomach and a temperature which rises 
all of a sudden. 
In, a radical inversion of the reading produced in the 
second volume's presentation of Le Malade imaginaire, 
repressed and traumatised memories re-emerge after 
Auschwitz in the body, locus of deep memory. If, in that 
volume, the dramatic narrative serves as a mnemonic of 
memory performed in the Lager, it is evoked in the present 
text rather as an amnesia. This micronarrative is 
essentially the narration of the need to forget the memory 
of Auschwitz and to continue despite surviving Auschwitz. 
As a project of amnesia, of forgetting the past, it is 
disrupted each year by this mystery illness which 
ressembles the typhus that the survivor has had in the 
camp. Here, Auschwitz as "imaginary" illness explodes the 
positivist epistemologies of medical science whose 
diagnostic labels in Latin are silenced in the face of 
incurable, inexplicable illness which is the return of the 
deep memory of Auschwitz. 
Readings which invoke survival as a "condition", as a 
pathology, urge the addressee to contemplate the difficult 
and painful assumptions 
imposed on the survivor 
{social and moral) which are 
and the culturally reproduced 
representations of the survivor and of victimhood. Hence, 
in this final instalment, the trilogy's title, Auschwitz et 
Apres, takes yet another meaning in its polysemic 
accumulation of signification: after Auschwitz the survivor 
is doomed to bear the traces of their experience in a post-
Lager milieu that reinforces isolation and the stigma of a 
rejected otherness. 
BURNT BOOKS, DEFUNCT WORDS: RETURN AS A FORGETTING 
There is a section in La Memoire et les Jours {Delbo, 
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1985) where the narration of the survivor's return and of 
his/her sense of possessing ruined or incoherent memories 
is in the form of poetic verse. The final stanza of the 
poem provides an important key which links the second and 
third volumes of Auschwitz et Apres and which outlines an 
ambivalence in the narrator's experience of memory, of the 
recollecting impulse, subsequent to return: 
Amon retour j'ai relu les poemes de 
Blaise Cendrars 
Je n'ai pas retrouve le vers qui avait affleure 
transf orme 
a ma memoire 
de la-bas. (40) 
On my return I reread the poems of 
Blaise Cendrars 
I did not retrieve the verse which had 
blossomed 
transformed 
by my memory 
of over there 
Central to this apparent repositioning of memory after 
Auschwitz is the dispersion of literary or poetic language 
as the means of "owning" or engaging one's memory, narrated 
in the previous volume. In that volume of the trilogy, the 
role of literature and of figurative language is shown to 
be an edification of memory, through the narration of the 
mechanics of memory, against the obliterating forces of the 
Lager. For the narrator, the loss of memory in the Lager 
"c'est se perdre soi-meme, c'est n'etre plus soi." (Delbo, 
1970b: 124) (is to lose oneself, is to no longer be 
oneself). Thus, memory in Auschwitz provides an 
overarching framework which provides a tenuous but 
important form of continuity "pour nous garder, pour ne 
pas nous laisser entamer, pour ne pas nous laisser 
aneantir." (52) (to keep ourselves, to not let ourselves be 
worn down, to not let ourselves be wiped out) This poem, 
however, testifies rather to a displacement of the memory 
which had been evoked in the camps. Now, poetic language, 
113 
in its self-presentation of the traces of Auschwitz and 
deferral in perpetuity to the Lager, can be metaphorically 
symbolised by the French poet's name which - bearing the 
trace of its submission to the Lager and being forcibly 
wrought through the simultaneous act of rereading and 
translating - attests to poetic language's inability to 
figure that experience. Poetic language passes through the 
fires of the crematoria, through the "blaze" of the 
Holocaust and emerges, like the victims, as "cinders", as 
the testifying trace of remains. Hence, once the narrator 
passes through the camp and returns, the memory that she 
thought she "possessed" reveals itself, along with the poet 
and the language which frames him, to be illusory. Poetic 
language, symbolically resumed in the poet's name, is 
reduced, like the survivor's memory, to cinders, to ashes: 
a negative presence that can only signal itself by signing 
its perpetual absence (Derrida, 1991: 39) . 26 
It is precisely in this refashioning of the ruined 
morphology of memory / which · emerges through the 
presentation of an ambiguous memory in Mesure de nos jours, 
that survivor memory is revealed, immediately after return, 
as an anguished and tortured forgetting. The moment of 
return marks a forgetting of everything that preceded 
Auschwitz. The narrator expresses this forgetting thus: 
Avec difficulte, par un grand effort 
de ma memoire --mais pourquoi dire: 
effort de la memoire, puisque je 
n 'avais pl us de memo ire? - - par un 
effort que je ne sais comment nommer, 
j'ai essaye de me souvenir des gestes 
qu 'on doi t faire pour reprendre la 
forme d' un vi vant dans la vie. 
Marcher, parler, repondre aux 
questions, dire ou l'on veut aller, y 
aller. J'avais oublie. L'avais-je 
26 Significantly Derrida's text is constituted as a 
polylogue examination into the presence, in voice-as-body and 
text-as-body, of the signifying presence of cinders. 
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jamais su? Je ne voyais ni comment me 
prendre ni par ou commencer. (11) 
With difficulty, through a great 
effort of my memory - - but why say 
"effort of memory" if I no longer had 
a memory? -- through an effort which I 
do not know what to identify as, I 
tried to remember the gestures which 
are made in order to take on t;:.he 
appearance of a living person who is 
alive? To walk, talk, answer 
questions, say where I want to go and 
go there. I had forgotten. Had I 
ever known? I knew neither how to 
start nor where to begin. 
The discontinuity of the Auschwitz experience is signalled 
as a breach with the anteriority of existing reference 
points which is, in turn, anticipated by a break with both 
words and gesture. As such language and action or the very 
way of being in the world is interrupted by the absolute 
incoherence of such an experience. Moreover, the 
presentation of a pre-Auschwitz memory which is wiped out 
contains the implicit suggestion that the concentration 
camp is the moment of the survivor's ontogenesis, an 
originating moment which radiates outwards from itself as 
a new beginning. Thus Gilberte responds to a repatriated 
deportee's question of "D'ou es-tu, toi?" (28) ("And you, 
where are you from?") in order to arrange her journey home 
with the response "D'Auschwitz" (28) ("From Auschwitz"). 
Mado presents Auschwitz as an untransgressable spacio-
temporal boundary, an originating moment with no 
anteriority: 
La-bas, nous avions tout notre passe 
[ ... ]. Chacun a raconte sa vie mille 
et mille fois, a ressuscite son 
enfance, le temps de ·la liberte et du 
bonheur pour s 'assurer qu 'il l 'avai t 
vecu, qu'il avait bien ete celui 
qui'il racontait. Notre passe nous a 
ete sauvegarde et rassurance. Et 
depuis que je suis rentree, tout ce 
que j'etais avant, tous mes souvenirs 
d'avant, tout s'est dissout, defait. 
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On dirai t que je l 'ai usee la-bas. 
D 'avant, il ne me reste rien. [. .. J 
Aujourd'hui, mes souvenirs, mon passe 
c'est la-bas. Mes retours en arriere 
ne franchissent jamais cette borne. 
Ils y butent. (SO} 
Over there, we had our entire past. 
Each of us recounted her life time 
after time, resuscitated her 
childhood, time of freedom and 
happiness in order to assure herself 
that it had been lived, that it had 
indeed been herself who recounted it. 
Our past was our safeguard, our 
assurance. And since I have returned, 
everything that I had been before, all 
my memories of before, everything has 
dissolved, is ruined. One would say 
that I used it up there. From before, 
nothing remains. [ ... J Today, all my 
memories, my past, are from over 
there. My flashbacks never cross over 
this boundary. They stumble against 
it. 
In a projection of the way that representation will 
emerge through conunon memory, language and its lexicon of 
words, like books, are 11 things 11 , material artifacts that 
the narrator can only employ much later to describe her 
experience. Over against this reference to the historical 
consciousness implicit in common memory, the historical 
moment of' return is narrated as conversely a moment of a 
"suspension d'existence" (12} (suspension of existence). 
Significantly this memory is represented as 11 l 'epoque ou il 
n'y avait pas de mots." (13} (the era when there were no 
words} . 
Importantly, it 
literary text which 
is once again 
reveals the way 




implicated in representing memory by emerging as the very 
site of a forgetting. Loss of memory and loss of language 
are articulated as an inability to discern what books 
represent, what activity they necessitate,· what meaning 
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they yield, and what role they perform. During the time 
following her return, the narrator writes, 
je regardais ces livres sans faire de 
relation entre des livres et la 
lecture. Des objets sans usage? Et 
puis je les oubliais et je retournais 
a mon absence" ( 14) 
I used to look at these books without 
making a connection between books and 
reading. Objects without a use? And 
then I used to forget about them and 
return to my absence. 
I would suggest that precisely by framing the loss of 
language and memory as a calling into question of the 
presence and function of the book, material and cultural 
artifact which comes through Auschwitz altered, unfamiliar, 
the literary text itself becomes a metonym for the 
explosion of epistemological frameworks through which 
meanings are produced. 
The absolute alterity of the book object can be 
understood to be a contestation of the very ways we read 
the post-Auschwitz world whose socio-cultural protocols, 
underpinned by Enlightenment notions of the contractual 
relation of the individual with knowledge and its reality. 
For the returning survivor these protocols are meaningless. 
So the books are placed on the table near the headboard and 
"restaient la sans que j 'aie seulement 1 'idee de les 
prendre. Longtemps, longtemps, les livres sont restes la, 
a ma portee, hors de ma portee. Longtemps. II (14) . 
(remained there without the idea of picking them up even 
enter my mind). Visitors, meanwhile, come and go bearing 
gifts of books and flowers, objects which are clearly 
described as having lost any referential signification for 
the survivor in this "present sans realite" (14) (present 
stripped of reality} . 
I would say, Adorne's original dictum - even in the 
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light of its reformulated expression - that to write poetry 
after Auschwitz is barbaric resonates powerfully in the 
narrator's presentation of Auschwitz as the eternal and 
definitive replacement of the purely poetic dimensions of 
the imaginary mode. Thus, in a succession of interrogative 
statements, which preface the narration of an episode where 
the narrator/survivor picks up her first book after 
returning, she asks: 
Qu'est-ce qui n'est pas a cote? N'ai-
je plus rien a trouver dans les 
livres? Sont-ils taus repetition 
futile, description jolie et imagee, 
suite de mots sans poids? (16) 
What is not beside? Did I no longer 
have anything to find in books? Are 
they all futile repetition, pretty 
description full of imagery, the 
result of empty words? 
The exercise in reading produces its own answer as a 
response to its own questions as well as to Adorno' s 
proposition. Once again, what is at stake in representing 
Auschwitz and, now, the narration of survival and of return 
is the inability to find stable meaning. Survival, here, 
highlights the radical contingency of language, of the 
production of meaning. After Auschwitz reality has 
outstripped its own ability to be represented and words, 
having been implicated in the reality of Auschwitz, are no 
longer innocent. Expressing this idea thus, the narrator 
comments that, 
[t]out etait faux, visages et livres, 
tout me montrait sa faussete et 
j'etais desesperee d'avoir perdu toute 
capacite d'illusion et de reve, toute 
permeabilite a l'imagination, a 
l'explication. Voila ce qui, de moi, 
est mart a Auschwitz. Voila ce qui 
fait de moi un spectre. (17) 
[e]verything was false, faces and 
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books, everything showed me its 
falseness and I despaired at having 
lost my capacity for illusion and for 
dreaming, all permeability of the 
imagination, of explanation. This is 
what, in me, died in Auschwitz. This 
is what makes me into a spectre. 
DISCONTINUITIES OF SURVIVAL 
A. DEEP MEMORY AND DREAMS OF RETURN TO AUSCHWITZ 
The survival of an event in extremis, its effects on 
language, identity, physical and mental health as well as 
on memory inform the representation of the post-Auschwitz 
existence which is narrated in this text. 
Significantly, one of the tropes of deep memory - the 
memory of extreme trauma which collapses narration and 
projects the survivor back to the Lager - employed in this 
text is that of recurring nightmares. Deep memory emerges 
in these nightmares as the enactment of the endless return 
to the camp. The dream of return to a pre-Auschwitz 
existence, the longed for reason to survive in order to 
return (Frankel, 1963) which had animated the dreams of 
inmates in Auschwitz recurs after liberation as a dream of 
an inverted return. After Auschwitz, the dream-images lead. 
back to the Lager. As we have seen in Chapter One, as 
tropes of the disruptions of deep memory in the 
reconstructed life-world of the survivor, displacing 
nightmares of impending return to Auschwitz are recounted 
time and again in survivor testimonies. 
During the train journey to Germaine' s funeral, a 
survivor recounts how "quand j'etais la-bas, je revais que 
j'etais a la maison et, depuis que je suis rentree, je reve 
que je suis la-bas." (201) (when I was there, I used to 
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dream that I was at home, since I have returned, I dream 
that I am there.) Another survivor describes a recurring 
nightmare which presents the survivor's relationship to the 
past as a suspension of free will and individual choice: 
Je suis en prison. On me laisse sortir 
sur parole et le soir, je reviens 
conune je l'avais promis apres avoir eu 
la tentation de m'evader toute la 
journee, apres avoir essaye de perdre 
le Chemin. Je n'y reussis jamais, le 
chem in abou tit touj ours a 1 a prison. 
Toujours le meme theme, dans des 
decors differents: tan tot la Sante, 
tant6t Romainville, tant6t une batisse 
que je ne connais pas, tant6t le camp. 
Le plus affreux, c'est le camp. Tu 
imagines cela, sortir d'Auschwitz et y 
retourner de soi-meme? C'est si 
horrible au moment ou je franchis les 
barbeles et ou je me rends compte que 
l'occasion de sortir ne se 
representera jamais plus; c'est si 
oppressant que je veux crier et je ne 
peux pas crier parce que la poitrine 
me fait mal. (200) 
I am in prison. I am allowed out on 
parole and in the evening, I come back 
as I had promised to do after being 
tempted to run away the entire day, 
after having tried to lose the way. I 
never manage to succeed, the path 
always .leads to/ends at the prison. 
Always the same theme, in different 
settings: sometimes la Sante, 
sometimes Romainville, sometimes an 
unfamiliar edifice, sometimes the 
camp. The most hideous is the camp. 
Can you imagine that, leaving 
Auschwitz and returning there by 
oneself? At that moment when I cross 
the barbed-wire, it so horrible and I 
realise that the opportunity to leave 
will never present itself, it is so 
oppressive that I want to shout and I 
cannot shout because my chest hurts 
me. 
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Implicit in this narrated sequence is the circular 
trajectory of the dream consciousness which anticipates 
freedom and imprisonment as successive and alternative 
modes of experience which radiate away from and back to 
Auschwitz. Through the suspension of free will, the dream 
presents the post-camp subconsciousness as automaton-like, 
as acting in accordance to a dictate other than individual 
choice. In turn, the ineradicable permanence of the camp 
in the survivor's existence is reinforced whilst the 
incommunicability of that permanence - and the paralysis 
which it evokes - is underscored. Clearly then, the will 
to return has to be reformulated in the light of having 
returned. In the death-camp, return functions as a 
projection of hope, survival, continuity. After 
liberation, after having returned, the self is threatened 
by deep memory's interjections by the same sense of 
disorientation and fragmentation which was experienced in 
the camps, projecting the survivor, thus, back to the 
Lager. 
B. DREAMS OF RETURN AS THE UNLISTENED TO STORY 
It would seem that, in the dream narratives of 
replacement in Auschwitz, another mechanism is operating. 
If Auschwitz has come to be shown as a radical challenge to 
the referential capacity of language, that is, to 
language's seamless ability to represent the realities to 
which it claims attachment, then the very reality of return 
has to be placed into question as a possible deception, as 
an illusory referent. Just as the logic of power in the 
Lager functions through the deception and dissimulation 
articulated through bureacratic language, the extension of 
that logic impacts on the survivor's post-camp life-world 
as a calling into question the very possibility of an 
after. The dream of never-ending returns to the death-camp 
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therefore functions as a challenge to the very materiality, 






Auschwitz to language and 
referentiality of return, 
representation 
even after 
In order to explore this phenomenon it is 
useful to turn to the account of the two recurring dreams 
which Primo Levi relates in two separate texts. 
The first dream is narrated in his first text which is 
an account of Auschwitz and his survival. (1962 :46) The 
second dream is narrated in his second text which is an 
account of his return to his hometown in Italy following 
liberation and finds resonance in Delbo' s Mesure de nos 
Jours in its exploration of post-Auschwitz existence and 
representation of the survivor. The initial dream is a 
recurring dream which Levi dreams whilst in Auschwitz. The 
dream anticipates how after his return, he will sit with 
his sister and friends and tell them about his experience 
in the Lager. The dream presents his listeners as unable 
to understand him, his words, and his story. Instead, they 
begin to speak amongst themselves of other things and 
finally rise and leave him without saying another word (to 
him). Levi's narrator then recounts how, after his return, 
his second recurring dream occurs as a dream within a 
dream. After Auschwitz he dreams that his return to 
family, home, wholeness is, itself, a dream, a chimeric 
fantasy: 
Now everything has changed to chaos; I 
am alone in the centre of a grey and 
turbid nothing, and now, I know what 
this thing means, and I also know that 
I have always known it; I am in the 
Lager once more, and nothing is true 
outside the Lager. All the rest was a 
brief pause, a deception of the 
senses, a dream; my family, nature in 
flower, my home. Now this inner 
dream, this dream of peace, is over, 
and in the outer dream, which 
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continues, gelid, a well-known voice 
resounds: a single word, not 
imperious, but brief and subdued. It 
is the dawn command of Auschwitz, a 
foreign word, feared and expected: get 
up, 'Wstawach'. (Ibid.:47) 
The narration of these dreams is the narration of 
return as displacement/re-placement. Return anticipates 







inverted continuity is 




to the Auschwitz 
narrated by Levi, 
a perpetual Sisyphean 
Lager. The memory of 
temporally. projects the 
narrator forward, in the first dream, and back, in the 
second dream, and in this way its narration creates a 
blurring between conscious states of waking and sleeping, 
dream and reality, before and after, departure and return. 
Narration of return is the telling of rupture (the- "brief 
pause"), of displacement, a moving between the inner and 
outer dream-realities and.disorientation. 
The narrator of La Mesure de nos Jours evokes this 
shifting re-placing consciousness of survivor dream 
narratives when she provocatively asks - in response to 
another survivor's statement that in Auschwitz she had 
dreamt of return and following return she dreams of 
Auschwitz - "[e]t si on passait du reve a la realite? La 
realite, oii: est-ce?" (202) (and if one passed from dream to 
reality? Reality, where is it?) Thus, through its very 
narration the return is placed in doubt, it is a "deception 
of the senses". 
I would suggest that the deception of return is not 
only a manifestation of a narration at the limits of 
representability but also a manifestation of a 
problematised reception, a refused reception of the 
survivor's story. Deep memory interrupts narratives with 
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its silences, its contestations and fragmentations, 
inserting into the progression of narrative an anti-
historicising, anti-narrativising impulse which subverts 
that which precedes and follows it. 
Historian Annette Wieviorka, suggests that following 
the war, historians had been unable to integrate the 
silences in survivor testimony into historical narratives 
and, she continues, therefore transposed this apparent 
"muteness" back onto the survivors: 
En matiere d'histoire, la notion 
d'indicible apparait cozrune une notion 
paresseuse. Elle a exonere 
l 'historien de sa tache qui est 
precisement de lire les temoignages 
des deportes, d'interroger cette 
source ma1eur de l'histoire de la 
deportation, jusque dans ses silences. 
Elle a transfere sur les deportes la 
responsabilite du mutisme des 
historiens. (1992: 165) 
In the subject of history, the notion 
of the unsayable appears as an idea of 
laziness. It has exonerated the 
historian from his/her task which is 
precisely to read the testimonies of 
the deportees, to interrogate this 
major source of the history of the 
deportation exactly in its silences. 
It has transferred onto the deportees 
the responsibility of the historians' 
muteness. 
Arguably, the figure of the historian could function as the 
metonymic representation of the post-Auschwitz world-as-
unwilling interlocutor. As tradional representative of 
the empirical, legalistic and forensic demands which 
underpin the production of historical truths, the 
historians' silence represents a resistance to the 
cognitive assimilation of the survivor's testimony which 
reproduces, in its structure and content, the disrupting 
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and fragmentary silences of deep memory's trauma. As such, 
the dream narratives of survivor testimony anticipate 
return as a dismissed testimony, an unlistened to story, 
which, in turn, places that very return into question. 
In part a function of both a dismissive and rejecting 
post-Auschwitz world represented by the unlistened to story 
and in part a function of the double-bind' s speaking 
silence/silent speaking structure from which a fragmented 
speaking emerges, the survivor's return to the 
possibility of life, to language is framed in this 
narrative as an experience of extreme alienation and 
profound loneliness. Hence, Gilberte, survivor/narrator 
of one of the volume's micronarrati ves, describes the 
unacknowledged and unacknowledgeable return as 11 cette 
solitude intolerable" ( 24) (this intolerable loneliness) 
which continuously plunges the survivor back into the 
hermetic Auschwitz Lager. 
C. RETURN DISRUPTED BY DEEP MEMORY 1 S TEMPORALITIES 
Return from Auschwitz anticipates the experience of 
life after Auschwitz as an absence, as "suspension 
d'existence" (12) (suspension of existence). An 
unrecuperable continuity with pre-Auschwitz frames of 
reference, represented by a loss of memory, is reinforced 
in representations of the survivor's temporal 
consciousness. By expressing the experience of temporality 
as a caesura the survivor is presented as having been 
displaced from one hermetic space to another: from the 
sealed off experience of the Lager to a return to a world 
whose experience is described as "un monde a part" (13) (a 
world apart) . 
The representations of return in this volume present 
deep memory as an immanent present time of the Lager whose 
temporal di.mensions of a simultaneous compression and 
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suspension suggest that its anti-historical dimension 
perpetually disrupts the survivor's experience of having 
returned. Thus Gilberte narrates this disruption in her 
inability to discern either the point of departure marked 
by the consciousness of a moment or the passage of time 
that has passed since that moment: 
Depuis ... Jene sais pas. Jene fais 
rien. Si on me demandait ce qui s'est 
passe depuis le retour, je repondrais: 
rien. [ . .. J Je me repete pour m' en 
assurer qu 'il y a vingt-cinq ans que 
nous sommes rentres, sinon je ne le 
croirais pas. Je le sais comme on 
sait que la terre tourne, parce qu'on 
l'a appris. Il faut y penser pour le 
savoir. ( 41) 
Since ... I do not know. I do nothing. 
If one asked me what has happened 
since returning, I would respond: 
nothing [ ... ] I repeat to myself in 
order to reassure myself that it is 
twenty five years since we came back, 
if not I would not believe it. I know 
like it is known that the earth turns, 
because it has been learnt. It is 
necessary to think about it in order 
to know it. 
By introducing the temporal deictic "depuis" (since) and 
then literally disrupting its marking of an instant by 
following its utterance with three points de suspension, 
suspension points, the narrator emphasises the primacy of 
deep memory's presence in the narration of return. This is 
highlighted by the antagonism between deep and common 
memory which is invoked in 





(knowledge) and their disruption by "depuis" (since) which 
tails off, reinforced by the negation of "rien" (nothing). 
Mado's narration reveals the day of deportation as the 
moment which marks a continuity with the temporality of the 
Lager. but not with a prior te~poral mode. That day 
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represents "le dernier jour de ma vie ... Je n'ai pas change 
d'age, je n'ai pas vieilli. Le temps ne passe pas. Le 
temps s'est arrete. (52) (the last day of my life ... I am 
the same age, I have not aged. Time does not pass. Time 
has stopped.) Once again the points de suspension, the 
suspension marks literally punctuate the narrative as an 
end-of-history consciousness which is revealed in so many 
of these narrations. 
It becomes clear that in the representation of these 
survivors' post-Auschwitz temporal consciousness, the very 
notion of return begins to signify the subversion of its 
implicit meaning: the movement in time which marks a 
retrieval of continuity or the moment of a new beginning. 
As such, deep memory, represented in the survivor's 
temporal consciousness, seems to preclude both survival 
and return. In its radical breaching of an unproblematic 
historical existence, deep memory, expressed in a collapse 
of the consciousness of unfolding temporality, presents 
these versions of survival as the absence of life. It is 
precisely the presentation of animating a temporal rupture 
which informs the representation of deep memory described 
by Mada: 
Les gens croient que les souvenirs 
deviennent flous, qu'ils s'effacent 
avec le temps, le temps auquel rien ne 
resiste. C' est cela, la difference; 
c'est que sur moi, sur nous, le temps 
ne passe pas. Il n'estompe rien, il 
n'use rien. Je suis morte a Auschwitz 
et personne ne le voit. (66) 
People believe that memories become 
blurred, that they are erased with 
time, time against which nothing can 
hold out. This is exactly the 
difference; that over me, over us, 
time does not pass. It wipes nothing 
out, it wears nothing down. I have 
died at Auschwitz and nobody sees it. 
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The shedding skin metaphor examined in Chapter One, 
metonymic metaphor for the body-as-memory or the embodied 
memory of la memoire profonde returns in this narrative to 
present survival as the return of death in Auschwitz. This 
presentation would suggest that the survivor is condemned 
to survive for if deep memory, as memory of the senses, is 
inscribed in the corporeal presence of the survivor it can 
never be erased nor change in form nor impact. 
D.· THE GHOST/WRITER RETURNS 
Central to the survivor narratives in this text is the 
representation of return - and the narration of return - as 
a disorientation and displacement. Return comes to signify 
a threat to the very integrity of the survivor's being in 
her/his experience of life as rupture. Significantly, 
the French text repeatedly employs the term revenant 
(ghost), in self-representations of both survivor and the 
dead. Revenant, in its polyvalent resonance in French, 
comes to incorporate both significations of a ghost, a 
material apparition which ressembles a dead person and as 
re-venant, a person who returns, comes back again. In its 
ambiguous and multiple meanings it can also be read as the 
presence of the Lager which perpetually returns. 
The figure of the revenan t becomes an important trope 
through which the survivor's problematic self-
representation. as well as his/her temporal experience of 
present time which is predicated on a forgetting of the 
pre-Auschwitz past and a re-placing remembrance of the 
eternally present past of the concentrationary universe is 
revealed. The figure of the revenant clearly highlights 
the survivor's experience of alienation and a 
problematisation of the historical present time of 
narration. Indeed, the very concept of a ghost calls 
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attention to the narrative construction of itself as a 
representational device, a likeness. A signifier of 
similarity, of duplication, and of absent materiality, the 
ghost gestures to the same disembodying splitting operated 
by the Lacanian mirror. Hence, when Mado narrates that Je 
suis autre ( 60) (I am other) , she articulates the 
survivor's experience of fragmented subjectivity, the 
returning self as disembodied from the pre-Lager past and 
the post-Lager liberation. (Hoppe, 1984) Return becomes a 
"ghosting" of another self of which there remains no trace. 
This is clearly highlighted in the following extract: 
Comment me rehabi tuer a un moi qui 
s'etait si bien detache que je n'etais 
pas sure qu'il eut jamais existe? Ma 
vie d'avant? Avais-je eu une vie 
avant? Ma vie d'apres? Etais-je 
vivante pour avoir un apres, pour 
savoir ce que c'est qu'apres? (14) 
How do I get reaccustomed/used to a 
self which had detached itself so well 
that I was uncertain if it had ever 
existed? My life before? Did I have a 
life before? My life after? Was I 
alive to have an after, to know what 
an after is? 
The characterisation of the survivor as ghostly apparition 
embeds into the narration an explicit expression of the 
sheer arbitrariness of survival, of having accidentally 
returned from certain death. This expression emerges in 
the same moment as those who did not survive are named: 
[ ... ] Il faudrait expliquer 
l'inexplicable 
expliquer 
pourquoi Viva qui etait si forte 
est-elle morte 
et non pas moi 
pourquoi Mounette 
qui etait ardente et fiere 
est-elle morte 
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et non pas moi 
pourquoi Yvonne 
qui etait resolue 
et non pas Lulu [ ... ] (78) 
It would be necessary to explain 
the inexplicable 
to explain 
why Viva who was so strong 
died 
and not me 
why Mounette 
who was so passionate and proud 
died 
and not me 
why Yvonne 
who was so resolved 
and not Lulu 
This extract clearly highlights how the silencing guilt of 
the survivor operates in its subversion of the imputation 
of all meaning to survival precisely in its search for 
meaning ( "expliquer 1 1 inexplicable", explain the 
inexplicable) . The narrator's expression of arbitrary 
return becomes, at the same time, a ritualised naming 
underlined by the incantational refrain of "pourquoi" 
(why) and "non pas moi" (not me). These names, in turn, 
assume their own signifying presence in the text as the 
eternal "true witnesses" whose stories are imbricated in 
the survivor narratives by the ghost-writer who is the 
witness by proxy, the survivor/narrator. 
The representation of the survivor/narrator as ghost-
writer which emerges here assumes particular significance 
in this text where the survivor is simultaneously 
represented as the ghost (returns from certain death) who 
narrates as well as the narrator who bears witness on 
behalf of the dead. The ambiguity which emerges in the 
dual signification of the image of the ghost-writer is 
further underlined by Delbo' s theorisation of the two 
memories, deep and common, which animate the survivor who 
moves in between two spaces, two temporalities. 
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The metaphor of the ghost-writer is revealed in the 
survivor/narrator's presentation of repatriation as the 
progressive inability to distinguish dead compatriots from 
living survivors or from the crowds of people awaiting 
their repatriation on ~rrival in Paris. This presentation 
clearly anticipates the ambivalent representations of the 
survivor both as a medium through which the dead speak as 
well as one who occupies a· world in-between. (9) Quite 
literally a medium, the narrator addresses her friends who 
died in Auschwitz in direct speech, as present addressees 
and, as such, presciently anticipates the ontological 
dilemmas of survival and return 11 Viva, ou es-tu? Non, tu 
n'etais pas dans l'avion avec nous. Si je confonds les 
mortes et les vivantes, avec lesquelles suis-je, moi ? 11 (10-
11) {Viva, where are you? No, you were not in the aeroplane 
with us. If I confuse the dead with the living, with whom 
exactly am I?). At the same time the narrator anticipates 
her isolation, her own unacknowledged return, from the 
world to which she returns by concluding that she herself 
has become transparent I ghostly I II [ • • •) j I etais aussi 
transparente, aussi irreelle, aussi fluide qu'elles." (10) 
(I was as transparent, as unreal, as fluid as they). 
Ultimately, these representations of the survivor as 
spectral presences, narrate in a very immediate and literal 
manner the returning survivor's radical· isolation from 
human community, from intimate contact. As the 
micronarrati ve of Ida reveals, she returns after having 
lost her entire family at Auschwitz. 11 Il ne me restai t 
aucun parent, tous avaient ete pris[,) 11 she writes, "[t)ous 
etaient morts la-bas." (117) (I had no remaining relatives, 
everyone had been taken, everyone died there.) By 
repeating that she has no surviving family or relatives Ida 
emphasises that nothing remains to which she can return. 
Any tenuous memory of a pre-Auschwitz past is negated by 
the extermination of any remaining witness to that past. 
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III. ENDING WITH RETURN 
By ending this volume with the survivor's return, 'the 
.interpretative limits of texts of the 
modulated by the survivor's resonating, 
story. Eli Wiesel, articulates 
Holocaust are 
if fragmented, 
this idea of 
reappropriating survivor's memory as a way to underline the 
perpetual and incommunicable isolation of the survivor 
after Auschwitz in an essay entitled, A Plea for the 
Survivors. By presenting representation as a cognitive 
abyss which will always separate the survivor from the 
addressee, Wiesel implies that the limits of interpretative 
and theoretical possibilities of readings are produced 
through the representation of the breach: 
The survivor speaks in an alien 
tongue. You will never break its 
code. His works will be of only 
limited use to you. They are feeble, 
stammering, unfinished, incoherent 
attempts to describe a single moment 
of being painfully, excruciatingly 
alive - the closing in of darkness for 
one particular individual, nothing 
more and perhaps much less. Between 
the survivor's memory and its 
reflection in words, his own included, 
there is an unbridgeable gulf. The 
past belongs to the dead, and their 
heirs do not recognize themselves in 
its images and its echoes. [ ... ] A 
novel about Auschwitz is not a novel, 
or it is not about Auschwitz. One 
cannot imagine Treblinka, just as one 
cannot reinvent Ponar. (Wiesel, 
1978:198) 
Here the restitution of the survivor's tongue/language (a 
linguistic polyvalence which emerges in the use of the 
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French word "la langue") as the re-embodyment of memory 
coincides with the limits of representation and 
interpretation of survivor narrative. 
By examining questions relating to healing trauma, to 
the retraumatisation of the unlistened-to-story and to the 
return of deep memory within a narrative structured through 
a series of separate yet thematically interlinked 
conversations, interviews / anecdotes and meditations in 
prose and poetry, Delbo' s text once again manifests a 
resistance to a teleological narration. In this way 1 the 
volume incorporates into its very structure a contestation 
of the addressee's or reader's expectations from narrative 
which serves, in turn, to highlight the ways that silences 
of the survivor are produced: as response to a disbelieving 
post-war world which seeks the kinds of essentialist 
meanings that can be anchored in foreclosed narratives of 
the past. Over against the representation of silence as 
response to the unwilling addressee, this volume presents 
survivor silences as an obviation of healing through 
"mastery", through a telling of the memory of trauma. The 
narration of the memory of trauma simultaneously becomes 
the narration of memory as trauma and retraumatisation. 
This study has 
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AFTERWORDS 
attempted to demonstrate how 
representations of personal memory contest disembodying and 
overarching historical truths while investigating these 
memories, often fragmented and dislocated, within the 
responsible limits of a reality which underpins that truth. 
At the same time this examination has attempted to approach 
the traces of Holocaust memory as a supplementary reading 
to the history which mediates it and which it mediates. 
By setting up a theorisation of survivor memory as 
embodied inscription in Chapter One I have tried to 
construct a conceptual framework as an interpretative 
approach to the discontinuities of silent memory. Besides 
recognising the important role that the body plays in 
transacting violence (Feldman, 1991), presenting the body 
as the material locus of memory recalls us to the way that 
corporeality is inextricably bound to metaphysical 
conceptions of human existence. (Amery, 1986:28) Thus, by 
conflating memory with body, I have attempted to 
demonstrate that remembering the body's violation becomes 
a double remembering by gesturing both to the violation of 
the humanity of the individual and to the trauma of that 
violation which remains both hidden and immanent in the 
silences of memory. 
In the second Chapter I have outlined the 
contradictory impulses represented by survivor silence and 
attempted to examine how these paradoxical urges to testify 
and to remain silent are fundamental to the narration of 
the memory of trauma. In turn, the ways that tropes of 
silence and of language are implicated in the radical 
alienation, powerlessness and dehumanisation of the 
individual in the Lager are examined. 
Thematically counterpointed to the first volume, my 
analysis of the second volume in Chapter Three has tried to 
investigate the meanings of "relationship", of 11 dialogue 11 , 
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as a narrative strategy of memory and as a way to highlight 
the rupture signified by Auschwitz. Telling the story of 
the past, of existence in the Lager and of relationships 
with other camp inmates proceeds through a systematic 
rewriting of a literary tradition as a way to insert into 
that tradition the absolute breach represented by the 
Auschwitz experience. 
I have tried to demonstrate in the final chapter that 
the displacements of memory and silence are often enacted 
in the reception of testimonies. By presenting survival 
itself as an essentially disturbing and threatening state 
of being I have attempted to investigate how 
displacement/displacing mechanisms occur in the 
transmission and reception of testimony and how these 
mechanisms are constructed as threatening to a collective 
memory of the past. 
Now, more than ever, as survivors pass on, and 
memories of the past are no longer living memories, the 
difficult questions of historical context and of historical 
relevance are inevitably raised when an examination of 
silenced/silent fragments of memories is undertaken. 
Annette Wieviorka indirectly responds to Eli Wiesel's 
description, at the beginning of this study, of the 
contemporary era's literature being, primarily, one of 
testimony, whose memory of the past serves a vision of the 
future, with her own observations on the changing forms and 
functions of testimony. ( 1992: 161-166) In the period 
following the Second World War different perspectives and 
agencies collectively informed the way the past was 
represented: victims, survivors, perpetrators, bystanders, 
Resistance fighters and collaborators provided testimonies 
which would function as necessary historical records 
enabling the essential construction of an enduring body of 
knowledge about the genocide. (Wieviorka, 1992:161) Today, 
according to Wieviorka, testimony does not have to realise 
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these events, its function is 11 les maintenir presents. Il 
doit etre un vecteur de la transmission pour les 
generations d' apres". · (1992: 161) (to maintain them as 
present. It must be a vector of transmission for the 
generations after) . 
Delbo has commented that one of the reasons for 
writing Aucun de nous ne reviendra in 1945 and then placing 
the manuscript aside for twenty years before publishing it 
was to "see if it would withstand the test of time, since 
it had to travel far into the future." (Houlding, 1995:3) 
Elsewhere, in her impassioned condemnation of the atrocity 
and horror of the Gulag she observes: 
[n]ous, victimes d'un fou sanguinaire, 
nous qui pensions que la fin du fou 
sanguinaire signifiai t la fin du 
systeme concentrationnaire, il nous 
faut maintenant vivre avec cette 
veri te-la: il y a encore des camps. 
Verite insupportable. (1995:137) 
[w] e, victims of a bloodthirsty 
madness, we who thought that the end 
of the bloodthirsty madness meant the 
end of the concentrationary system, we 
now have to live with this truth: 
there are more camps. Unbearable 
truth. 
Contained in these statements is the belief that if memory 
serves a vision of the future, implicit in such vision is 
a certain redemptive view of the past. (Benjamin, 1968) 
The question is raised: how can the fragments and shards of 
memory of an event of unimaginable proportions contain any 
such vision? It would seem to me that, while we can be 
aware of the inappropriateness of historical comparison, 
the methodology of examinations of memory can inform other 
readings and understandings of the politics and poetics of 
the memory of trauma. Such understandings could be 
imported into other historical contexts. 
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Clearly, there remains a profound tension, often 
covered over, between personal memory, collective memory, 
public memory, popular memory and historical practice. Yet, 
at the same time, I would say that it is necessary for such 
investigations of memory to remain sensitive to the ways in 
which they key into debates of historicisation or 
historical relativism. As this study has progressed, the 
notion of investigating personal memory has taken on very 
different meanings in the light of a personal interest and 
active observation of the unfolding historical process of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. 
{Grunebaum-Ralph, 1996, 1997} This process has seen the 
emergence, in public spaces, of debates on memory, history, 
truth and justice. The very public and visually immediate 
way that these questions in the form of open and 
televised hearings - are raised and engaged with testifies 
to the ongoing tensions which emerge between personal, 
public and collective memory; academic and official 
historical practice; the establishment of forensic, 
juridical and historical Truth and truths. At the same 
time the individual testimony, the personal and devastating 
effects of trauma are often ellided in service of 
specifically nationalistic or totalising historical 
narratives. Holocaust memory itself, has been implicated 
in this process in a very peculiar way: it underpins a move 
in historical and certain political circles to relativise 
the past in South Africa. (Braude,1996} The question which 
I have been asking myself is how would Delbo comment on the 
role of memory in collective examinations of the past, in 
South Africa? How would she have her testimony to the past 
read in such a context? What does her theory of embodied 
memories mean in this context? How can navigating the 
difficult and sometimes contradictory representations of 
personal memory in Delbo's texts be modulated by ethical 
considerations? 
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This examination of the representations of the memory 
of torture, trauma and atrocity has attempted to 
investigate the ways that personal memory intervenes in and 
facilitates its own narration. What emerges is a testimony 
to the ways that remembering atrocity threatens to subvert 
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